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1Introduction
I said nothing. She lifted me on to her shoulder. I could still see the head of the
woman. I could still hear the voices of passionate gardens, _couldstill hear their
sunflower cantatas. I saw delicious girls dancing tarantellas infields of comets. The
woman's head turned to give me a last smile before she vanished altogether in a
Milky Way of Music. The air became void of riddles. I heard the last notes of a flute
adagio floating across a lake of green mirrors. Mum took me home over the mud and
wreckage of the street, over the mild deluge, under an arpeggio ofwatery stars. She
was silent. I smelt the gutters, and the rude plaster of the corroded houses. Then all I
was left with was a world drowning in poverty, a mother-of-pearl moon, and the long
darkness before dawn.l
1. On the General Strategy
The underlying aim of the six essays in this thesis is to contribute to further
understanding of the problem of poverty. That is needed in a world where 494 million
individuals are deprived of adequate diet and a much larger number of people suffer
from inadequate shelter and clothing.s In these introductory remarks, though, I shall
not ponder on whether I have succeeded or failed in adding some relevant knowledge
to the debate on this problem, but rather sketch the general strategy of the thesis.
I am concerned about the fact that many people are suffering immensely, and so are
most other people that I discuss this issue with. In my view, this concern reflects (at
least partly) the acceptance of some deeper ethical values, and, thus, is not only the
image of a particular taste. (In the words of Bertrand Russell, I tind myself incapable
of believing that all that is wrong with the problem of poverty is that we do not like
1 B. Okri, The Famished Road (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), p. 308.
2 FAO, Fifth World Food Survey (Rome: FAO, 1985).
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it.3) In the thesis, then, I aim to clarify these underlying ethical values, and, moreover,
elaborate on how to formalise the various normative positions that we may take up in
a discussion of this problem.
The clarification of the underlying values of the concept of poverty may serve various
purposes. First, and most important, it makes transparent the inevitable connection
between this topic and normative reasoning. A characterisation of the problem of
poverty needs to take place within a normative framework, and the normative
framework that we take up in this debate will define the concept of poverty. Second, a
clarification of the various feasible normative positions may reveal an overlapping
consensus on certain aspects of the problem, and may, thereby, indicate a fruitful
starting point for further discussion. Finally, a deeper understanding of the internal
structure of the various positions can elucidate the implications of the problem of
poverty for individual and social choices, and, thereby, contribute to a discussion of
consistency in individual behaviour and public policy.
Some formalisation may be needed in a discussion of the internal structure of a
normative framework. A normative position may be characterised by certain axioms,
and formal reasoning may contribute to reveal a tension between various seemingly
appealing axioms. Thus, in some cases, a rigorous analysis may demand us to
reconsider our present position on normative questions, and, thereby, contribute to an
improved understanding of the line of reasoning at issue. Moreover, a formal
representation of the underlying normative framework is needed in order to be able to
measure the problem of poverty. In this process, the demand for precision may clarify
substantial difficulties that may easily be overlooked in an informal discussion, that
may be, by way of illustration, the complexity of the concept of well-being and the
difficulty of claiming completeness in nonnative considerations.
Hence, the general strategy of this thesis is to throw some light on the fundament of
the idea of poverty by pursuing clarification and formalisation of underlying ethical
values. This project involves considerations of various related matters, and I shall in
the following elaborate somewhat on the content of the six essays.
3 See D. Wiggins, Needs. Values. Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) for a discussion of the view of
Russell.
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2. On the Content
In the first essay - 'The Concept of Poverty and Normative Reasoning' - I consider the
concept of poverty within various deontological and teleological frameworks. In each
case, I indicate a possible interpretation of the poverty line. Within the classical
utilitarian framework, the poverty line may be interpreted as a criterion for selecting
out a group of people with particularly intense desires; within the Kantian framework
it may be interpreted as a criterion for selecting out the group of people who
experience situations where they are treated merely as means. Thus, our concern for
the problem of poverty may reflect a concern for the absence of goodness and
presence of badness in some people's lives (which we may assume are indicated by
the presence of intense desires) or for the presence of unfairness in society (which we
may assume is indicated by the fact that some people are treated merelyas means).
Evidently, these two approaches may overlap in the identification of the poor
population, but, nevertheless, they represent rather different positions on this issue.
The Kantian criterion is rather vague, and in the essay I pursue a further
understanding of this criterion within the framework of Rawls+ Inspired by the
second principle of justice of Rawls, I suggest to define people as poor (in the context
of resource allocation issues) when they have less than a reasonable share of the
resources in society. Obviously, the further question is how to define a reasonable
share of the resources, and in this respect I consider the problem of acquiring
plausible assumptions on the length of the period of time over which this definition
ought to cover and on the appropriate spatial perspective for the Rawlsian framework.
I have no definite results to offer, but I believe that the essay sketches a reasonable
framework for this type of discussions.
'Rationality, Value, and Well-Being', the second essay of the thesis, is only indirectly
related to the problem of poverty. The essay aims to validate the possibility of making
interpersonal comparisons of well-being, which is an important premise for any
discussion of the idea of poverty. The strategy of the essay is to indicate the close link
between the conventional framework of rational choice theory and a reasonable
framework for interpersonal comparisons of well-being. It is argued that the line of
reasoning of pure positivism has to be abandoned in a discussion of the underlying
4 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) and Political Liberalism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
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foundation of rational choice theory, and that the appropriateness of the axioms of
consistency and completeness (at least partly) depends on whether or not people
believe that there are valuable and disvaluable objects in life.
In general, it seems reasonable to claim that most people are not ethical nihilists, and,
thus, it becomes of a certain interest to discuss the perceived nature of the valuable
and disvaluable objects. Two conclusions emerge from debating this issue in the
essay. First, the axiom of completeness in rational choice theory is less innocuous
than frequently assumed; people probably face non-trivial choices where there is no
'best' element in the set of alternatives. Second, the unrestricted desire theory does not
offer an adequate understanding of the concept of well-being, because there are many
other objects (than desire fulfilment) that belong to the realm of value.
Both conclusions are important for a discussion of interpersonal comparisons of well-
being. The presence of incompleteness should make us more humble in debating this
question, and cause us to avoid a one-dimensional delineation of the concept of well-
being. On the other hand, the rejection of the unrestricted desire theory as an
appropriate representation of the concept of well-being should lead us to reject the
claim of the ordinalists (to wit that we are unable to make meaningful interpersonal
comparisons of well-being). We can observe the presence or absence of many
valuable and disvaluable objects in a person's life, and, therefore, we can make
reasonable statements on this issue. In particular, the claim of the ordinalists seems
outlandish in a discussion of immense suffering and destitution, and, thus, the
problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being should not pose a problem for
our discussion of these issues.
The link between the idea of poverty and the Rawlsian framework is discussed further
in the third essay - 'The Distribution Problem and Rawlsian Reasoning'. The main
claim of this essay is that the second principle of justice of Rawls has been wrongly
translated in the formalliterature on welfare economics and social choice theory. The
second principle of justice is concerned with the well-being of the least advantaged
segment, and, thus, does not - as frequently argued - assign dictatorial power to the
person in the worst-offposition in society. This distinction is important, and the focus
on a leximingroup rule makes the Rawlsian position more plausible than it is in the
'disguise' of the conventionallexiInin rule.
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However, there is a difficulty with this approach, to wit how to understand the least
advantaged segment in society. Various definitions are considered in the essay, but it
turns out that there is only one line of reasoning that makes the Rawlsian
leximingroup rule a genuine alternative to the leximin rule. This line of reasoning
imposes an external cut-off line dermed on income on the analysis (i.e. a cut-off line
that is independent of the income distribution under consideration), and identifies the
least advantaged segment as those who have less income than this minimum stipend.
Within the Rawlsian framework, the appropriate level of the minimum stipend is to
be decided in a primordial position of equality, but this issue is not pursued further in
the essay. (The claim of Rawls on this issue is that the minimum stipend is to be
considered as the level of income above which any further income is of no
fundamental importance in the lives ofpeople.)
The minimum stipend may be interpreted as a poverty line, where people below this
line are poor because they lack a reasonable share of the resources in society. Hence,
the Rawlsian leximingroup rule represents a position where the improvements in the
conditions of the poor are assigned lexicographic priority in social choices. However,
in general we should not expect agreement on the weight that ought to be assigned to
the interests of the least advantaged segment in society, and, thus, it is of importance
to outline an approach to the poverty problem that may embrace various positions on
this issue. That is the aim of the next two essays - 'On Subgroup Consistency in
Poverty Measurement' and 'A New Approach to Normative Poverty Measurement'-
where the clarification of a general basis for a normative representation of the
problem of poverty is pursued (without considering how the fact that some people in
society may enjoy a high level of well-being should be taken into account in a
comprehensive social welfare judgement).
'On Subgroup Consistency in Poverty Measurement' clarifies a misunderstanding in
the present poverty measurement literature. It has been claimed that the Sen-measure
and its variants are not well suited for poverty analysis, because they violate the
subgroup consistency axiom.t However, this claim is unfounded, and the underlying
line of reasoning is based on a misrepresentation of the approach of Sen. The concept
of reference group plays an important role in the Sen-measure, by defining the
structure of the physical and psychological interconnections in the society in question.
S See Foster, J., Greer, J., and Thorbecke, E., "A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures"
Econometrica, 42 (1984) and Sen, A., "Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurements",
Econometrica, 59 (1976).
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In the approach of Sen, it is assumed that the well-being of a person depends on the
well-being of the other members of the reference group. Thus, it is necessary in a
discussion of this framework to make the appropriate distinction between subgroups
and reference groups, and by doing that in this essay, I prove that the Sen-measure is
a subgroup consistent poverty measure. Moreover, I extend the framework to also
cover cases which innate a complex structure of reference groups.
The present poverty measurement literature faces some deep _difficulties, and in 'A
New Approach to Normative Poverty Measurement' I outline a framework that deals
with these problems. First, the suggested framework provides a reasonable approach
to the measurement of poverty in cases where population size differs; second, it
clarifies the distinction between factual and normative considerations in poverty
measurement; third, it makes cardinalisation of poverty measurement more relevant
by reporting on the problem of poverty in an intuitively appealing way; fourth, it adds
understanding to the question about discontinuity at the poverty line, and allows for
flexibility in the analysis on this issue; fifth, it provides a cardinal understanding of
the parameter values present in normative poverty measurement, and, sixth, it outlines
a cardinal complement to the traditional approach on ordinal poverty rankings. In
sum, these improvements contribute to alleviate the present arbitrariness in normative
poverty measurement, by making it possible to people to respond to normative
choices in poverty measurement in a way that is in compliance with their normative
position on this issue.
The thesis is closed by the essay - 'Distant Suffering and Morality' - where I ponder
on the complexity surrounding my (and, I believe, many other people's) internal
conflict about suffering in the poor parts of the world. In this context, I discuss four
sources of moral motivation - sympathy, mutual advantage, value, and the desire for
justification - and indicate how these various sources differ in their implications for
our moralobligations towards distant suffering. The discussion underlines the
importance of establishing international institutions that can commit us to the moral
obligations that we endorse when we take up the impersonal standpoint, and,
moreover, stresses the relevance of making leeway for moral reflection in our lives.
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2The Concept of Poverty
and Normative Reasoning
1. Introduction
In 1989, the Secretary of State for Social Security in Britain argued - in a speech
called 'The End of the line for Poverty' - that poverty had been abolished, and that it
made no sense to use the word in a characterisation of the situation among people in
the lower tail of the income distribution in Britain.å On the other hand, it has for
example been argued by Townsend that as many as one in seven Britons were in
poverty in the sixties.3 (Certainly, the development in Britain has been remarkable if
both these claims are true!) Finally, by applying the poverty standard of the European
Commission, Blackburn has classified 9.2 percent of today's population in Britain as
poor - a far cry from the statement of the Secretary of State.'
These differences reflect deviating definitions of the concept of poverty, and, hence, it
seems of interest to ask what an appropriate foundation for this concept may' be.
Poverty denotes the lack of something, but the word itself does not impose any
particular interpretation. However, the fact that poverty implies deficiency indicates
the need for a norm of completeness in order to make sense of the concept. In this
essay I discuss, within various normative frameworks, plausible interpretations of the
norm of completeness or what I henceforth will call a poverty line. That is, I pursue
interpretations of the concept of poverty to which normative force can be assigned,
l For their comments on this essay, I am grateful to Rune Jansen Hagen, Ottar Mæstad, Agnar
Sandmo, and Svein Aage Aanes.
2 See Atkinson (1993).
3 Townsend (1962). Moreover, Beckerman and Clark (1982) estimate that the number of poor people
in Britain went up by about 59% in the period 1961-76.
4 See Blackburn (1994). According to the poverty standard of the European Commission, persons with
less than 50 percent of the median disposable income of the country in question are classified as poor.
This poverty line is closely related to the so-called Fuchs criterion; see Rawls (1971), p. 98.
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and which thus also can explain why people often attach particular importance to the
extent of poverty in social welfare judgements.
Some readers may be surprised by the amount of effort I put into this discussion,
(probably) because they endorse a straightforward interpretation of poverty as the
lack of basic needs. But to appeal to bask needs does not provide a solution to the
main concern of this essay, because there must still be a norm of completeness to
defend in order to make sense of the idea of basic needs. Various interpretations of
basic needs have been advanced in the poverty measurement literature, but there have
been few attempts to explicitly link these definitions to any particular normative
framework.f One line of reasoning has been to argue that basic needs ought to be
defined as the amount of resources needed for survival, and this criterion (which
undoubtedly needs further clarification) has provided a foundation for various
nutritional cut-off lines.s Others have appealed to a more comprehensive definition of
poverty, where the idea has been to express basic needs as the amount of resources
needed in order to attain a minimum standard of living (and not merely survival)."
But what is a minimum standard of living? A wide range of suggestions has been
advanced - with some convergence on content - but a deep disagreement has
prevailed about whether we should accept a relativist or an absolutist approach to the
definition of basic needs," The absolute-relative dispute is also the core of the conflict
in the discussion of the extent of poverty in Britain. My claim, though, is that in order
to make sense of this debate, we have to outline a normative framework within which
the various suggestions - narrow and comprehensive - may be evaluated.
Hence, the primary idea of the essay is very simple: There must be some reasons why
the idea of poverty is a major evaluative concern in most countries, and each of these
reasons may provide the foundation of a corresponding conceptualisation of poverty.
The weight people attach to reported poverty figures should, therefore, reflect the
importance they assign to the underlying foundation of that poverty line. Thus, in this
essay, I elaborate on various normative ideas that may support the concept of poverty,
S Braybrooke (1987) and Wiggins (1987) are two exceptions.
6 Dasgupta (1993), p. 437-473, surveys many of the conceptual problems with this approach.
7 See for example Squire (1993).
8 See Braybrooke (1987), p. 34, for a discussion of various suggestions of a comprehensive definition
of basic needs. See also Weigel (1986), who surveys recent advances within socio- and neurobiology,
and discusses implications for a reasonable interpretation of the idea of poverty.
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and sketch possible interpretations of the poverty line. In section 2, I brieflyoutline
the general normative framework that supports the discussion. The most important
part of this section is to clarify the structure of normative reasoning that is adopted in
this essay, and to elaborate on the a priori assumption that justifies the relevance of
normative reasoning. In section 3-6, I discuss various normative positions and their
bearing on the idea of poverty, and in section 7, I debate the relevance of the absolute-
relative dispute in the discussion of a sensible defmition of poverty.
2. Some Basic Elements
A normative framework supports a particular ranking of states of affairs, where a state
of affairs should be interpreted broadly by including "past actions, present actions,
intended actions, Mother Nature's choice of actions, and the past, present, and future
consequences of this stream of actions't.? It is considered incontrovertible to presume
that such a ranking will be consistent for any normative framework of interest, and I
shall not deviate from the conventional position on this issue. However, it is more
dubious to extend the assumption to include the property of completeness as well, a
problem I shall elaborate on in the sections 4 and 5.10
At the risk of some oversimplification, we may say that there is one basic distinction
between various normative theories. Choosing state of affairs A instead of state of
affairs B can be defended by arguing either that there is more goodness in A than in B
or that it is (for some other reason) morally wrong to prefer B to A (even if B should
contain more goodness than A). The former argument is usually classified as
teleological reasoning, Le. that rightness is determined by goodness, the latter
argument reflects a deontological view, Le. that rightness is not necessarily to
maximise goodness.U Thus, the idea of poverty may be interpreted either within a
deontological or a teleological framework (or, as I discuss in section 5, within a
framework that combines deontological and teleological reasoning). In other words,
poverty can either be linked to the lack of goodness (or the presence of badness) in a
9 Dasgupta (1993), p. 29-30. See also the discussion of social states inArrow (1963).
10 See Tungodden (1994a) for a discussion of the properties of completeness and consistency in
individual choices motivated by self-interest,
11 There are numerous definitions of a deontological view. The definition referred to here is from
Rawls (1971), p. 30, but see Scheffler (1982), Sen (1987), and Broome (1991).
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state of affairs or to the wrongness in a state of affairs, and both possibilities are
elaborated on in the essay.
But why are we interested in nonnative reasoning at all?12 Why should we care about
any normative interpretation of poverty? This is a difficult - but substantial - issue,
though one I am unable to elaborate on in-any satisfactory way here. However, it is
important to notice that the reasoning in this essay is fundamentally different from the
one pursued within the Hobbesian tradition. The Hobbesian framework assumes that
"every man has a Right to every thing, even to another's body",13 and rejects any
further discussion of the idea of overall goodness and rightness. Hence, everyone
simply ought to pursue their personal aims in a rational way (where these aims, of
course, may be influenced by the sympathy they feel towards other people), and only
co-operate if co-operation is rational. Thus, a normative framework is in the
Hobbesian tradition only a device introduced in order to support an equilibrium - in
the game of life - which is mutually advantageous for the members of society
compared to a non-co-operative equilibrium.
The Hobbesian framework has been developed in various directions by the use of
rational bargaining models, where the differences are primarily related to the
specification of the non-co-operative equilibrium and the interpretation of the co-
ordination mechanisms that will be applied by the members of society.14But common
to all approaches within this tradition is the fact that they reject characterising any
inequality between people, whether (by way of illustration) slavery or the presence of
hunger in an affluent society, as intrinsically wrong or bad. No action has any
inherent normative status, because there are no normative claims that ought to be
taken into account in our lives. Equivalently, no experience has any inherent
normative status, and, hence, we can not claim that, for example, undernourishment is
intrinsically bad. Therefore, these models reject any normative understanding of
poverty beyond the (possible) claim that this idea may reflect the lack of rational co-
12Midgley (1991) argues that "we need priority-rules, not just because they make society smoother,
nor even just to make it possible at all, but also more deeply, to avoid lapsing individually into states of
helpless, conflict-tom confusion. In some sense, this is the 'origin of ethics' and our search need take us
no further" (p. 11). See also Taylor (1993).
13Hobbes (1986), p. 190.
14 See for example Gauthier (1986) and Binmore (1994). Gauthier works within a Lockeian
framework, and deduces a particular social contract that he claims people will find rational to endorse
in every society. Binmore, on the other hand, underlines the importance of evolutionary forces in the
construction of a social contract, and avoids the use of a fictitious description of the status quo.
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ordination of activities among the members of society (where rationality has to be
understood in the context of mutual advantage). One such rational co-ordination
mechanism may, of course, be to establish conventions that define certain actions and
experiences as 'wrong' and 'bad'.
The framework adopted in this essay, however, presumes a priori that we have "a
desire to be able to justify [our] actions to others on grounds they could not
reasonably reject".1S Thus, we do not only occupy our own point of view when
people's interests conflict, but aim at an understanding of how to balance - in a
reasonable way - our own individualistic motives and interests against other people's
motives and interests.lf In other words, we pursue an appropriate normative
framework which can guide us in cases of this type, and in that context, we speak
about goodness and rightness. It would, of course, be somewhat naive to believe that
we all the time possess this desire to be able to justify actions to others. Almost every
choice we make is a social choice in the sense that other people's interests are
involved, though we are unable to take that fully into account in daily life, where
individualistic motives and concerns often will dominate.!? But this desire for
justification may nevertheless be influential in the sense that it may be the foundation
for social institutions. We may, through the state, commit ourselves to a particular
normative framework, such that the state - as the institutionalisation of the legitimate
use of force - can be understood as a mechanism for implementing the normative
framework that the citizens endorse.P These remarks are all-too-brief about the link
between personal ethics and social arrangements, but the intention here is only to
indicate the importance of individual values in the construction of a sensible
normative theory of social arrangements. A foundation for social arrangements ought
to be derived from an understanding of what constitute reasonable personal ethics,
and to separate these questions may easily lead to utopian social arrangements which
15 Scanlon (1982), p. 116. See also a similar discussion in Rawls (1993), p. 48-54 on the distinction
between the rational and the reasonable, and Nagel (1991) on the distinction between the personal and
the impersonal standpoint within each of us. A further difficulty is how to understand the relationship
between the reasonable and the rational; on this issue see Nozick (1981) and Griffm (1986).
16 See Tungodden (1994c) for a discussion of this problem in the context of distant suffering.
17 There may also be very good reasons for neglecting the interests of others in particular situations, an
issue which has been extensively discussed in social choice theory. See Sen (1970a) for a discussion of
the Paretian Liberal.
18 There are, of course, also other factors which ought to be taken into account in a more
comprehensive discussion of the foundation of the state, for example, that the state can be the most
efficient insurance mechanism, or the most efficient mechanism for expressing important symbolic
values (on the latter issue, see Nozick (1989), chap. 25).
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consistently are in conflict with what the citizens perceive as justifiable behaviour
from the personal point of view.l? The close connection between personal ethics and
social arrangements is essential to a normative discussion of the concept of poverty,
because the idea of poverty has deep roots in the design of social institutions. Hence,
we need an understanding of the concept of poverty which, while being part of the
foundation of social institutions, may co-exist with what we perceive as reasonable
personal behaviour.
What, then, does a normative framework really express? It may be an objective
ethical truth,20 or it may be the less ambitious aim of being the most plausible
conception of political values (Le. individual values on relevant social choices) as the
focus of an overlapping consensus.U But be that as it may, the purpose of this essay is
to elaborate on the link between various normative frameworks and the concept of
poverty, and for that task we do not have to state a position on metaethical issues.
However, we shall notice that the line of reasoning adopted in order to defend a
normative framework is dependent on the metaethical position.22 Rational
intuitionism appeals to an independent order of values that is to be recognised on due
reflection, and where the fact that these values are true provides a sufficient
foundation for justification.P Thus, from that position one will argue that a normative
framework is to be accepted if its first principles appear to convey the true
independent normative values (which are to be revealed and not constructed). On the
other hand, one may argue along the lines of reasonable constructivism, where a
normative framework is established by human reasoning, and as a result of a
procedure of construction. In that case, it is the reasonableness of the procedure that is
19 See Sen (1992), p. 18-19, for a somewhat divergent position on this issue.
20 For a defence of non-religious objective ethics, see (among others) Nagel (1979), p. 196-213,
Nozick (1981), p. 400-402, and Parfit (1984), p. 452-454.
21 See Rawls (1993), p. 89-130 for a discussion of this idea. Notice that there is a fundamental change
in the reasoning on this issue from Rawls (1971) to Rawls (1993), where the later Rawls adopts the less
ambitious aim of presenting a reasonable conception of political values, in contrast to the early Rawls
who presents a proposal for an independent moral theory. The main structure of Rawls (1971) and
Rawls (1993), however, is more or less the same.
22 Here I draw on Rawls (1993), Lecture III. However, the term 'reasonable constructivism' is not
suggested by Rawls, but introduced in my discussion in order to avoid any further elaboration on the
distinction between 'moral constructivism' and 'political constructivism' (which are terms used by
Rawls).
23 Another possibility would, of course, be to relate the order of values to a religious doctrine, and
utilitarianism was, for example, defended (in the 19th century) by William Paley because it reflected
God's wishes. This kind of defence, though, was rejected by (for example) both Mill and Kant who
argued that it must always be possible for us to ask whether God's commands are themselves good.
See Ryan (1987), p. 19.
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to be evaluated, and eventually improved upon in order to arrive at a plausible
normative framework. And, of course, the conclusions derived from such a procedure
may overlap with the normative ideas that rational intuitionists claim are a part of an
independent order of values. Both arguments are present throughout this essay,
though reasonable constructivism probably has the upper hand in most of the
discussion.
Is it, then, possible to find any justifiable procedure that aggregates individual
interests into a social ordering? (If so, then we may be able to find a normative basis
for the concept ofpoverty.) The Arrowian framework, where an ordering of states of
affairs is established from the ordering of states of affairs of the members of society,
has been the point of departure for a considerable amount of normative reasoning.24
The axioms proposed by Arrow suggest one possible normative position, and within
this framework we arrive at the well-known result, Arrow's General Impossibility
Theorem, that there is no social ordering satisfying these axioms. But this framework
can be informationally enriched by admitting (partial or full) comparability of well-
being levels, and social orderings may, then, be derived byentering into various
normative positions.25 In this essay, I ignore problems with respect to interpersonal
comparisons of levels, gains, and losses of well-being, and within a setting of perfect
information I discuss various feasible procedures of balancing individual interests.26
This a priori assumption is undoubtedly controversial, but it nevertheless provides a
useful point of departure for normative reasoning by allowing us to focus on
disagreement of a fundamental normative character (by neglecting disagreements
based on divergent assumptions about the amount of information available).
What maya reasonable procedure for balancing people's interests in social choices be
like?27 A frequently adopted approach (which at least can be traced back to Adam
Smith) is to introduce a fictitious ideal actor in order to construct an impartial
24 Arrow (1963). See also Hylland (1986) for a discussion of the framework of social choice theory.
25Notice that there also is a close relationship between the degree of interpersonal comparability
admitted and feasible ethical positions, see Sen (1971) and Deschamps and Gevers (1978). Idiscuss
this issue further in Tungodden (1994b).
26See Sen (1970b) for a discussion of various issues on interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
27On this issue, see (among others) Dworkin (1978), Griffin (1986), Harsanyi (1953,1955), Kymlicka
(1990), Nagel (1979), and Sen (1977, 1992). See Sugden (1993) for a critical view of this line of
reasoning.
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perspective, and then discuss how this person would respond to social choices.P'
Various interpretations of the ideal actor are presented throughout this essay, and, in
each case, I explore whether the principle presumed endorsed by this ideal actor adds
any normative understanding to the concept of poverty. If it does, then the importance
of that particular normative interpretation of poverty will depend upon how successful
the underlying interpretation of the ideal actor is in incorporating an impartial
perspective which people (who endorse reasonable constructivism) find appropriate
as a method of approaching social choices, and how the first principles of that
framework appeal to our intuition on these questions.
Hence, in the next three sections I discuss various normative positions - teleological
and deontological - which people who are moved by normative reasoning may adopt,
and where the aim is to understand how the concept of poverty may fit into each of
these positions. I begin with a discussion of the possibility of incorporating the
alleviation of poverty as a distinct dimension in the conception of the good within
utilitarianism - the most commonly endorsed teleological theory.
3. A Utilitarian Response
A familiar interpretation of the impartial perspective has been to explain it as the
viewpoint of a detached observer.s? The idea is that the demand for reasonableness in
social choices ought to be connected to our ability to have sympathetic feelings
towards our fellow beings, where the construction of the ideal actor as a detached
observer aims to distinguish the ideal scheme of sympathetic feelings from the
scheme of sympathetic feelings which we may express from the personal standpoint;
the detached observer has no relationship to any of the members of society, and
would thus presumably be granting everyone equal consideration.F' The framework is
frequently used to defend classical utilitarianism. The argument is that in order to
28 Smith writes: "Before we make any proper comparison of those opposite interests (his interests and
my interests), we must change our positions. We must view them neither with our own eyes nor yet
with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person who has no particular connection with
either, and who judges with impartiality between us" (Theory of the Moral Sentiments III 3.3., see
Wiggins (1987), p. 74).
29 See Rawls (1971), p. 183-193, for a critical view on this interpretation of the impartial perspective.
30 The relevance of sympathy in moral reasoning can be traced back to David Hume and Adam Smith.
Hume once remarked that: "No quality of human nature is more remarkable ...than the property we have
to sympathise with others, and to receive by communications their inclinations and sentiments" (see
Binmore (1994), p. 54-56).
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have equal sympathy for each of the individuals involved, the detached observer
should imagine himself in the place of each person in tum, and, when he has done this
for everyone, the strength of the detached observer's approval ought to be determined
by the balance of each person's good to which he has sympathetically responded.
Conventionally, it has been argued that from this kind ofreasoning it follows that the
detached observer will acknowledge the total net amount of goodness as the relevant
criterion to be used in the ranking of states of affairs, where a person's good has been
defined either in terms of happiness or desire-fulfillment_. This conclusion is
appealing at first glance; the greatest amount of happiness seems to be what we
pursue in our own lives and in the lives of those we love,31 and, thus, it appears rather
innocuous to claim that this also should be what we generally ought to pursue in
social choices.
However, the classical utilitarian framework poses some well-known problems for
our ordinary intuition. The greatest-amount-of-happiness criterion can provide
normative support for the sacrifice of the happiness (or desire-fulfillment) of one
person, without limit, for the total amount of happiness. Surely, classical
utilitarianism supports, on resource allocation issues involving identical individuals,
equality in happiness among people. This follows from the fact that in this particular
situation the greatest amount of happiness is achieved by an equal distribution of
resources - given the factual assumption that resources produce 'diminishing marginal
benefit' to people (i.e. in this particular case an equal distribution of resources implies
that the 'marginal benefit' from an extra unit of resources is the same for all members
of society). But in general, the framework may support any distribution of happiness
in society if people differ in their capacity to convert resources into happiness.å-
Moreover, if no restrictions are placed on the kind of sources of happiness which are
to be counted as appropriate in social welfare judgements, then the classical utilitarian
framework involves the claim that whether we for example should prefer a state of
affairs where someone is tortured to a state of affairs where no one is tortured ought
31 But see Tungodden (1994a) for a comprehensive discussion of the content and structure of our
personal aims.
32 Initially, this argument was discussed by Friedman (1947), who, in a controversy with Lerner,
asked: "Suppose, further, that it is discovered ... that a hundred persons in the United States are
enormously more efficient pleasure machines than any others, so that each of these would have to be
given an income ten thousand times as large as the income of the next most efficient pleasure machine
in order to maximise aggregate utility. Would Lerner be willing to accept the resulting division of
income as optimum ...?" (p. 310-311). See also the writings of Sen (1973,1979,1992).
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to solely depend upon which state of affairs has the greatest amount of happiness or
desire-fulfillment.P The gains of some persons ought to be balanced against the loss
of other people in the ranking of states of affairs, and, hence, any loss of one person
(of whatever size and type) may be outweighed by a gain of other people. In addition,
the fact that some people acquire their happiness from for example torturing an
innocent child is irrelevant in the original version of classical utilitarianism (where
there is no 'laundering' of the sources of happiness).34
Hence, it may appear futile to aim at intrinsic normative support for the concept of
poverty within this framework. But this conclusion may rest on some particular
assumptions underlying the traditional interpretation of the structure of the good
within classical utilitarianism, and some further deepening on this issue will turn out
to be of interest for our purpose. What I am aiming at can be illustrated by briefly
discussing the kind of reasoning presented by Bentham - the originator of classical
utilitarianism. Bentham argued - as a rational intuitionist - that pain and pleasure were
the body of goodness and rightness, and, moreover, that the total amount of these
experiences present should be the only relevant aspect in deciding the goodness (or
badness) of states of affairs.35 Suppose that one as a detached observer agrees with
Bentham on this issue, and assume as well that we are able to precisely define and
measure the amount of pain on the same scale, and opposite of, the amount of
pleasure. Would this necessarily imply that a perfectly sympathetic detached observer
should choose in accordance with the classical utilitarian principle in order to grant
everyone equal consideration?
33 There have been advanced various suggestions as to how one could avoid this problem within a
utilitarian framework, by introducing rule utilitarianism and indirect utilitarianism, but none of them
have proved to be a very good answer to the basic problems of utilitarianism. See Kymlicka (1990) for
a brief survey on this issue.
34 In addition, we may question whether utilitarianism is too demanding as a normative theory,
because it requires us to maximise the total amount of happiness in every choice we make; i.e. it
interprets every choice of a person as a social choice. However, this is a complex issue which it is
beyond the scope of this essay to discuss. See, for example, Parfit (1984) for a discussion of motive
utilitarianism, and the possibilities for taking into account partiality within a utilitarian normative
framework. See also Nagel (1979), p. 116.
35 See chap. 2 in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by Jeremy Bentham for
his defence of classical utilitarianism (reprinted in Ryan (1987)). Notice that John Stuart Mill -
frequently viewed as a prominent defender of this framework - was less convinced about the general
principle of classical utilitarianism (see Ryan (1987), p. SO-51).
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The suggestion of Bentham (to wit to assign equal weight in social choices to the
amount of pain and the amount of pleasure present in states of affairs) is far from
self-evident. And the principle of negative utilitarianism has been advanced by
various authors, saying that the avoidance of pain ought to have lexicographic priority
in social choices.36 The intuition behind this line of reasoning is simply that "the
happiness of a million somehow fails utterly to compensate or even to mitigate the
torture of one".37A view of this type - acknowledging a certain asymmetry between
pleasure and pain - may also find support within the framework of rational
constructivism, where it may be argued that it is plausible to assume that the detached
observer would express more sympathy to the avoidance of pain than to the
experience of pleasure.38
Versions of negative utilitarianism may indicate interesting normative interpretations
of the idea of poverty, but before we make any further investigations along these
lines, we have to clarify some weaknesses in Bentham's utilitarianism. The claim
made by Bentham is problematic in the sense that pain and pleasure are not two
distinct kinds of experiences, there is no common quality that can define neither the
experience of pleasure nor the experience of pain.39 This is widely recognised, and a
common response has been to argue that the utilitarian framework should be
interpreted in the context of desires (or preferences).40The attack on Bentham's view
on pleasure and pain is justifiable, and the change in focus towards fulfilment of
desires (or preferences) does not necessarily undermine the argument present in
negative utilitarianism. On the face of it, however, the move from pain and pleasure
to experiences more or less desired seems to erode some of the intuitive appeal of
arguments of this type. The reference to pleasures and pains marks a clear distinction
between goodness and badness, and, thus, makes the principle of negative
utilitarianism transparent. It is less evident, though, how this distinction should be
interpreted within the framework of desire-utilitarianism.
36 For such a view, see Popper (1966). A more eccentric view along these lines was advanced by
Epicurus, who argued that the state of painlessness is equivalent to the highest possible pleasure, so
that if absolute freedom from pain is obtained, the aim of classical utilitarianism is achieved (for a
discussion of the ideas of Epicurus, see Sidgwick (1907).
37Perry (1950), p. 671.
38 On this issue, see also Smart and Williams (1973) and Griffin (1979,1986).
39 See, for example, Parfit (1984), p. 493, and Griffm (1986), p. 7-8.
40 SeeParfit (1984), appendix I.
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The possibility for a distinction between badness and goodness within a desire-
fulfillment interpretation of utilitarianism depends on how the relation between a
desire (or a preference) and the good is interpreted. Negative utilitarianism is hard to
understand within this framework if it is the fulfilment of desires in itself that is the
sole aspect of good. But is it desires that make something valuable, or do we have a
desire for something because it is valuable? It is possible, I would like to claim, to
interpret desire-fulfilment utilitarianism as a normative theory that is based on the
view that there are various reasonable conceptions of the good,_and not necessarily as
a normative theory that suggests that the fulfilment of desires in itself is the single
aspect of good that we ought to pursue. This is an interpretation which is in line with
most of utilitarian reasoning. Normative theories that in one way or another endorse
the desire-fulfilment utilitarian view argue in favour of a certain degree of idealisation
(or correction) of desires, i.e. some desires are rejected as irrational (as for example
sadism, envy, and malice), and that would not be a rational procedure to adopt within
a normative framework that endorsed desire-fulfilment in itself as the sole aspect of
good.41
As reasonable constructivists, a more comprehensive view on the idealisation of
preferences would be to make the (not too implausible) assumption that from
practical reasoning, a consensus about what constitutes the set of good and bad
experiences can be attained in society {and rational intuitionists - as Sidgwick and
Mill - would probably support a distinction of this kind).42Ifwe accept this premise
of desire-fulfilment utilitarianism, it seems also indisputable to infer that everyone
has a desire for experiencing all the good situations and avoiding all the bad situations
which constitute the set of experiences which there is consensus about.43Admittedly,
I find these assumptions particularly plausible with respect to the badness dimension.
There is undoubtedly consensus about the badness of some circumstances, and
everyone attempts - to greater or less extent - to avoid the experience of situations of
this type. What I have in mind is, for example, the experience of being
41See Sen and Williams (1982), p. 9-11, for a brief discussion of some problems connected to the
idealisation of desires. See also the contributions of Hare (1982), Harsanyi (1982), Mirrlees (1982),
and Shick (1982) in Sen and Williams (1982). Harsanyi (1982) claims that "[a]ny sensible ethical
theory must make a distinction between rational wants and irrational wants, or between rational
preferences and irrational preferences" (p. 55).
42See Taylor (1993) for a discussion of the structure of practical reasoning.
43By making this assumption we have avoided the difficulty of 'discontinuity' discussed in Sen and
Williams (1982), p. 6. But how can we avoid making such a conclusion? If people agree that a certain
experience is good, then why should they not desire this experience?
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undernourished and the experience of being tortured, where it is hard to believe that
anyone would reject the characterisation of these experiences as bad.
So far so good. But how should we interpret the fact that people's preference
structures are different? The story may be the following: The problem each of us
faces is that the number of good situations,that may be pursued within a life span is
limited, so that some selection must be made from the full range of good situations
that might be realised. Similarly, we are unable to live a life without experiencing bad
situations, and, thus, we have to reflect upon which bad situations we ought to strive
most to avoid. A person's preference structure reflects his or her response to this
unavoidable choice of framework for value-seeking activity, which - for various
reasons - may differ from other people's ranking (but not, we now assume, in the
definition) of good and bad experiences. Hence, I assume that even if we reject the
narrow definition of good and bad in the context of pain and pleasure, we retain the
idea that there is a realm of good and bad experiences which explain why people have
a desire for experiencing some situations and a desire for avoiding other situatlons+t
Thus, the principle of negative utilitarianism may be reformulated within this type of
desire-fulfillment utilitarianism, saying that in social choices we ought to assign
priority to the avoidance of those situations which we all acknowledge are bad.
Traditionally, it follows from people's preference structure that the intensity of their
desires to experience and avoid situations varies, and, thus, we have to clarify the role
of the intensity of a desire in the framework outlined above. One possible view -
which I shall pursue - is to argue that the amount of goodness or badness extracted in
any situation will be determined by the intensity of the person's desire for
experiencing or avoiding that particular situation. Hence, the most goodness is
attained by satisfying the most intense desires for good situations, and the most
badness is avoided by avoiding the bad situations people have the most intense
desires for avoiding. This is a controversial assumption, and we may question
whether the intensity of desires possibly can play such an important role in the
context of goodness and badness. Our desires are (at least) partly shaped by society
and the possibilities we face, and some people may find it unreasonable that the
question of goodness and badness is to be settled on such a flimsy basis.
44 See Tungodden (1994a) for a more extensive discussion of this issue.
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Two other options seem available: We may claim that the question of goodness and
badness is independent of the intensity of desires, or, more moderately, that it is only
partly dependent on the intensity of desires. The claim of independence, though, is
implausible. If a person - for whatever reason - only has a weak desire for
experiencing a particular good situation, then it is difficult to understand how there
can be achieved much goodness by fulfilling that desire (if the fulfilment, that is to
say, does not change the preference structure of this person). Someone may, of
course, claim that the lack of intensity in this desire is irrational, and argue that the
person has too weak a desire for a situation which has an enormous goodness
potential (which is to presuppose that the goodness and badness potential differ in
various situations). But that is not an argument which undermines the main claim in
this paragraph, to wit that the lack of intensity in a desire implies the lack of goodness
inhaving this desire fulfilled.
The more moderate claim, however, saying that the intensity of desires only partly
determines the amount of goodness or badness present in the fulfilment of these
desires, appears somewhat more plausible. That is in fact a view which is already
involved in the framework outlined above (by the acceptance of corrections of
particular desires), and, thus, the question concerns whether we should extend the
idealisation of preferences to also include the ranking of various good and bad
situations. The problem with such a framework is that its first principle consistently
will be in conflict with the Pareto principle, by evaluating the change in the life of a
person differently from the person's own evaluation. Obviously, this is a conclusion
that one should be reluctant to accept in normative reasoning.O Hence, the
assumption that most goodness is attained by satisfying the most intense desires for
good situations (and that most badness is avoided by avoiding the bad situations
people have the most intense desires for avoiding) outlines a reasonable setting to
work within inorder to interpret utilitarianism.
The issue of interest in our context is how to balance the total amount of goodness
against the total amount of badness in social choices. However, implicit in choosing
45 There are particular situations where the Pareto principle ought to be overruled in normative
reasoning (as is already indicated by the acceptance of some idealisation of preferences), but I find it
unreasonable to endorse a normative framework which involves a comprehensive conflict between the
first principles and the Pareto principle. See Sen (1970a) and Broome (1991) for a discussion of some
of the problems with the Pareto principle.
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the intensity of a desire as the metric for the amount of goodness or badness extracted
in a situation is precisely the statement that we have to assign equal weight to the
amount of goodness and the amount of badness present in states of affairs (at least in
order to avoid a conflict with the Pareto principle). If a person's desire for avoiding a
bad situation is as intense as his or her desire for experiencing a good situation -
which implies that the amount of goodness extracted from experiencing the good
situation is equal to the amount of badness present in the bad situation - then the
person is indifferent between avoiding the bad situation (and not experiencing the
good situation) and experiencing the good situation (and not avoiding the bad
situation). Thus, within this framework, negative utilitarianism and similar arguments
are in conflict with people's own judgement of states of affairs.
However, one possibility remains in order to defend - within our setting - the line of
reasoning reflected in the principle of negative utilitarianism: We may claim that
people in fact assign lexicographic priority to the avoidance of certain bad situations,
which would signify that the amount of badness extracted by experiencing these bad
circumstances exceeds the amount of goodness it is possible for people to extract
from experiencing any amount of good circumstances. In fact, this appears to be an a
priori assumption in much of modem poverty literature, where, by way of illustration,
a lot of work has concentrated on proving that the expenditure-elasticity of calorie
intake in populations with undernourishment are close to unity.46 This hypothesis
may be interpreted as reflecting the view that the badness avoided by becoming
somewhat less undernourished exceeds the goodness it is possible to extract from
experiencing any good situations and the badness it is possible to extract from any
other bad situation (that is to say, that can be experienced or avoided by the use of
resources).
The empirical results do not support the hypothesis, and Townsend, among others,
has argued that in order to understand the fact that "[ijn observation of behaviour in
every society, the drive to satisfy hunger sometimes take second place to other
drives ... "41, one has to recognise that the badness of having unfulfilled social needs
may sometimes exceed the badness experienced by being undernourished. That may
be a reasonable claim, but it appears to me that the most plausible interpretation of the
46For an overview on the empiricalliterature on this topic, see Lipton and Ravallion (1993), p. 36-38.
41Townsend (1985), p. 664. See also Townsend (1962,1979).
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empirical results nevertheless would be to accept that rational undernourished people
in fact use some of their resources to pursue goodness in their lives - that may be, for
example, on taste, appearance or odour.48 A somewhat more compelling case for
lexicographic priority in people's desires may be made by focusing on people's
behaviour in extreme situations (such as famines). However, even this argument
would probably not provide sufficient- support for the principle of negative
utilitarianism, because it is not too controversial to assume that people are willing to
gamble, in the choice between risky projects, on these (extremely) bad situations if
the expected gain is large. Thus, negative utilitarianism will probably also in cases of
this kind be in conflict with people's own judgement of the situation.
It should be kept in mind, though, that the lack of priority to the presence of badness
within the desire-fulfilment utilitarian framework does not necessarily imply a lack of
priority to the fulfilment of a desire for avoiding (for example) undernourishment,
because this desire is (in most cases) undoubtedly more intense than other desires.
Hence, one way of understanding a poverty line within this framework is that it
identifies people who experience an extreme amount of badness, and who have a life
where too many good situations are absent. The nonnative importance of this type of
poverty is derived from the intensity of their desires for avoiding these bad situations
and experiencing the good situations. Thus, the poverty line can hardly be interpreted
as a norm of completeness, but rather as a criterion for selecting out a group of people
with particularly intense desires. And the extent of this kind of poverty may playa
pro tanto role in social choices for people who endorse the utilitarian framework; it
gives a prima facie reason for saying something about the goodness (or badness) of a
state of affairs, but contrary reason may be produced by reference to the presence of
other bad or good experiences.49
The point of departure of classical utilitarianism is the view that the overall amount of
happiness or desire-fulfillment (in the rest of the essay I ignore the distinction to save
words) is the only relevant issue in normative reasoning. Therefore, it does not matter
48 On this issue, see also Dasgupta (1993), p. 470. Surely, the distinction between badness and
goodness in this discussion is somewhat elusive; some readers may, for example, want to claim that it
is goodness (and not avoidance of badness) people pursue when they strive for fulfilment of social
needs. But be that as it may, the important issue in this context is the absence of lexicographic priority
in their desires, and. thus, Ido not aim at more precise definition of the distinction between goodness
and badness.
49 See Sen (1967,1973) for a discussion of non-compulsive value judgements.
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in what life happiness comes about, because it is happiness in itself that has inherent
normative status. A rational constructivist may endorse this position if she finds
convincing the impartial view reflected by the choice of the detached observer
outlined above. But some rational constructivists reject this position, because they
find it implausible that a detached observer should be invariant to how much
happiness there is present within the life of each member of society when he makes
his choice. Inow tum to a discussion of a framework that provides a response to this
type of criticism about the choice of the ideal actor.50
4. A Deontological Response
Deontological reasoning underlines the duty we have to fulfil various obligations, and
claims that the rightness or wrongness of states of affairs depends on whether or not
these obligations are fulfilled.U There are, of course, divergent views about what
should be a reasonable scheme of moral obligations, but the point of departure of
most of contemporary deontological intuitionism has been (or may at least be
interpreted in the context of) the Kantian principle that you shall "[alct in such a way
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as means, but always at the same time as an end".52 From this
idea it follows that it is wrong to prefer a state of affairs where someone is treated
merelyas means to a state of affairs where everyone is treated as an end. The
important deviation from teleological reasoning derives from the fact that the Kantian
principle specifies a duty towards each of the members of society and not the content
of some impersonal good or bad which ought to be maximised or minimised. Hence,
the Kantian principle does not allow us to treat someone merelyas means even if that
would imply that one thereby avoided the same treatment of another group of people.
Thus, it is a misunderstanding when (among others) Binmore claims that within a
deontological framework one does not take into account the consequences of an act in
50Notice that the classical utilitarian principle is strengthened if we adopt a particular metaphysical
position - to wit the reductionist view - advanced by Parfit (1984). Parfit argues that our view on
personal identity is wrong. We are, roughly speaking, less connected to our own past and to our own
future than we believe, and, therefore, we ought to be less concerned with the separateness of lives in
social choices. See also Broome (1991) on this issue.
51 Deontology derives from the Greek deon; 'duty'.
52Kant (1964), p. 96.
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an evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of a state of affairs.53 If that were the
case, then this nonnative framework would not be worth our attention. The content of
the Kantian principle, however, is precisely about the consequences of our acts, to wit
that we ought to avoid to act in a way that has as a result that some people are treated
merelyas means. A more problematic issue, though, is how to understand more
precisely Kantian intuitionism, and deontological doctrines of very different types
have claimed support from the version of the categorical imperative outlined above.54
I now turn to a discussion of this issue, and, moreover, to how_onemay defend these
various interpretations within the framework of reasonable constructivism and
connect them to the concept of poverty.
First, we may ask whether the classical utilitarian view can be defended within the
Kantian framework as well.55Is it possible to argue that the choice of the detached
observer outlined in the preceding section conveys a plausible interpretation of the
categorical imperative? It is, and the line of reasoning may be as follows: The
detached observer gives everyone equal treatment by giving each person's interests
equal weight in every situation, and - a deontological utilitarian may argue - that is
what each person deserves as an end; to ignore someone's interests in any situation
would be to ignore that person's status as something of intrinsic importance.Ø The
same argument may as well be constructed from a somewhat different position,
proposed by Harsanyi, who, in what is often named the equiprobability model,
claimed that a reasonable interpretation of the impartial standpoint is the situation
where the ideal actor "had an equal chance of obtaining any of the social positions
existing in this situation, from the highest to the lowest".51Hence, the ideal actor is no
53 See Binmore (1994), p. 110. As pointed out in Rawls (1972): "It should be noted that deontological
theories are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterise the rightness of institutions
and acts independently from their consequences."(p. 30).
54 There are several versions of the categorical imperative, the one referred to in the text is the so-
called 'Formula of the End in Itself. The strictest version is 'The Formula of Universal Law', to wit that
one ought to 'act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal
law'. See O'Neill (1991) for a survey of Kantian ethics.
55On this issue, see Kymlicka (1988).
56 A reasonable deontological utilitarian view would also have to accept some idealisation of
preferences; on this issue, see the discussion in the preceding section.
51Harsanyi (1955), p. 316. See also Harsanyi (1976, 1982). Here, I ignore Harsanyi's use of von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences in interpersonal comparisons between people (which is of some
importance in the line of reasoning of Harsanyi), and focus solelyon the fundamental idea in
Harsanyi's approach. Harsanyi has two models on this issue. The one discussed in the text was
originally advanced in Harsanyi (1953); an alternative axiomatic version appeared in Harsanyi (1955).
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longer a detached observer, but involved in the situation as one who in advance is
unaware of his or her position. It follows from Bayesian rationality that such an
(involved) ideal actor would prefer the state of affairs with the highest mean of
happiness (which I in the following, for the sake of simplicity, assume is the relevant
parameter), and which thus would give the same ranking as the classical utilitarian
principle.58 Hence, both models support a-somewhat similar approach to the idea of
poverty, though the underlying intuition differs. The poverty line may, within a
deontological utilitarian framework, be interpreted as identifying a group of people
who in their lives experience situations where they undoubtedly are treated merelyas
means, because their interests compared to other interests involved have not been
given the consideration they deserve.
However, deontological utilitarianism is as vulnerable as teleological utilitarianism,
because the framework does not attach any intrinsic importance to the extent of
inequality in happiness in the lives of the members of society. An important challenge
to the deontological utilitarian framework has been advanced by Rawls, who argues
that our Kantian duty is to give each person's overall life prospects equal
consideration (and not only people's interests in each particular situation). If we do
that, Rawls claims, then we would recognise that there is no morally relevant reason
that can justify that anyone should be given lower prospects of life for the sake of
higher expectations of others.t? Rawls elaborates the argument by placing the ideal
actor (or the ideal contractor in a Rawlsian world) behind a veil of ignorance in an
original position, where the ideal actor is to choose "once and for all the standards
which are to govern ...[the] life prospects [of the members of society].60 By rejecting
the use ofprobabilities in the original position.s! Rawls claims that the ideal actor has
to consider normative questions as if she was each of the members of society
See Diamond (1967), Sen (1976, 1982), and Gauthier (1986) for a forceful criticism of this approach,
and Broome (1991) for a subtle defence.
58 See Tungodden (1994a) for an elaboration on the concept of well-being. Notice as well that the
equiprobability model cannot be used as a defence of classical utilitarianism as a teleological theory (as
we discussed in the preceding section), which becomes evident in social choices that influence the size
of the population. A teleological utilitarian theory always ranks states of affairs with respect to the total
amount of happiness, but that is not the case with the equiprobability model of Harsanyi when
~pulation size varies. See Parfit (1984) on this issue.
9 "No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favourable starting place in society",
see Rawls (1971), p. 180.
6°Rawls(1971),p.176.
61 For a critical view on the objection to the use of probabilities in the original position, see Harsanyi
(1976), p. 46-48.
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separately - as if each of their lives was her only life.62 Undoubtedly, this is a tall
order, but it may also be an important part of the framework needed in order to
answer the question at issue. The choices of the ideal actor should reflect a normative
position that we ought to take into account in our lives in order to be able to justify
our actions to others on grounds they cannot reasonably reject. Hence, the choice of
the ideal actor needs to be founded on an understanding of what would be a fair claim
from each of the individuals involved. And how can the ideal actor have any idea
about that without trying to imagine how it is to live each of the lives in question as
his or her only life?
How would the ideal actor choose behind a veil of ignorance? A very moderate
suggestion would be to say that in this position, the ideal actor should find it
unreasonable to prefer states of affairs where the life prospects of some people are
bad to states of affairs where everyone's life prospect is good. The ideal actor would
have to imagine how it is to live the life of those who are badly off as his or her only
life, and would, therefore, reject such an alternative without considering the mean life
prospect in this state of affairs. This marks a fundamental distinction between the
framework of Harsanyi and Rawlsian reasoning. More specifically, Rawls argues that
the ideal actor would rank states of affairs according to two principles of justice. The
first principle - which is assigned priority over the second - states, roughly, that each
person has "an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and
liberties".63 The second principle claims that social and economic inequalities ate to
be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society.64 This principle has been slightly modified by Sen, who introduces the
62See also Nagel (1991). In this discussion I ignore the question about the appropriate thickness of the
veil of ignorance. I probably also extend the use of the arguments of Rawls to issues where Rawls
would find his reasoning unfit. I indicate this by using the term Rawlsian reasoning in order to
recognise the source of the argument, but thereby also underlining the fact that it is not obvious that
Rawls himself would adopt this argument
63 Rawls (1993), p. 5. These liberties are given by a list which includes "freedom of thought and
liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms
specified by the libertyand integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the
rule of law" (Rawls (1993), p. 271). Rawls acknowledges that this is nothing but a list, and that there
may be another list which would do a better job even within this framework. Notice, moreover, that
Rawls has changed the formulation of the first principle of justice; Rawls (1971) argued that strict
priority should be assigned to "the most extensive total system of basic liberties" (p. 60). See Rawls
(1993), Lecture VIn for a discussion of this issue.
64 See Rawls (1971), p. 83, and Rawls (1993), p. 6. See also my discussion of the second principle of
justice in Tungodden (1994b).
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leximin principle.s> We may interpret the leximin principle as saying that in the
choice between two alternatives where the worst-off group is indifferent, then we
should choose the alternative that is to the greatest benefit of the second worst-off
group (and so on).
First, it is not obvious, as Rawls himself. acknowledges as well,66 that we should
assign strict priority to the avoidance of violations of basic liberties to socio-
economic issues. By way of illustration, undernourished people. may very well accept
a trade-off between essentialliberties and socio-economic rights, and to presuppose
anything else may involve an unwanted conflict with the Pareto principle (of the same
kind as we discussed in the context of negative utilitarianism). I return to this issue
shortly, but before I do that Iwould like to elaborate somewhat on the structure of
these principles. The first principle involves a great deal of incompleteness in the
normative ordering of states of affairs. The principle can be interpreted as saying that
people are treated merelyas means if they have one (or several) of these liberties
violated, and, therefore, states of affairs where that is the case should not be chosen if
there are feasible states of affairs where all these liberties are respected. But this
principle does not say anything about how to rank among various states of affairs
where these basic liberties are violated; it does not claim that we ought to prefer a
state of affairs with a few violations to a state of affairs with any number of
violations. Some readers may find this issue trivial, and insist that one, of course, has
to prefer fewer violations to more violations. However, in situations where those who
are victims in the two states of affairs are different people, that is not obvious from
Kantian reasoning. The Kantian principle does not in any situation permit us to treat
someone as merely a mean. Therefore, it is not straightforward to extend the
interpretation of the first principle to allow the sacrifice of some people's basic
liberties in order to avoid that the basic liberties of a larger group are violated.
The second principle can be interpreted as saying that no one - even if they are badly
off - is treated merelyas mean in resource allocation questions if the leximin criterion
65 See Sen (1970). Sen interprets the second principle of justice as being solely concerned with the
worst off person, and, hence, the leximin principle in the text is a modification of the suggestion of
Sen. On this issue, see Tungodden (1994b).
66Rawls (1993), p. 7.
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is applied.s? The condition of the worst-off group in the chosen state of affairs is
better than the condition of the worst-off group in any other feasible state of affairs,
and, thus, one may maintain that this group cannot reasonably argue that their status
as ends is violated.68 Moreover, the rest of the population is better off than the worst-
off group in the chosen state of affairs, and can therefore neither (according to the
Rawlsian view) reasonably reject the chosen state of affairs on the basis of the
Kantian principle. Thus, in the Rawlsian framework, the ideal actor is to arrange
social and economic inequalities as if he or she were going to be in the least
advantaged group in each state of affairs; any other ranking would, according to this
view, do wrong to the worst-off group. Hence, there is less incompleteness in the
ranking between states of affairs differing on issues covered by the second principle
of Rawls - though some incompleteness persists because the second principle does
not state a position on how to distribute resources within the least advantaged
segment
The lexical order between these two principles is, as already mentioned, questionable;
a state of affairs where some people are undernourished (but where no essential
liberties are violated) may be considered as worse than a state of affairs where
essentialliberties are violated (but no one is undernourished). However, I am not
going to elaborate on this trade-off, because it is probably a part of nonnative
reasoning where we have to expect the presence of some incompleteness. The
intention, though, is not to suppress the inherent nonnative importance of the aspects
covered by the first principle. On the contrary, the first principle is essential because it
underlines the importance of incorporating the violation of basic political and civil
liberties in a discussion of Kantian poverty. This concern becomes even more
pressing when we take into account the empirical fact that societies are not faced - as
frequently alleged - with a choice between political and civilliberties and economic
67 Here I ignore any comprehensive discussion about how to measure well-being. See Sen (1992), p.
79-87 for a critical view on the Rawlsian framework of primary goods.
68 We should notice that there is a problem with this interpretation of the second principle of justice.
The worst-off group in the chosen state of affairs may be in a better situation in other feasible states of
affairs (but, of course, in any other feasible state of affairs someone else would be worse-off than the
worst-off in the chosen state of affairs). Thus, strictly speaking, the social arrangements are in these
situations not necessarily to the benefit of the least advantage group (because they would not prefer this
state of affairs). I do not pursue this issue any further, and the problem is avoided if the same group
(for example the least talented) is the worst-off in every state of affairs; but see Parfit (1984), p. 490-
493.
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progress.s? Hence, violations of political and civil liberties cannot be supported by
arguing that they contribute to the improvement of, for example, life expectancy and
infant survival rates (which could have been a possible way of defending these
violations within a Kantian framework), and, thus, it is hard to interpret these
violations as anything but a transgression of people's status as ends. Thus, to solely
connect the idea of poverty to resource allocation issues - which frequently is the case
in the poverty measurement literature - is to delineate too narrow a picture of the
obligations we have towards other people. However, after having flagged this
important issue, I confine the discussion in the rest of the essay to the
conceptualisation of poverty with respect to resource allocation questions.
How may we, within the Rawlsian framework, understand poverty in the context of
resource allocation questions? The leximin principle can be interpreted as saying that
people are treated merelyas means if they have less then what the worst-off group in
society could have had in a feasible state of affairs. But we may question whether it is
fair to argue that everyone ought to support a criterion which assigns the least
advantaged group dictatorial power on every issue covered by the second principle of
justice. I want to claim that neither is it obvious that Rawls' basic argument (viz. that
native resources and social positions are morally arbitrary) implies that the leximin
criterion is in compliance with the Kantian principle, nor is it trivial to say that the
ideal actor would endorse the leximin criterion behind a veil of ignorance.
Consider first the link between talent and distribution. Some people are definitely
more talented than others, and contribute, therefore, more to the production of various
commodities. The question is, then, how these more talented people ought to face the
fact that there are people with fewer native resources who contribute less, and who
consequently would be entitled to fewer commodities in a society without
redistribution. The more talented group (we assume) want to redistribute some of
their commodities in order to be able to justify their way of living to the less talented
group, but they may find the leximin criterion unreasonable. Why? Simply because
they experience an unreasonably strong tension between aims and interests derived
from the personal standpoint and the claims made by Rawls' framework. That,
69 See Dasgupta (1993), p. 116-121. Notice that there seems to be one interesting exception from this
general conclusion; in countries that enjoy a per-capita national income less than $ 1500, adult literacy
rates are negativelyand significantly correlated with political and civilliberties.
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however, is a tension which is not present in the lives of the worse-off group, who are
receivers of resources in the distributional arrangement. Hence, the better off group
may argue that there ought to be a trade-off between the improvement of the
conditions of the worst-off group (who in an affluent society not necessarily have to
be badly off) and the amount of tension present in the lives of more talented people.
Thus, the better off group may agree that the members of the less talented group
under some distributional arrangements are entitled to such a tiny amount of
resources that their status as ends is threatened, and at the same time reject that the
leximin criterion ought to be the yardstick for the definition of what is a member's
reasonable share of the resources. The argument, though, is not based on a view
which necessarily is in conflict with the essential Rawlsian intuition; talented people
may acknowledge that they do not deserve their greater natural capacity, but at the
same time find it unreasonable that institutional arrangements deal with the natural
distribution entirely through the eyes of the least talented group. Furthermore, they
may claim that the ideal actor also recognises this when he imagines how it is to live
the life of a talented person as his only life (which is part of the imaginary process the
ideal actor has to go through before making a choice behind a veil of ignorance).
Hence, a modified version of the Rawlsian framework may identify people as poor if
they have less than a reasonable share of the resources in society (where the leximin
principle is the most demanding interpretation of the idea of a reasonable share of the
resources in society).
Another problem with the second principle of justice has been debated by Harsanyi.
Harsanyi has criticised the Rawlsian line of reasoning by introducing the following
example:"[C]onsider a society consisting of one doctor and two patients, both of them
critically ill with pneumonia. Their only chance to recover is to be treated by an
antibiotic, but the amount available suffices only to treat one of the two patients. Of
these two patients, individual A is a basically healthy person, apart from his present
attack of pneumonia. On the other hand, individual B is a terminal cancer victim but,
even so, the antibiotic could prolong his life by several months. Which patient should
be given the antibiotic?" .70 The example is about an important social choice, namely
how to organise health policy. Thus, it is of importance that an appropriate normative
70 Harsanyi (1976), p. 41.
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framework is able to guide us in a plausible way on this issue, and Harsanyi claims
that that is not the case for the leximin criterion.
We have to make a few assumptions in order to make the reasoning underlying the
conclusion of Harsanyi transparent. First, assume that A and B have had exactly the
same level of happiness (HA, HB) before they became ill, and assume that B is
attacked by cancer in the same moment as they both also are attacked by pneumonia
(at time O). The treatment takes place at time 1, and we may either choose policy TA
(i.e. we treat A) or TB (Le. we treat B). The person who is not treated dies at time 1, if
A is treated he dies at time 3, and if B is treated she dies at time 2. The leximin
criterion asks who is worst-off in each of the two relevant cases, and Harsanyi claims
that that would be B in both situations.U The line of reasoning of Harsanyi is
(roughly) sketched in Figure 1. If we choose policy TA, then the total amount of
happiness enjoyed by A and B from time O to their death is respectively
H:A = (a+ b + c+ d) and H;A = a. Corresponding figures for policy TB are
H:. =(a+b) and H;. =(a+d). Hence, B is the worst-off person in both situations
as long as b» d.72 Consequently, the leximin criterion claims that we should have a
policy that in these situations instructs the doctor to give the antibiotic to B (where the
cancer victim, after all, has his life prolonged). This is a counter-intuitive conclusion
according to Harsanyi, and he claims that the example indicates that Rawls' second
principle is fundamentally wrong.73
71 A and B may, of course, be interpreted as groups, i.e. A is the better off group and B the worse off
group. A reasonable objection to the example may be to say that both A and B belong to the worse-off
group; after all they are both critically ill. If that were the ease, then the second principle of Rawls does
not tell us anything about the distribution of resources in this example, because the second principle of
justice does not state a position on how to distribute resources within the worse-off group (on this
issue, see also Tungodden (1994b).
72 This restriction is only necessary in order to ensure that the same person is worst-off in both cases,
but that is (as discussed earlier) not an assumption present in the second principle of justice. The
conclusion in the example is, therefore, valid as long as d, b >O.
73 Harsanyi (1976), p. 44. However, it should be obvious that similar controversial examples can be
produced in the context of utilitarianism (though Harsanyi overlooks this fact). If, for example, the
cancer victim B would live as long as the healthy person A (who could be an old man), the utilitarian
framework would still say that we ought to give the antibiotic to person A. I guess many people would
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Fig. 1. An illustration of Harsanyi's example.
The problem in this situation is that the classification of the worst-off member is
based on the total amount of happiness enjoyed throughout his life, and not on the
total amount of happiness enjoyed from the point in time where the policy is
implemented. If the latter view was adopted, then the leximin criterion would support
the opposite health policy (because the corresponding figures would now be:
[H;! = (c +d), H;! = O] and [H;: = O,H;! = d]). But bygones are not bygones in
the Rawlsian framework, and, thus, the fact that the cancer victim has enjoyed less
happiness from time Oto time l overrules the fact that the gain achieved by giving the
antibiotic to A is far greater than the gain achieved by giving it to B.
Similar counter-intuitive examples may also be constructed with respect to the
expected happiness enjoyed by people in the future (independent of the health policy),
but it is not necessary to discuss this particular problem any further here. It is difficult
to make an appropriate link between the future, the past, and the present in the
stipulation of the overall level of well-being of people, and that makes the second
principle of justice vulnerable to the type of criticism advanced by Harsanyi. The
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principle has - for the same reason - some rather controversial consequences in a non-
ideal world (which, in this context, has to be interpreted as a world where Rawlsian
reasoning is at least partly neglected). If the principle is to be applied in our world,
then it demands of us (literally interpreted) not only to alleviate existing inequalities,
but also to compensate for the lower level of happiness that many people have
enjoyed in their lives so far.74
The Rawlsian position, namely to define the overalllife prospect of a person as the
relevant parameter in a discussion of these issues, undoubtedly .has some force, and it
is far from obvious that we ought to consider bygones as bygones in normative
reasoning. But still I find it plausible that people's present situation is stressed in
social choices (which, I hasten to add, is a vague suggestion). A person's present
situation dominates in our thinking on whether this person is treated merelyas a mean
or not, and it would be hard to argue that for example someone who is badly off in an
affluent society is not treated as merelya mean because this person in the past has
experienced a lot of happiness.75
Summing up: In my view, a sensible modification of the claim of Rawls is to argue
that people are treated merelyas means if they have less than a reasonable share of
the resources in society. The appropriate length of the period of time over which the
second principle of justice ought to operate, though, is an issue that needs to be
discussed in the context of our perception of the link between fairness, personal
autonomy, and identity_?6However, it is beyond the scope of this essay to elaborate
on this question, but I shall take up some other aspects connected to this interpretation
of the second principle of justice in section 6 of the essay.
I should like to end this section by briefly commenting on the libertarian
interpretation of the Kantian principle, which is rather different from the one present
in the Rawlsian framework. The libertarian view is that any intentional interference in
people's lives, without their consent, is to treat people merelyas means, and, hence, is
74 This issue raises difficult questions about the link between an ideal and a non-ideal normative
the<>rY; see Rawls (1993), p. 285.
75 Of course, there are many important questions which are closely connected to this issue, e.g. how
the person became badly off. I ignore these issues here, though they need to be dealt with in a more
elaborated discussion of how to understand the idea of a reasonable share of the resources in a non-
ideal world.
76 See also Nagel (1979), p. 124-125.
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a violation of the Kantian principle. Consequently, any moral balancing act that is
forced upon us is wrong."? This reading of the Kantian idea is compelling, because it
is hard to think of a contrary interpretation of intentional interference in people's lives
that aim at a benefit for someone else. We have separate lives and each of us has only
one life, and, thus, in some sense it may appear inevitable to conclude that it would be
wrong if anyone ever should be 'sacrificed' for others.
I cannot examine the conflict between the libertarian and the Rawlsian view closely
here, but I want to sketch a way of understanding the Rawlsian argument with
reference to the libertarian point of view. Rawlsian reasoning accepts interference in
people's lives, and, thus, it is difficult to avoid the formal criticism of liberalism
saying that by interfering in people's lives (aiming at a benefit for someone else) we
are treating those 'sacrificed' simply as means and not as ends.18 However, this type of
criticism is probably not substantial if we keep in mind that the aim of interference
within the Rawlsian framework is simply to guarantee that everyone is treated as an
end, where it is assumed that this moral obligation is not necessarily fulfilled within a
purely libertarian system. Hence, it follows that the use of people merelyas means in
certain respects is only allowed within a Rawlsian framework if it does not threaten
their overall status as ends. Thus, to sustain a strong criticism against moral balancing
acts, a libertarian has to argue that everyone's status as an end always is guaranteed
within a purely libertarian deontological framework (which is what is contested by
the Rawlsian argument).
Can a libertarian, then, support a Rawlsian definition of poverty? Yes, but not the
more comprehensive implications of Rawls' theory with respect to the design of basic
institutions. Libertarianism can be interpreted as a theory about what behaviour
legitimately should be enforced. The claim made byevery libertarian is that the only
normative obligation that can be incorporated into the institutional structure in society
is the obligation not to interfere in other people's lives without their consent. A
libertarian may, of course, also claim that the absence of enforced interference in
other people's lives is the only relevant criterion needed in order to justify our acts.
But another possible libertarian response would be to say that each of us ought to
77 See Nozick (1974), p. 33.
78 This is also recognised by Rawls (1971), who responds by asking "How can we always treat
everyone as an end and never as a means only?" (p. 179).
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contribute to the alleviation of Rawlsian poverty. The libertarian, however, does not
accept enforced interference in order to achieve this aim, and that is where the basic
difference between the Rawlsian and the libertarian framework is rooted on this
issue.I?
5. Teleological reasoning and deontological constraints
Kantian reasoning does not allow us to treat someone as a mean in order to avoid that
other people are treated as means, and thus it rejects the ranking between states of
affairs where this kind of poverty is present. That is a conclusion which most people
probably find hard to accept, even though we at the outset of the essay indicated that
some incompleteness was to be expected in a normative ordering of states of affairs.
One way out of the problem may be to endorse a goal rights system suggested by Sen,
where the violation of a person's status as an end is incorporated in a teleological
framework.t? Thus, the goodness (or badness) of a state of affairs in a goal rights
system may depend on, among other things, the number and types of violations of the
Kantian principle. Sen argues that this way of approaching the problem of
deontological constraints in the evaluation of states of affairs is dominant in our
thinking on these issues; it is for example frequently claimed that "the period of
Emergency Rule in India was a bad one because so many rights of so many people
were violated".81
Is it possible to defend this approach within a Kantian framework, or does a goal
rights system throw the baby out with the bathwater? Is not a goal rights system
simply eroding the protection of people's status as ends by allowing the trade-off
between the improvement of the conditions of those who have less than a reasonable
share of the resources in society (or who have some of their essential liberties
violated) and other goals we may have? The answer may depend on how the goal
rights system of Sen is interpreted, and in order to state a position on this issue we
ought to consider the suggestions made by Sen on evaluator relativity and the
possibility of a positional interpretation of the goodness of states of affairs.82 Sen
argues that an alternative internal structure of normative reasoning may be to allow
79 See also Noziek (1981), p. 502-504.
80 See Sen (1988), p. 187-223.
81Sen (1988), p. 197.
82Sen (1987), p. 61-78, and Sen (1988).
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the position of people to influence their evaluation of states of affairs. Hence, a
position-sensitive goal rights system may allow me as an outsider to make a trade-off,
in the evaluation of states of affairs, between, for example, Rawlsian poverty in
impoverished countries and other goals, and at the same time claim that poor people
should reject any trade-off between other goals and changes in their situation in the
evaluation of states of affairs. Within this. setting, then, the difference between my
normative ranking of states of affairs and the one endorsed by those who are poor is
solely explained by the fact that we occupy different positions in society.
One problem with this proposal is that it makes the link between the normative
ranking of states of affairs and a reasonable behaviour (or policy) difficult to
understand. Are we to act on the normative ranking of states of affairs obtained from
our position, or do we have to take into account the fact that people in other positions
sometimes endorse a different normative ranking? If we have to take into account the
normative ranking obtained in every position within this system, then we face a
version of the basic problem we have discussed throughout the essay (to wit the
problem of how to balance various normative rankings, which in structure is the same
as how to balance various people's interests). On the other hand, if we are to act on
the normative ranking obtained from our own position, then we face the problem that
we sometimes attempt to bring about consequences which other reasonable people -
even though they find our ranking sensible by taking notice of our position - may try
to prevent (because from their position the act causes a worse state of affairs). Thus,
even though a position-sensitive normative framework may partly accommodate the
Kantian idea in the evaluation of the goodness or badness of states of affairs (by
allowing people in particular positions - for example the poor - to reject any trade-off
between Rawlsian poverty and other goals), it faces the same problem as any other
normative framework with respect to the description of reasonable behaviour (or
policy).
The tension between deontological constraints and teleological reasoning is a
difficulty which we ought to consider seriously.83 It is hard to avoid doing trade-offs
between people's interests in normative reasoning, and such a thinking is frequently
needed in order to be able to choose one course of action instead of another. A
position-neutral goal rights system provides, as I see it, an appealing framework for
83On this issue, see also Taurek (1977).
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our thinking on these issues, by allowing a trade-off between deontological reasoning
and other goals, and at the same, and contrary to utilitarian reasoning, attaching
intrinsic importance to deontological arguments. There is a further question about
how to incorporate various deontological arguments in this structure, but it is beyond
the scope of this essay to provide a comprehensive discussion of that problem. I now
tum to an elaboration of the idea of poverty as the lack of a reasonable share of
resources in society, and ignore any further questions about how to understand the
link between aggregate poverty and social choices.
6. Rawlsian Poverty
Three important questions are discussed in brief in this section. First, how are we to
understand the spatial assumption needed in order to make sense of Rawlsian
poverty? Second, what is a plausible definition of a reasonable share of the resources
in a society? And third, is there any overlapping consensus between the Rawlsian and
utilitarian definition of the concept of poverty?
Rawlsian poverty may be interpreted within a global, national or local context,84 and
the relevance of reported poverty figures depends on the importance attached to the
underlying spatial assumption. People who are classified as Rawlsian poor within a
national context may very well possess a reasonable share of the resources if we adopt
a global perspective (or the opposite may be the case if the point of departure is an
impoverished nation). It has been claimed, though, that there are no plausible
normative arguments which can be used in order to defend a local or national analysis
of the Kantian perspective; " [wle rely on global economic and political processes, so
cannot consistently insist that justice (conveniently for the developed world) stops at
state frontiers".85 This may be interpreted as saying that any appropriate scheme of
duties ought to ignore international boundaries, and, hence, that the process of
justification of our acts cannot be narrowed down to only include members of the
community or nation we belong to. However, that may be to overstate a relevant
84 Here, I ignore any intergenerational interpretation of Rawlsian poverty, but that is also an issue
which ought to be taken into account in a comprehensive discussion of this concept Moreover, notice
that the underlying motivation of the normative reasoning present in this essay (to wit our desire to be
able to justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject) deviates somewhat
from the underlying motivation of the framework of Rawls. This difference may be important in a
discussion of the scope of our obligations; see Tungodden (l994c).
85O'Neill(1993), p. 314. See also O'Neill(1986).
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argument. It appears reasonable to argue that people in fact have special obligations
towards those who live close to them, and that national (or local) Rawlsian poverty
can reflect how successful people are in fulfilling these obligations.ås Alas, in this
essay I shall not elaborate on the appropriate link between the various obligations that
we may face within the Rawlsian framework. A moderate conclusion, though, may be
to say that international boundaries should- not be interpreted as cut-off lines for our
obligations, but that they may indicate a change in the strength of these obligations.
How are we to define a reasonable share of the resources when the appropriate
context is clarified?87 Three possibilities exist. First, we may argue that every citizen
ought to be entitled to a certain percentage of the resources available in society, where
the percentage is independent of the total amount of resources available. That is how
we may understand the poverty standard of the European Commission, where the
poor population is defined as people with less then 50% of the median disposable
income in the country in question. On the other hand, we may argue that the
appropriate percentage has to depend on the total amount of resources available in
that society. Two conflicting arguments can support this view, and, consequently,
guide us in opposite directions. We may claim that the tension (between fulfilling
moral obligations and pursuing personal aims) within each member of the better-off
group is stronger in impoverished societies, where the better-off group also may be
rather badly off. The ideal actor recognises that problem of the better-off group
behind the veil of ignorance, and, therefore, chooses less redistribution than in an
affluent society. On the other hand, the demands of the worse-off group in an
impoverished society are probably far more stringent than in an affluent society, and
that may cause the ideal actor to choose an even more equal distribution of resources
in these situations.
There is also a third option that merits mentioning within this setting. It is possible to
argue that the Kantian obligation of the members of the better-off group is to support
the members of the worse-off group to the extent that they attain a minimum level of
well-being, which, thus, is to claim that no one ever can argue that he or she is treated
86 These obligations may be of both of instrumental and intrinsic importance; on this issue, see Sen
(1984), p. 290-300. See also Dower (1991).
87See Tungodden (1994b) for a discussion of the implications of various definitions of a reasonable
share of the resources for the social ordering on various distributions within the least advantaged
segment,
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merelyas a mean if they have attained a level of well-being above this minimum
standard. (Of course, within this view one also has to specify what a reasonable share
of the resources ought to be if the society has fewer resources than what is needed in
order to provide everyone with this minimum standard.) This view marks a
fundamentally different position from the two discussed above; the underlying idea is
here that people only are obliged to contribute to the improvement of the conditions
of the least advantaged segment as long as this group has a level of well-being below
a given minimum standard. But what ought this minimum standard be like? One may,
of course, link the minimum level of well-being to the meeting of needs that are a
prerequisite for the continuation of people's lives, but I find it more plausible that an
ideal actor behind a veil of ignorance - if she endorses this position - would favour a
more comprehensive definition of the minimum standard.
To focus on a narrow definition of the minimum level of well-being may, however,
be of practical interest in order to attain agreement about the importance of reported
poverty figures. Poverty in the utilitarian framework is about identifying people with
particularly intense desires, and it should not be very controversial to assume that
people who lack food, shelter, water, clothing and alike are one such group. There
are, of course, also other groups with intense desires, but poverty figures that report
changes in the conditions of this group of people are undoubtedly essential within a
utilitarian framework. Moreover, these figures are at the same time important from a
Rawlsian point of view (at least if we accept the framework of a positional-neutral
goal rights system), because in most cases, if the society is not too impoverished, they
represent people who are merely treated as means according to any plausible
interpretation of the Kantian principle. Hence, though the underlying reasoning differs
fundamentally, there is probably a certain overlapping consensus between the
Rawlsian and the utilitarian framework about the importance of poverty figures of
this kind.
This is, of course, an all-too-brief discussion of the content of the various positions
which one may take up on the question of how to understand Rawlsian poverty. But,
hopefully, the discussion has emphasised the importance of clarifying the structure of
the underlying foundation of various poverty figures. We cannot expect complete
agreement on how to interpret the concept of poverty, but we ought to pursue a
transparent understanding of the normative foundation of reported poverty figures. In
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that respect, I believe the Rawlsian understanding of poverty (as the lack of a
reasonable share of the resources in society) represents one fruitful approach. And I
now apply the Rawlsian framework in order to clarify a deep disagreement present in
the poverty measurement literature, to wit about whether to endorse an 'absolutist' or
'relativist' understanding of the concept of poverty.
7. Absolute or Relative Poverty
There is a well-known controversy between Sen and Townsend on this topic.88
Townsend has, in his work on poverty, emphasised the importance of including social
needs among the basic needs of individuals, and he is thereby in line with a tradition
which goes back to Adam Smith: "By necessaries I understand not only the
commodities which are indispensable necessary for the support of life, but whatever
the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest
order, to be without ...Custom ...has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in
England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in
public without them".89 The demands of society will, of course, change over time and
vary among cultures, and Townsend rejects on this basis the fundament for absolute
poverty. However, as Sen underlines, the need for, for example, social participation
can be perceived as a constant element in the definition of absolute poverty. The
relative aspect in Townsend's argument is only referring to an instrumental space, i.e.
to what commodities that are needed in order to participate in social life. Thus,
Townsend's claim (according to Sen) cannot be counted as an attack on the absolutist
view on poverty, but rather as an important contribution in the debate about what
ought to be taken into account in a defmition of absolute poverty.
However, as should by now be clear from our discussion, it is also possible to defend
a relativist approach to poverty within a space of intrinsic importance.90 Ifwe adopt a
Rawlsian understanding of poverty, we may argue that whether people with a
particular level of well-being are poor or not ought to depend on the level of well-
being enjoyed by the rest of the population. Thus, an intrinsically relativist approach
to poverty is not to be explained by the variable commodity requirement needed in
88 See Townsend (1985) and Sen (1985).
89Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (see Sen (1984), p. 333).
90 See Sen (1992), p. 116, as well.
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order to attain a particular level of well-being, but by reference to the Kantian
obligation we have to guarantee that everyone in society is entitled to a reasonable
level of well-being. And the importance of the concept of Rawlsian poverty is easily
seen if we discuss aspects as life expectancy and infant mortality. People are
Rawlsian poor when their life expectancy at birth is 35-45 years (as in for example
Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Nepal) when at the same time the
life expectancy in our part of the world is 75-80 years.P! But the same group of
people can hardly be characterised as poor in a Rawlsian frame_work if everyone's life
expectancy in the relevant society in fact is 35-45 years. Hence, the Rawlsian
framework may capture an important part of a plausible interpretation of the concept
of poverty, which is easily neglected by solely focusing on the idea of absolute
poverty.
8. Final Remarks
The interpretation of the concept of poverty as the lack of a reasonable share of
resources links poverty to the idea of inequality, but it does not make the content of
the two concepts the same. Inequality (in the level of well-being enjoyed by various
people in a society) is needed in order to explain Rawlsian poverty, but some
inequality may also coexist with the absence of Rawlsian poverty (as should be
obvious from the discussion in section 6). Hence, Rawlsian poverty provides one
reason for why we ought to be concerned with the presence of inequality in a society,
but there are also other reasons (such as the one derived from utilitarian reasoning)
which may be linked to the issue ofinequality.92
The idea of Rawlsian poverty introduced in this essay is vague, and it does not settle
the question about the appropriate definition of a reasonable share of resources.
Hence, the statement of the Secretary of State for Social Security in Britain can be
defended within a Rawlsian framework by either appealing to a global context as the
appropriate spatial assumption (though it is far from obvious that no one in Britain is
91 See Dasgupta (1993), p. 118-119, for figures on the life expectancy at birth for people in various
developing countries.
92 See Atkinson (1970) for an illuminating discussion of the link between the utilitarian framework
and the idea of inequality.
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below the poverty line derived from that assumprionv'), or by appealing to a very low
level of well-being as the appropriate minimum standard to be used in the discussion
of our Kantian obligation (independent of whether the society in question is affluent
or impoverished). Neither of these assumptions would be indisputable, though, and
there are strong arguments that can be used in order to defend a very different
position from the one taken up by the Secretary of State. The importance of the idea
of Rawlsian poverty elaborated on in this essay is that it provides us with a
framework for this type of discussions.
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3Rationality, Value, and Well-Beingl
1. Introduction
Is there anything that makes my life better or worse? Anything I should aim at or try
to avoid? I think so, and most people agree. But would the same elements also
improve or worsen other lives? Are there any objective elements in the description of
the quality of life? If so, what are these elements? And what makes them valuable?
These questions are discussed in this essay, where the aim is to shed some light on the
idea of rationality in individual choices, the concept of well-being, and the problem of
interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
If there are things that I ought to pursue in order to improve my well-being, then these
things - if I am aware of them - should have an influence on my choices. However,
they are not necessarily the only things that may affect my choices; I may for example
also view myself committed to acts which sometimes reduce my own level of well-
being.s In this essay, though, I neglect these other aspects which may affect my
choices, and take up a well-being interpretation of preference.å In section 2, I discuss
l For their comments on earlier versions of this essay, I am grateful to Bernt Christian Brun, Rune
Jansen Hagen, Ottar Mæstad, Derek Parfit, Agnar Sandmo, and Svein Aage Aanes.
2 The claim that people sometimes choose an alternative which may reduce their own level of well-
being is often met by scepticism ("Be honest now, there was also something in it for you!"). The
problem in a discussion of this issue is, of course, the difficulty of doing upright introspection of the
motivation of your own choices, but still I see it as plausible that people sometimes are motivated by
something else than self-interest. Note as well, that people rejecting this position do not necessarily
endorse a narrow interpretation of the structure of people's motivation; see for example Becker (1992):
"I have tried to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest Behaviour is driven
by a much richer set of values and preferences" (p. 385). On this issue, see also Hausman and
McPherson (1993,1994), Nozick (1981,1989,1993), Parfit (1984), Rawls (1993), Sen
(1982,1992,1994), and Walsh (1994).
3 See Tungodden (l994a) for a discussion of the underlying structure of our social choices.
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some seemingly inevitable implications of the framework of rational choice theory; in
section 3, I elaborate on the understanding of the concept of well-being; and in
section 4, some important issues on interpersonal comparisons of well-being are
discussed.
2. Rationality and Value
The conventional theory of individual rationality imposes the properties of
completeness and internal consistency on people's preference structure. And the
presence of these two properties ensures that there is always at least one 'best' element
in the set from which people have to choose+ The requirements of completeness and
consistency may be interpreted as either hypotheses or axioms about the foundation
of individual motivation, and - for reasons that soon will be made clear - the latter
interpretation has the upper hand in this essay. The aim of the discussion in this
section is to consider the reasonableness of assuming that there always is at least one
'best' element in the set from which people have to choose (this topic is also discussed
further in section 3), and, moreover, to indicate the deeper ethical implications of
endorsing the framework of rational choice theory. 5
But let us first consider the idea of interpreting these requirements as hypotheses. It
has been argued by Sen that the possibility of actually testing conditions of
consistency is rather limited, and I should like to elaborate - and maybe strengthen -
that claim somewhat.s For that purpose, consider the following dialogue (taking place
during the annual family party) between cousin R (who is a researcher concerned with
the empirical validity of the consistency hypothesis in rational choice theory) and
cousin F (who is a fanner with a particular interest in the behaviour of guinea-pigsj.?
4 The property of consistency may be defined in various ways; the requirement of transitivity is the
most common, but it may be substituted by a requirement of either quasi-transitivity or acyclicality; on
this issue, see Sen (1970). The discussion in this essay is only concerned with choices under certainty,
but see Broome (1991) and Hausman and McPherson (1993) for a discussion of the structure of
rationality underlying expected utility theory.
5 On these issues, see also von Wright (1987), p. 151-155, and Sen (1987a).
6 Sen (1982), p. 3.
? The consistency hypothesis that cousin R has in mind in this example is the one introduced by
Samuelson (1948), to wit that if x is revealed preferred to y by a person, then y would never be revealed
preferred to x by this person. The close relationship between this idea and the idea of transitivity is
discussed in Sen (1973). See also Sen (1993a) for the discussion of a similar example.
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R: My dear cousin, I have to say that your behaviour is rather inconsistent today.
F: What do you have in mind, cousin R?
R: Well, I just observed that you first rejected aunt Bessie's offer of a slice of apple-pie, and then, in the
next moment, accepted the same offer from her.
F: But, my good friend, there was no inconsistent pattern present in those choices. Did you not notice a
difference between the two offers from aunt Bessie1
R: Admittedly, I did not
F: I am baffled, I thought you were a trained observer. Anyway, the difference was the following:
There was only one slice left on the plate the first time aunt Bessie offered me apple-pie. When she
returned from the kitchen, however, there were several pieces on the plate. I accepted her second offer,
therefore.
R: Oh, I see. So the difference between the alternatives you faced the first time was not only between
having a slice of apple-pie or not, but also between being perceived as a well-behaved or a greedy guy
by the rest of the family. And, surely, this latter distinction was absent when you made your second
choice. Of course, that explains the seeming inconsistency in your behaviour. Well, I can really
understand that you wanted to avoid the embarrassment of being perceived as a greedy guy.
F: No no, that is a misconception of the situation. It is true that several members of the family would
have perceived me as greedy if I picked the last slice of apple-pie. But, honestly, I am completely
unconcerned about whether the family perceive me as a well-behaved or a greedy guy. However, I also
knew that you would have been amused by the talk about 'the greedy cousin F', and that was what
made me reject the first offer from aunt Bessie.
R: I am surprised and disappointed. I would certainly not be amused by such talk. But be that as it may,
the important issue is that your behaviour was not at all inconsistent
F: That is true, you can take Il!y word for it,
The hypothesis about consistency in people's behaviour is unverifiable unless the
observer is able to see inside people's heads, because any seeming inconsistency may
derive from a misunderstanding of the real alternatives faced by the person in
question. We may, of course, ask the person whether the alternatives faced in the two
situations were identical from his position, but that is the same as to ask him whether
he in fact acted consistently. Obviously, we are unable to verify whether the given
answer is true or not. It follows straightforwardly that we face the same type of
problems in a verification of the hypothesis about completeness in people's preference
structure, and, hence, we shall concentrate on the question about the reasonableness
of assuming that people always view at least one of the elements in the set from
which they have to choose as 'best'. This question is, as should become evident
shortly, important in a discussion of the scope of human behaviour that may be
analysed by the use of the framework of rational choice theory.
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In order to be able to select a 'best' alternative, people need one or several criteria.
One possibility is, of course, to say that people are born with a complete and
consistent preference structure, Le. their understanding of the 'best' alternative among
a set of alternatives is nothing but a reflection of a predetermined biological
preference structure. (But why should theJorce of evolution bring about a complete
and consistent preference structure?) Another suggestion may be to say that our
preference structure is entirely shaped by the era into which w~ happen to have been
born, by our parents, and so on.8 However, these arguments - despite their obvious
relevance - can hardly provide a complete understanding of this issue. They certainly
explain why someone prefers apples to pears or blue cars to red cars, but at the same
time they delineate a too narrow picture of what it is to be a human being. We do not
conceive ourselves - rightly I think - as merely playthings of external forces (that may
be biological or sociological), but also as individuals who reflect and seek reasons
that may guide our behaviour throughout our lives. We have all been pondering on
hard choices, where the process of choosing has involved reflection beyond
straightforward introspection of what the inescapable part of our preference structure
has to tell us in this situation.
Hence, it becomes relevant - in order to evaluate the appropriateness of the axioms of
consistency and completeness - to discuss the content and structure of the various
reasons that may constitute the foundation of our preference structure. (In this
discussion, the reader should keep in mind that we are only concerned with the well-
being interpretation of preference.) By way of illustration, consider the choice of
career, and assume that someone may become either a lawyer or a forester.? This
person wants to choose the profession that gives her the highest level of well-being.
One problem (stressed by Elster) is that she has incomplete information about both
professions. But let us for the sake of the argument assume that she already had tried
both for a lifetime. Would there then necessarily be a 'best' alternative? What type of
information could persuade her to say that the life as a forester is better than the life
as a lawyer (or maybe to say that the the choice of profession does not influence her
level of well-being)? Elster's suggestion seems to be that she ought to choose the
8 See Becker (1992), and Griffin (1991).
9 This choice is also discussed by Elster (1989), p. 9-10.
51
career that makes her more happy. io And the Benthamian idea will provide us with a
reason that may constitute the framework of the axioms of completeness and
consistency in rational choice theory. Various alternatives can within this setting be
ranked according to how much happiness they bring about for the person in question,
and, thus, through the lenses of the Benthamian idea, there is always at least one 'best'
alternative in every situation.
Happiness is an elusive concept,'! and I shall, in the next section, consider alternative
approaches to the concept of well-being. But be that as it may for the moment. The
introduction of happiness in the reasoning of Elster is important, because it illustrates
the close link between a discussion of rational choices and a discussion of our
understanding of the valuable objects that constitute the concept of well-being. If
there were no valuable objects, then the concept of well-being would be meaningless,
and there was no reasoning for pondering.P Within such a framework, there would be
nothing that anyone should consider as good or bad in their lives. Hence, the idea of
betterness would be meaningless, and the person should simply toss a coin when
choosing between two alternatives. (The reader may object, and argue that the person
still could use the inescapable part of her preference structure in some cases. But why
should the person choose the alternative she inevitably desires? Why should she not
sometimes choose contrary to her inclinationsft-) In a world without values - which
is the world of an ethical nihilist - there is nothing to pursue.l+ Hence, in such a world
there is no deeper foundation for the properties of completeness and consistency in
individual choices. Why should the internal structure of our choices be consistent if
there is nothing worth pursuing? And for the very same reason, why should we then,
in any situation, prefer one alternative to the other?
Consequently, I want to claim that rational choice theory has to be interpreted within
a non-nihilistic framework, i.e. axioms of consistency and completeness can only be
of interest if people in general believe that there are valuable and disvaluable objects.
10 Elster (1989), p. io, footnote 29.
11 See Parfit (1984) and Griffm (1986) for a discussion of the concept of happiness.
12 Taylor (1993) has made a similar claim: "[W]e cannot understand ourselves, or each other, cannot
make sense of our lives or determine what to do, without accepting a richer ontology than naturalism
allows" (p. 212).
13 See also Sen (1987c), p. 202.
14 For brief discussions of ethical nihilism and scepticism, see Nozick (1981), Parfit (1984), Putnam
(1993), and Taylor (1993).
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That, however, is not to say that we ought to embrace the idea of a world of values or
the framework of rational choice theory, but rather that there is a close link between
these two ideas.l> In faet, there are interesting results reported by psychiatrists about
the problems of increasing nihilism in society that illustrate the inappropriateness of
the rational choice model in certain contexts. It is reported that the problem of
'Borderline Personality Disorder' - which is defined by the following (among others)
diagnostic criterion: "marked and persistent identity disturbance manifested by
uncertainty about ...long-term goals or career choice ... [and] ...preferred values ... " - is
increasing in the young part of the population due to the (for many) seeming lack of
meaning in our modem world.l6 Obviously, people who find it difficult to perceive
anything of value in our world will not fit into the framework of rational choice
theory.
But I find it reasonable to assume that the general opinion in society is that it makes
sense to talk about valuable and disvaluable objects, and, thus, it becomes of interest
to discuss the nature of these objects. That is the topic of the next section, where I
elaborate on possible interpretations of the concept of well-being. However, I should
like to end this section by in brief indicating the status of values within economics,
and, moreover, with some remarks about possible misinterpretations of the arguments
outlined so far. First, what is the present view on values within our profession? The
standard approach is to claim that "we deal with people who maximize their utility,
and it would be both inconsistent and idle for us to urge people not to do so" .17
However, as is well-known, a utility function is nothing but an appropriate phrase for
the mathematical representation ofpeople's preferences, and thus - despite its rhetoric
elegance - the claim does not say anything of substantial importance about the
underlying foundation of our preference structure.P It simply states that we have a
complete and consistent preference structure that guides our choices, and leaves the
question about the origin of this preference structure unanswered. Hence, it is of more
15 This link is very explicit in the writings of Rawls (1971,1993): "This idea [of goodness as
rationality] supposes that the members of a democratic society have, at least in an intuitive way, a
rational plan of life in the light of which they schedule their more important endeavours and allocate
their various resources ...so as to pursue their conceptions of the good over a complete life, if not in the
most rational, then at least in a sensible way" (1993, p. 177).
16 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association,
Washington D. C. 1987, p. 347). I am indebted to Nina Tungodden for this reference; see also
Tungodden (1992).
17Stigler (1981), p. 150.
18On this issue, see also Cooter and Rappoport (1984).
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interest to relate our discussion to the claim of Sugden about economists as moral
subjectivists who argue "that the moral world contains alternative theories of the good
life, and that which theory any individual accepts is a matter of personal taste or
private commitment't.J? This claim acknowledges that the foundation of the
preference structure (at least partly) is related to a conception of the moral world, and
if this is the standard view within economics, then it is somewhat surprising that so
many economists have been reluctant to discuss value issues. It should be of a certain
interest - for those who endorse the claim of Sugden - to discuss which theories that
constitute the moral world, even though the choice of theory should be a matter of
personal taste or private commitment (whatever that means). In fact, willy-nilly,
economists do make claims about values. It is for example commonly assumed that
the utility function of people is defined on consumption and leisure, and assumptions
of this kind ought to reflect (if we are not simply playthings of external forces) the
view that there is a dominant underlying conception of the good life in society.20 In
the next section, I shall elaborate on various views on the realm of value that may
explain our preference for (by way of illustration) consumption and leisure, and
which may enrich our understanding of the motivational sources of human behaviour.
A further clarification of the content and structure of the realm of values may solely
be motivated by an interest in predictive issues (as I shall illustrate by an example in
section 3). However, as should be evident from the quoted statements, arguments
about values are often interpreted within a normative setting, and in that respect I
shall like to make a few remarks on possible misinterpretations of the present
discussion. First, the arguments advanced in this section have had nothing to say
about the status of preference autonomy.s! Obviously, if it is to be meaningful to say
that some objects are valuable, then there also have to be disvaluable objects, and,
consequently, sometimes we may pursue the wrong ends. But whether anyone should
try to stop us from doing things that are bad for us (if they by any chance should have
more knowledge in this situation than ourselves), is a social choice which it is beyond
the scope of this essay to discuss (but offhand I guess the idea of liberty is of utter
19Sugden (1993), p. 1953.
20 One possibility, though, may be (as suggested by Rawls (1971, 1993» that some goods are all-
purpose means, i.e. that they may serve all the various conceptions of a good life. But in order to
evaluate the reasonableness of this assumption, we have to clarify the various conceptions of a good
life that may be present in the realm of value. Hence, assumptions of this kind do not erase the
relevance of the present discussion. On this issue, see also Sen (1992).
21On this issue, see Broome (1978), Harsanyi (1976), and Scanlon (1991).
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importance in this context).22 Next, the aim of this section has not been to argue that
the acknowledgement of valuable and disvaluable objects is sufficient in order to
make the assumptions of rational choice theory reasonable in every situation. The
presence of a realm of values may still imply some incompleteness in the preference
structure of people, because, in certain situations, there can be irreducible conflicts
between the values involved (an issue I shall return to in section 3).23 Schelling has
illuminatingly illustrated this problem: "How do we know whether an hour of extreme
pain is more than life is worth? Alternatively, how do we know whether an hour of
extreme pain is more than death is worth? The conclusion that I reach is that I do not
know, not for you and not for me".24
3. Value and Well-Being
There are at least two substantial questions about the structure of the realm of
values.25 The more ambitious question is to ask about what makes certain objects
valuable. In order to answer such a question, a general theory of value is needed.26 If
we were able to outline this general theory of value, we would also be able to list (and
rank) the particular objects that are valuable. A more mundane question, though, is to
just ask about the content of a list of valuable objects, without demanding a deeper
explanation of what it is that makes these objects valuable (though we should expect
some kind of defence to go with a claim of this kind). An example may clarify the
distinction. Consider the claim of Schelling quoted at the end of the preceding
section. Schelling assumes that pain is a disvaluable object, Le. the presence of pain
in a person's life decreases her well-being. That is a fair suggestion, but we may still
ask why pain should be such a disvaluable object. It is in order to answer such a
question that we need a general theory of value. However, the more mundane
question is at issue in this section, and I now tum to a discussion of whether the
unrestricted desire theory may convey a reasonable understanding of the concept of
well-being.I?
22On this issue, see Hausman and McPherson (1994). Some difficult questions in this respect have
been discussed by Schelling (1984).
23 Seealso Sen (1987a),p. 66-67.
24Schelling (1984), p. 9.
25 See also Scanlon (1993), p. 190.
26On this question, see Nozick (1981), p. 399-457.
27 See also the discussion in Scanlon (1993) and Sen (l987b) on this issue.
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The basic structure of the unrestricted desire theory is simple. Fulfilment of any desire
makes a life better, because the valuable object in life is fulfilment of desires. We
may say that fulfilment of desires has intrinsic value. Anything, however, may have
instrumental value, i.e. anything may be valuable because it contributes to the
fulfilment of desires. If a person desires friendship, self-respect, and a nice meal, then
the introduction of these things in his life contributes to an improvement of his well-
being (by increasing the number of desires fulfilled). Henc~, it follows from this
framework that a person ought to rank various alternatives according to how much
they contribute to the fulfilment of his desires (where the fulfilment of intense desires
is to be considered as more valuable than the fulfilment of weak desires). Of course,
this also covers cases that involve endogenous preferences - the person always ought
to choose the alternative that has most desire-fulfilment, independent of the type of
desires that are fulfilled in the various alternatives. Thus, the unrestricted desire
theory would provide us with the necessary foundation for acquiring a complete and
consistent preference structure.
The choice of career is rather trivial in the light of the unrestricted desire theory if we
possess complete information about the content of both alternatives; the life as a
forester is better than the life as a lawyer if it contains more desire fulfilment (where,
once again, desire fulfilment in any alternative is to be measured in relation to the
preference structure occupied in the respective alternative).28 More generally, some
interesting predictions may be made about preference formation if we assume that
people perceive the unrestricted desire theory as a reasonable representation of the
realm of values, and I should like to briefly mention one of them here, by introducing
an idea from the theory of network externalities. The theory of network externalities
argues that "the utility that a given user derives from the good depends upon the
number of other users who are in the same 'network' as is he or she".29 The personal
computer market may exemplify this idea, where "an agent purchasing a personal
28 This line of reasoning may be important for many economic choices. Consider. by way of
illustration, the question about migration discussed by (among others) Bliss (1993). Bliss asks us to
imagine a farmer that reflects on the possibility of moving to the city. The farmer knows that he will
adapt to city life. and moreover he possesses complete information about the two alternatives. What is
he to do? Bliss claims - without any further reasoning - that "with a fundamental change [in preference
structure]. the problem looks impossible" (p. 426). However. as illustrated above. the choice is trivial if
the farmer perceives the unrestricted desire theory as a reasonable representation of the realm of value.
29Katz and Shapiro (1985). p. 424.
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computer will be concerned with the number of agents purchasing similar hardware
because the amount and variety of software that will be supplied for use with a given
computer will be an increasing function of the number of hardware units that have
been sold"_3oNow, interpret the hardware as the person's preference structure and the
software as the kind of commodities needed to fulfill the most intense desires derived
from this preference structure. By applying the same line of reasoning as present in
the discussion of the personal computer market, we may argue that the amount of
desire fulfilment that a person can derive from choosing a_particular preference
structure depends upon the number of people that choose the same preference
structure. This argument thus indicates that there is a reason for rational people to join
the dominating 'network' in society when they choose their preference structure, and,
hence, we may predict an extensive overlapping among the preference structures of
people in society.U Obviously, it is possible to produce contrary arguments, but I
shall not consider them here.
But how plausible is the unrestricted desire theory as a description of the realm of
values? The framework is to some extent intuitively appealing, because it appears to
capture an important part of our thinking on the concept of well-being. A life without
the fulfilment of any desires seems to be unbearable, and it appears rather innocuous
to claim that a person that lives such a life has an extremely low level of well-being.
Thus, to claim that desire fulfilment constitutes the relevant aspect of well-being may
at first glance be perceived as reasonable (and inevitable). But an unrestricted desire
theory faces some deep problems, and I shall in a moment explain why I find it
implausible that the unrestricted desire theory provides an adequate understanding of
our view on the realm of values. However, first I shall like to invalidate two
unreasonable claims against the unrestricted desire theory. In that respect, consider
the following example:
Example A: I have a desire for a glass of water. There is a glass at my table. I believe
it contains water, and, thus, I desire it. It contains, however, fatal poison.
30 Katz and Shapiro (1985). p. 424.
31 Some readers may find this argument somewhat obscure, because they find it difficult to understand
the process of choosing a preference structure. I guess the reason is that the wording is somewhat
unfamiliar. Rational preference formation may straightforwardly take place by for example choosing
friends and career (and so on) that you expect will influence your preference structure in the wanted
direction. See also the discussion in Beeker (1992) on rational preference formation within the family.
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This example has been discussed by Hausman and McPherson.32 They argue that it
illustrates the problem that false beliefs impose on an unrestricted desire theory,
because they conclude that this theory says that my well-being is improved when I
drink the glass of poison (after all, I have a desire fulfilled)}3 Clearly, no one would
find such a claim reasonable, and, thus, it seems like the unrestricted desire theory is
embarrassed by Example A. However, that is not the case, and I want in brief to
indicate where the reasoning of Hausman and McPherson has gone astray. They claim
that my desire for a glass of water is fulfilled when I drink the glass of poison. That is
in some sense true if I do not notice the distinction between water and poison when I
drink the glass of poison. I desire the psychological state of drinking a glass of water,
and this is in fact the experience I have when I drink the glass of poison (and believe
that I drink water). And if that were the only consequence of my act, then we could
join the conclusion of Hausman and McPherson. However, by drinking the glass of
fatal poison I also cause my own death, and, obviously, that reduces the number of
desires fulfilled in my life. The unrestricted desire theory says that I should choose
the alternative that brings about most desire fulfilment in my life, Le. I should not
drink the glass of poison. Hence, if I drink the glass of poison, I act wrongly
according to the unrestricted desire theory.
False beliefs may be problematic with respect to social choices (though not in this
particular case), but they do not pose a problem for the unrestricted desire theory as
the foundation for the concept of well-being.H The next example indicates that it
would be unreasonable to neglect desire-fulfilment derived from false beliefs in a
discussion of a person's level of well-being.
Example B: I have a desire for being a good father. I believe that I am a good father,
but the truth is that I am not.
There is, however, an ambiguity in example B that has been considered to be of a
certain interest. In general, my desire for a specific state of the world can be on two
different levels. First, Imay desire a state of the world because I desire the experience
of this state of the world. If that is the kind of desire I have in mind in example B,
then my desire is fulfilled when Ibelieve that I am a good father. We may say that I
32Hausman and McPherson (1993,1994).
33Hausman and McPherson (1994), p. 396.
34 See Broome (1991), chap. 8, for a discussion of the problem of false beliefs in social choices.
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only have a derived desire for a specific state of the world, Le. the state of the world is
only important in order to bring about the fulfilment of my desire for a particular
mental state. However, the desire in example B may also be a desire for being a good
father as such, and not only a desire of believing oneself to be a good father. If that
were the case, then - according to the unrestricted desire theory - my well-being is
lower than I assume in example B (because I wrongly believe that I am a good
father). Some people find this implication of the unrestricted desire theory
troublesome, because they view it as implausible that one's well-being could depend
on anything else than the fulfilment of desires for mental states.35 But consider now
the following example:
Example C: I have a desire for being a good father. I believe that I am not a good
father, but the truth is that I am.
Does the reader find it straightforward to say that my level of well-being is higher in
B than in C? I do not, though I admit that a thorough discussion is needed in order to
settle any dispute on this question. However, I shall not elaborate on the various pros
and cons here, but only comment on one line of reasoning that I find unreasonable in
a discussion of this issue, to wit the line of reasoning that refers to the problem of
measurement in a justification of a narrowing of the concept of well-being.Jf
Someone may for example support the claim that the experienced quality of a person's
conscious life ought to constitute our understanding of the concept of well-being by
the following argument: "Everyone should be able to precisely evaluate changes in
one's own level of well-being". But, obviously, it is impossible to say whether one is
able to measure an object or not before we have defined the object which we are
about to measure, and, thus, it does not make sense to impose such an a priori
restriction on the concept of well-being. It may very well be the case that we are
unable to measure precisely our own - or other people's - level of well-being, but that
is a question we should discuss when we have acquired a definition of the concept of
well-being that we find plausible. (I shall return to this issue in section 4.)
35 People who make a claim of this kind are sometimes called preference-hedonists. See Parfit (1984)
and Scanlon (1993) for a more comprehensive discussion of their argument, and the connection 10the
hedonistic view of Bentham.
36 See for example Bliss (1993), p. 417-418.
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The shortcoming of the unrestricted desire theory, however, is straightforwardly seen
from the following example:
Example D: I may choose to become a drug addict. I am assured sufficient supplies
of drugs for the rest of my life. A life as a drug addict would thus consist of fulft1ment
of extremely intense desires (for injection of drugs). (My life expectancy is
independent of whether I choose the life as.a drug addict or not.)
The unrestricted desire theory claims that I enjoy a high level of well-being as a drug
addict, because my life consists of the fulfilment of a large number of extremely
intense desires. That is an unreasonable claim, because the overall condition of living
achieved by a drug addict cannot be characterised as valuable.t? Surely, the drug
addict has an enormous amount of desires fulfilled, and there is no other way of
achieving more desire fulft1ment.But the life as a drug addict lacks achievement in
every other dimension of life, and that makes us hesitant to accept the claim of the
unrestricted desire theory. Thus, there seem to be other things than the amount of
desire fulfilment that we perceive as valuable, and the absence of these things in the
life of the drug addict causes us not to choose the life as a drug addict (if we had the
opportunity discussed in example D).
Some readers may want to argue that the drug addict has a desire for a disvaluable
object, and - if this claim is reasonable - we may question whether desire fulfilment
should be considered a valuable object in example D738 This is a difficult issue, and
various views may be advanced. On the one hand, we may claim that desire
fulfilment is not a valuable object in itself, but only important in order to extract the
value potential present in various situations.J?Hence - according to this interpretation
37 See also Parfit (1984), p. 496-498. Parfit argues that there may be another version of the unrestricted
desire theory which can be applied in cases of this kind, to wit one may say that people also have
global desires for one's life considered as a whole, and that the fulfilment of global desires has
lexicographic priority in the evaluation of a person's level of well-being. Hence, if I have a global
desire for a life not addicted to drugs, then I have a low level of well-being if I in fact become a drug
addict. Thus, the global version of the unrestricted desire theory seems to avoid any embarrassment
from example D. However, this presumes that our global desires may be unconnected with the
fulfilment of local desires in each life (otherwise, I should desire the life as a drug addict). But if that
were the case, then people may have a global desire for a life without any local desire fulfilment (i.e. a
global desire for a life without anything of value), and we should have to say that their lives are
valuable if they have fulfilled this global desire for a life without any value. That seems to be an absurd
conclusion, and, thus, the global version of the unrestricted desire theory does not appear to be a very
~romiSing alternative (I should like to thank Derek Parfit for detailed comments on this issue).
8 See also Sen (l987b), p. 9-12.
39 See Tungodden (1994a) for a further discussion of this idea.
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- if a person desires something that is disvaluable, then the fulfilment of this desire
does not bring about anything valuable in his life (on the contrary, it only brings
about the disvaluable object that the person desires). But it does not seem
straightforward to apply this argument to example D. It would not be unreasonable to
claim that the life as a drug addict is less bad if one always has sufficient supply of
drugs than if one sometimes lacks the .desired drug (of course, we neglect the
possibility of becoming 'clean' if the supply of drugs is cut). Alternatively, we may
argue that desire fulfilment should be considered as valuable !n every situation, and
claim that cases of the kind discussed in example D only illustrate situations where
the valuable object of desire fulfilment is outweighed by the presence of a disvaluable
object. But neither is this suggestion indisputable; it may seem implausible to claim
that anything of value is obtained when someone for example obtains the fulfilment
of an antisocial desire ("lt was valuable that he had his desire for killing his neighbour
fulfilled, even though it undoubtedly is disvaluable to be a murderer").
However, I shall in the following disregard these extremely difficult cases, and, on the
whole, view desire fulfilment as a valuable object. Moreover, I shall also assume that
desire fulfilment is necessary to extract the value potential present in other relevant
objects. There are, of course, a number of objects that may be of interest in this
context; whether I am in good health, a person with self-respect, a part in the life of
the community, and so on. These objects, that characterise what the person is able to
do and be in the various states of affairs, are conventionally considered to be valuable,
and the presence or absence of them is usually taken into account in an overall
consideration of the situation (together with the extent of desire fulfilment in the
various alternatives). Sen has characterised these various objects as functionings, and
he claims that "functionings are constitutive of a person's being, and an evaluation of
well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements".40 In
the light of our discussion, that appears to be a reasonable claim, and I shall apply the
framework of Sen in the rest of the discussion.
The approach of Sen may indicate a reasonable representation of the concept of well-
being, but it leaves unanswered some difficult questions. Certain valuable and
40Sen (1992), p. 39. The freedom aspect is also an important part of the framework suggested by Sen,
and it is characterised by the concept of a capability set, See Sen (1987b,1993c) for a discussion of this
issue.
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disvaluable functionings have already been suggested, but how are we to identify and
determine the overall set of functionings that belongs to the realm of values?
Moreover, what are the relative weights that we ought to give them in the evaluation
of various alternatives? The first question, though, may turn out to be less problematic
in practice than it appears to be at a metaphysical level; it is not implausible to
assume that we to a great extent are able to. acquire an understanding of the content of
the realm of value by practical reasoning.e! This is the project of Aristotle, who aimed
at an objective account of the human good, and the continued relevance of this line of
reasoning has been underlined by (among others) Nussbaum: "The rejection of the
idea of ethical truth as correspondence to an altogether uninterpreted reality does not
imply that the whole idea of searching for the truth is an old-fashioned error. Certain
ways in which [we] see the world [may] still be criticized exactly as Aristotle
criticized them: as stupid, pernicious, and false. The standards used in such criticism
must come from inside human life ...And the inquirer must attempt, prior to criticism,
to develop an inclusive understanding of the conceptual scheme being criticized,
seeing what motivates each of its parts and how they hang together".42 By linking the
realm of values to practical reasoning, though, we do leave the sphere of positivism.
But that is - as should now be evident from the discussion in section 2 - not a
particular problem for this type of questions. However, this fact should make us
humble in a discussion of the realm of values, because the possibility for testing our
understanding of value issues rests on our willingness to reflect openly on the
arguments of our opponents.
It seems to me, though, that there is more or less consensus in society with regard to a
classification of valuable and disvaluable functionings. Obviously, the consensus does
not have to imply that the general opinion on this issue is reasonable, but it may
indicate that people perceive the problem of weighting as the source of the hard
choices in their lives.43 Recall the problem of choosing a career. If we have complete
information about the life as a forester and the life as a lawyer, then my claim is that
we do not find it too difficult to identify the valuable and disvaluable functionings in
the various altemanves+' Hence, we may describe the problem as a choice between
41 See Taylor (1993).
42Nussbaum (1993). p. 260-261. See also Goodin (1986).
43 On this issue. see also Sen (1992). p. 46-49. and Sugden (1993). p. 1953.
44 Once again. we may. of course. make mistakes in this process of classification. but that is not an
important issue for the present argument.
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two vectors which characterise the valuable and disvaluable functionings (as we see
them) in the respective alternatives. The problem is then how to weight the various
elements in each vector in order to reach an overall judgement. Of course, if one
alternative completely dominates the other alternative, i.e. it has more of every
valuable functioning and less of every disvaluable functioning, then we face a trivial
choice. But that is usually not the case jn the choice of career (and many other
important situations), and, thereby, we may run into a difficulty.
This difficulty may reflect the structure of the realm of values, and that is what Sen
calls the 'fundamental reason for incompleteness' .45 A fundamental reason for
incompleteness reflects that there in general is no 'best' scheme of relative weights
between the various valuable and disvaluable functionings. In other words, there is no
single recipe for a good life. That is not to say that it is impossible to acquire a
ranking in every non-trivial case, but rather that in many situations there is a range of
reasonable weights that may be applied. Two arguments may indicate that a
fundamental reason for incompleteness is present in the realm of values; we may call
them 'the problem of space' and 'the problem of compatibility' .46The problem of
compatibility has been illuminatingly discussed by Berlin (though in a somewhat
different context): "Some among the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a
conceptual truth. We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an
irreparable loss".47 The problem of space indicates the possibility that life may not
contain enough space to incorporate all of the Great Goods that in fact are compatible.
Both problems appear to me to be rather obvious on due reflection, though,
admittedly, their relevance may depend on the level of abstraction applied in debating
the content of the realm of values.48However, for our purpose, Ifind it appropriate to
neglect the possibility for further abstraction, and, thus, I shall in the following
discussion pursue the line of reasoning that presupposes the presence of
incompleteness in the concept of well-being.
45Sen (1992). Sen adds: "The 'pragmatic reason for incompleteness' is to use whatever parts of the
ranking we manage to sort out unambiguously, rather than maintaining complete silence until
everything has been sorted out and the world shines in dazzling clarity" (p. 49).
46Similar problems have also been discussed in a somewhat different context by Nagel (1979) and
Berlin (1991).
47Berlin (1991), p. 13.
48See also Tungodden (1994b).
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As argued by Berlin, the presence of incompleteness in the concept of well-being may
cause many hard choices for each of us, and, hence, it is important to bear in mind the
reason for these hard choices. We do not necessarily make a mistake if we make a
choice that involves an irreparable loss in one dimension of our well-being (if at the
same time we acquire something of value), it may simply reflect an inevitable
consequence of the underlying structure of the realm of values. This structural aspect
should also be captured by the framework that we apply as representation of the
concept of well-being, and, in this respect, the framework_of functionings is a
promising candidate. It does not provide us with a one-dimensional delineation of the
consequences of the various alternatives that we face, but rather underlines the
extensive incompleteness that seems to be present in the concept of well-being. This
setting has important consequences for the question about interpersonal comparisons
of well-being as well, and I now tum to a discussion of this issue.
4. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being
We sometimes want to make judgements about other people's well-being, and, in this
section, I shall debate the possibility of doing interpersonal comparisons of well-
being. This is an extremely important issue, because if interpersonal comparisons of
well-being do not make any sense, then important institutions (such as the welfare
state and agencies of international redistribution) may lack a reasonable foundation.
Yet, many people have perceived an elaboration of this issue as idle, though for very
different reasons. Some people claim that the level of income is a satisfactory
indicator of the well-being of a person; others endorse the claim of Robbins that there
is no meaningful way of making such comparisons.s?
The problems of the income indicator are rather evident, and, therefore, I shall focus
on the relevance of the claim of Robbins. Robbins perceived interpersonal
comparisons of well-being as meaningless inasmuch as it is impossible to see inside
other people's heads.50 And surely, the impossibility of observing the mental states of
people complicates the task of making interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
However, it seems to me to be outlandish to claim that this fact completely erases the
49 See Sen (1982, 1987b) and Cooter and Rappoport (1984).
50 "Introspection does not enable A to measure what is going on in B's mind, nor B to measure what is
going on inA's" (Robbins (1935); quoted in Sen (1982), p. 265).
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relevance of such comparisons, because (as has been stressed in section 3) mental
states are not at all the only objects of value in people's lives. There is a vector of
functionings that characterise the well-being of any person, and the mental state of a
person is only one element in this vector. Thus, it is hard to see that the difficulty of
observing one element (even though it is an important one) should make it impossible
to say anything meaningful about a concept that is characterised by a vector of
functionings.S
If that were the case, then it implies that none of us would be able to make any
meaningful comparisons of changes in our own level of well-being.wIf we believe
that it is valuable to have good friends as such (and not only acquaintances that
pretend that they are friends, and then behind our back make cheap jokes about our
behaviour), then we cannot verify whether a valuable functioning is present in our
lives unless we are able to see inside the heads of the people we perceive to be our
friends. Equivalently, if we view it as valuable to have a job that other people
perceive as meaningful, or to be part of a society where people enjoy a reasonable
level of well-being, or to have a mate and kids that really love you, and so on. In
every case, we are caught in a dilemma, because we are unable to measure what is
going on in other people's minds. But consider the following two cases:
Example E: A good friend visits you and your mate. She tells you that her well-being
has improved the last year. Your mate is delighted about such good news. You, on the
other hand, burst out: "My naive friend, what are you talking about, you cannot make
any meaningful evaluation of the change in your level of well-being"?
Example F: A good friend visits you and your mate. She tells you that she has
donated some money to the victims of the civil war in Rwanda. Your mate is proud of
the friend's noble act. You, on the other hand, burst out: "My naive friend, why are
you doing that, you cannot make any meaningful comparison of your level of well-
being and the level of well-being of the victims of the civil war in Rwanda"?
51 In this discussion, though, we should keep in mind that mental states have both instrumental and
intrinsic importance; desire fulfilment is a valuable object in itself, and, moreover, the intensity of
people's desires influences the amount of value extracted from various situations.
52 This may be the case - as indicated in the discussion of Example C in section 3 - and a further
statement on this issue demands a clarification of the content of the concept of well-being. That is the
purpose of this section, where I aim to validate the possibility of doing both intrapersonal and
interpersonal comparisons of well-being within the setting of functionings.
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The visitor (in both examples) may, of course, acknowledge an interest in your
arguments (to wit the arguments of Robbins), but I doubt that these arguments will
convince her about her initial evaluation necessarily being meaningless. She may
insist that her intention was to make a reasonable position dependent statement about
a part of reality where nature does not permit anything else than this type of positional
objectivity; and in the following I shall provide arguments that support her claim.53
(She may further insist that there is no part of reality which makes possible a position
independent observation, but that is an issue which it is beyond_thescope of this essay
to debate.)
A position dependent statement about changes in our own level of well-being has to
be founded on observations that we are able to make from our position about the
presence and absence of valuable and disvaluable functionings in our life. The fact
that we are unable to make anything but incomplete observations (from our position)
of the vector of functionings that is relevant for the evaluation, explains why our
statements cannot express anything else than positional objectivity on this issue.
People who are in a different position - that may, for example, be our (so-called)
friends - may make a different observation from their position (because they know
about the cheap talk behind my back). But still the nature of our statements does not
make them meaningless. They are not at all unfounded, but derived from observations
of a large number of the. objects which are of vital importance for our well-being.
(Moreover, they are the kind of statements about our own level of well-being that it is
possible to acquire from our position in the system - and they would have been
replicated by anyone who entered into this position.)
But if we should consider this type of intrapersonal comparison of well-being as
meaningful, then may we still insist on interpersonal comparisons of well-being being
meaningless? We are able to observe the presence and absence of many of the
valuable and disvaluable functionings in any person's life, and, thus, neither in cases
of this kind will our statement be unfounded. Some readers may object, and claim that
the problem of being unable to see inside the head of the person whose well-being we
attempt to evaluate is far more severe than the corresponding problem present in the
kind of intrapersonal comparison of well-being discussed above. That is undoubtedly
53 On a more comprehensive discussion of positional objectivity, see Sen (1993b). See also Putnam
(1993) and Scanlon (1991).
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a fair objection, but it does not completely destroy the possibility of making
reasonable interpersonal comparisons of well-being. First, it is possible for us to make
a sensible assessment of the mental experiences of, for example, the victims of the
civil war of Rwanda. We understand that they experience an immense amount of
sorrow and pain in their lives, and, moreover, that the absence of desire fulfilment is
overwhelming in almost every dimension. We are (of course) unable to feel their pain
and sorrow in the same way that they feel it, but we are still able to make a sensible
judgement about their feelings in the present situation.54 S~cond, we are able to
observe a number of other relevant functionings, and, thus, our statements on this
issue are not at all utterly unfounded.
I shall close this section by briefly commenting on a debate in recent social choice
theory that is influenced by the issue of interpersonal comparisons of well-being.Ø A
conventional strategy in this literature has been to explore the link between
informational bases and social choice criteria by assuming that the same type of
interpersonal comparisons of well-being is possible throughout the society. Hence, if
you find it reasonable to state that you enjoy a higher level of well-being than the
victims of the civil war in Rwanda, then it is assumed (within this line of reasoning)
that you also can make a reasonable statement about whether you enjoy a higher or
lower level of well-being than your neighbour next door. But why should you? The
positional statements that we are able to acquire on interpersonal comparisons of
well-being in an affluent society may be rather dubious, because the differences in the
vector of functionings may often be related to differences in functionings that are not
observable (and, hence, difficult to assess). However, that is not the case in
comparisons between the victims of the civil war of Rwanda and citizens of an
affluent society, and, thus, there is an important structural component in the
informational base of interpersonal comparisons of well-being that has been
overlooked in the literature on social choice theory. The fundamental reason of
incompleteness adds another complication to this picture, but it is beyond the scope of
this essay to elaborate on the consequences of such a substantial change in the
informational structure of social choice theory.56
54 Seealso Roy (1989), p. 178-179.
55 d'Aspremont (1985) and Hammond (1991) provide surveys on this literature.
56 Offhand, though, it seems plausible to claim that these changes may strengthen the relevance of




The theory of revealed preference claims that a person's preference structure can be
'revealed' by observing this person's behaviour. At the same time, the ordinalists claim
that we cannot 'reveal' anything meaningful about a person's well-being by observing
the life of that person. Surprisingly, many economists have chosen to work within a
framework where both these claims are accepted. I have argued in this essay, though,
that we have to modify both claims. We ought to consider the requirements of
consistency and completeness in rational choice theory as axioms, and not as
hypotheses that may be tested, and the reasonableness of these axioms depends (at
least partly) on which ethical framework people find plausible. (The foundation of
rational choice theory is, for example, inappropriate, in many situations, in societies
where ethical nihilism is the dominant view.) On the other hand, I have argued that
we can - based on position dependent observations - attain a reasonable foundation
for interpersonal comparisons of well-being (if we accept the structure of the realm of
values discussed in the second part of section 3), though the seeming presence of
incompleteness in the concept of well-being should make us humble with respect to
this task in certain situations.
68
REFERENCES
d'Aspremont, C. (1985) "Axioms for Socia! Welfare Ordering", in Social Goods and
Social Organization, eds. Hurwicz, L., Schmeidler, D., and Sonnenschein, H.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 19-76.
Becker, G. S. (1992) "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behaviour",
Journal ofPolitical Economy, 101: 385-409.
Berlin, I. (1991) The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York: Knop).
Bliss, C. (1993) "Life Style and Standard of Living", in Nussbaum, M. C. and Sen, A.
(1993): 417-436.
Broome, J. (1978) "Choice and Value in Economics", Oxford Economic Papers, 30:
313-333.
Broome, J. (1991) Weighing Goods (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Cooter, R. and Rappoport, P. (1984) "Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare
Economics", Journal of Economic Literature, XXII: 507-530.
Elster, J. (1989) Solomonic Judgements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Elster, J. and Hylland, A. (1986) Foundations ofSocial Choice Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Elster, J. and Roemer, P. (1991) Interpersonal Comparisons ofWell-Being
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Goodin, R. E. (1986) ''Laundering Preferences", in Elster, J. and Hylland, A. (1986):
75-102.
Griffm, J. (1986) Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Griffin,1. (1991) "Against the Taste Model", in Elster, J. and Roemer, P. (1991): 45-
69.
Hammond, P. (1991) "Interpersonal Comparisons ofWell-Being: Why and How
They are and Should be Made", in Elster, J. and Roemer, P. (1991): 200-254.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1976) Essays in Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation
(Dordrecht: Reidel).
69
Hausman, D. M. and McPherson, M. S. (1993) "Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics
and Contemporary Moral Philosophy", Journal of Economic Literature, XXXI:
671-731.
Hausman, D. M. and McPherson, M. S. (1994) "Preference, Belief, and Welfare",
AER Papers and Proceedings, May 1994: 396-400.
Katz, M. L. and Shapiro, C. (1985) "Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility", American Economic Review, 75: 424-440.
Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press).
Nozick, R. (1989) The Examined Life (New York: Simon & Schuster).
Nozick, R. (1993) The Nature of Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press).
Nussbaum, M. C. (1993) "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach", in
Nussbaum, M.C. and Sen, A. (1993): 242-269.
Nussbaum, M. C. and Sen, A. (1993) The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Putnam, H. (1993) "Objectivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction", in Nussbaum,
M. C. and Sen, A. (1993): 143-157.
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Rawls, J. (1993) Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press).
Roy, S. (1989) Philosophy of Economics (London: Routledge).
Samuelson, P. (1948) "Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference",
Economiea, 15: 243-253.
Scanlon, T. M. (1991) "The Moral Basis ofInterpersonal Comparisons", in Elster, 1.
and Roemer, P. (1991): 17-44.
Scanlon, T. M. (1993) "Value, Desire, and Quality of Life", in Nussbaum, M. C. and
Sen, A. (1993): 185-200.
Schelling, T. (1984) "Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of
Rational Choice", AER Papers and Proceedings, May 1984: 1-11.
Sen, A. (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden Day).
Sen, A. (1973) "Behaviour and the Concept of Preference", Economiea, 40: 241-259.
70
Sen, A. (1982) Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Oxford: Blackwell).
Sen, A. (1987a) On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blackwell).
Sen, A. (1987b) The Standard of Living (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Sen, A. (1987c) "Rational Behaviour", in The New Palgrave - Utility and
Probability, ed. Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P. (London:
W.W.Norton): 198-216.
Sen, A. (1992) Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Sen. A. (1993a) "Internal Consistency of Choice", Econometrica, 61: 495-521.
Sen, A. (1993b) "Positional Objectivity", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22: 126-145.
Sen, A. (1993c) "Capability and Well-Being", in The Quality of Life, ed. Nussbaum,
M. C. and Sen, A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 30-53.
Sen, A. (1994) "The Formulation of Rational Choice", AER Papers and Proceedings,
May 1994: 385-390.
Stigler, G. J. (1981) "Economics or Ethics?", in The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 145-187.
Sugden, R. (1993) "Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality
Reexamined by Amartya Sen", Journal of Economic Literature, XXXI: 1947-
1962.
Taylor, C. (1993) "Explanation and Practical Reason", in Nussbaum, M.C. and Sen,
A. (1993): 208-231.
Tungodden, B. (1994a) "The Concept ofPoverty and Normative Reasoning", mimeo
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (Essay 2 of this
thesis).
Tungodden, B. (1994b) "Distant Suffering and Morality", mimeo Norwegian School
of Economics and Business Administration (Essay 7 of this thesis).
Tungodden, B. (1994c) "The Distribution Problem and Rawlsian Reasoning", mimeo
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (Essay 4 of this
thesis).
Tungodden, N. (1992) "Borderline - A Modem Identity Problem?" (in Norwegian),
mimeo, University of Bergen.
Walsh, V. (1994) "Rationality as Self-Interest versus Rationality as Present Aims",
AER Papers and Proceedings, May 1994: 401-405.
Wright, G. H. von (1987) "Preferences", in The New Palgrave - Utility and






Social choice theory is concerned with the problem about how to choose in situations
where there are conflicting interests. That may be with respect to what book someone
ought to read (if other members of society also take a position on this issue) or with
respect to what basic institutions that ought to be established in a society.2 Two
important problems have to be dealt with in an overall discussion of these issues.
First, how are we to separate choices that belong to the personal domain and choices
which others legitimately can claim an interest in, and, second, how are we to
measure and compare various people's interests in the relevant situations?
The discussion in this essay concerns the second problem with respect to one
particular social choice; to wit about how to evaluate various income distributions in a
society. Two approaches to this particular issue have dominated the literature on
political philosophy, and the distinction between them is closely connected to 'the
first-mentioned problem of social choice theory. On the one hand, we may argue that
the issue of income distribution is solely about respecting people's rights with respect
to the acquisition and transfer of resources: "What each person gets, he gets from
others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift. In a free society,
diverse persons control different resources, and new holdings arise out of the
voluntary exchange and action of persons. There is no more a distributing or
distribution of shares than there is a distributing of mates in a society in which
persons choose whom they shall marry. The total result is the product of many
l For their comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Rune Jansen Hagen, Karl Ove
Moene, Ottar Mæstad, Agnar Sandmo, Amartya Sen, and Svein Aage Aanes.
2 The classical references on this subject are Harsanyi (1955), Arrow (1963), Sen (1970), and Rawls
(1971).
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individual decisions which the different individuals involved are entitled to make".3
This view is neglected in the coming discussion.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the society should be considered as a system
of cooperation, where the distribution of income ought to be regulated by the basic
institutions of society. 4 If we take up this position - as I do in this essay - then we
need to specify a choice rule that can guide the basic institutions in the choice among
various feasible income distributions; a choice rule that can amalgamate people's
interests on this issue in a reasonable way. That is the subject at issue in this essay.
More precisely, I elaborate on one particular choice rule suggested by Rawls - the
maximin rule - which together with the classical utilitarian rule constitute the two
dominant views within this framework. The principal argument in the essay is that the
maximin rule has been wrongly translated in the formal literature on welfare
economics and social choice theory, which has contributed to a misplaced debate
about the appropriateness of this criterion. In section 2, I provide some further
motivation for the discussion. In section 3-4, I present the formal analysis, and in
section 5-6, I comment on the results.
2. Motivation
The Rawlsian framework provides an illuminating approach to social choices. Rawls
claims that we ought to solve the conflicts in social choices byentering into a
primordial position of equality - the original position - and behind an imaginary veil
of ignorance choose as if we are ignorant about our own position in society. S And it is
from this construction that Rawls justifies the two principles of justice as the
foundation for the choice of basic institutions in society. Rawls makes two important
claims with respect to the distribution of income. First, he claims that people's level of
income constitutes a reasonable foundation for ordinal interpersonal comparison of
well-being.f The underlying idea of this claim is that income is needed in order to
3 Nozick (1974), p. 149-150.
4 See Rawls (1993), p. 15-22.
S Harsanyi (1955) presents a similar idea, but there are some fundamental differences between the
framework of Harsanyi and the Rawlsian framework. It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate
on these differences, but see Tungodden (l994a).
6 Rawls often uses the more comprehensive notion of primary goods (which in addition to income
includes wealth, rights and liberties, powers, and opportunities) in his discussions, but this broader
approach easily involves the problem of indexing. To escape this problem, Rawls assumes that these
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pursue whatever people perceive as a good life. This view is accepted a priori in the
following discussion," Second, Rawls claims - in the second principle of justice - that
behind a veil of ignorance people would choose basic institutions that bring about the
income distribution that favours the least advantaged in society. The interpretation of
this claim is the issue of interest in this essay.
The second principle of justice has been interpreted as saying that the preferred
income distribution ought to be the one that yields the highestJevel of well-being to
the worst-off person in society; and in choices between income distributions that
assign the same amount of well-being to the worst-off person we ought to prefer the
income distribution that assigns most well-being to the second worst-off person (and
so on). This interpretation of the second principle of justice is labelled the leximin
rule.8 However, as should be well-known, the leximin rule does not convey the
intention behind the reasoning of Rawls.? Rawls is concerned about the well-being of
the least advantaged segment in society (and not only the well-being of the least
advantaged person): "In any case we are to aggregate to some degree over the
expectations of the worst off ... [The persons in the original position] interpret [the
second principle of justice] from the first as a limited aggregative principle and assess
it as such in comparison with other standards. It is not as if they agreed to think of the
least advantaged as literally the worst off individual ...".10
Thus, Rawls' claim is that we behind a veil of ignorance would allow a trade-off
between gains and losses of people that belong to the least advantaged segment in
society, but neglect changes in the conditions of the better-off group (as far as the
other primary goods are sufficiently correlated with income (see Rawls (1971), p. 91). Thus, our
concentration on the distribution of income is justifiable. The focus on income (and primary goods in
general), though, is controversial if people differ in their ability to convert income into something of
intrinsic importance; see Sen (1973,1992).
7 Once again, see Sen (1992), p. 85-87 for a discussion of the problem of "inter-end variation" in the
Rawlsian framework. See also Tungodden (l994b)
8 See Sen (1970), p. 138, and Sen (1974).
9 At least not the view expressed by Rawls (1971, 1993). But see Rawls (1963) for a position closer to
the intuition in the leximin principle.
10 Rawls (1971), p. 98. However, Rawls is somewhat flimsy in his reasoning on this issue. In the
discussion of a two-person society, Rawls argues that "[a]lso, nothing is lost if an accurate
interpersonal comparison of benefits is impossible. It suffices that the least favoured person can be
identified and his rational preferences determined" (Rawls (1971), p. 77). Thus, in this example, Rawls
stresses that the maximin rule only requires ordinal interpersonal comparability of well-being; and that
has been used as a defence for the interpretation of the maximin rule as being solely concerned with the
least favoured person (see for example d'Aspremont (1985), p. 55).
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members of the least advantaged segment are not indifferent between various income
distributions). We may label this the leximingroup rule. The most obvious difference
from the leximin rule is that a leximingroup rule would demand the possibility of
making interpersonal comparisons of well-being gains and losses between the
members of the least advantaged segment. Hence, the invariance class with respect to
people's well-being functions needs to be extended. However, the leximingroup rule
can still be less demanding in this respect than the utilitarian rule (which demands the
possibility of comparing well-being gains and losses throughout the entire
population), so that this aspect should not make us reject this interpretation of the
second principle of justice. A more substantial issue, though, is how to define the
least advantaged segment in society. Rawls made various suggestions on this issue,
and in the next sections I discuss these and some other possibilities. It turns out that
for many of these defmitions of the least advantaged segment (as those suggested by
Rawls), we in fact end up - ifwe accept some other reasonable axioms - byendorsing
the leximin rule. However, genuine alternatives to the leximin rule do exist, and I
elaborate on them at the end of section 4.
3. Preliminaries
Define a finite set of individuals N = {1,2,...,i,j,k, ...,n}. The problem is to find a
consistent choice rule that ranks all income vectors yl = {yf ,... ,Y! ,... ,y!}, 'V I, where
yf ~ O, 'V i. At the outset of the analysis, I assume that people are unconcerned with
respect to the income level of the rest of the population in society. This assumption is
captured by the following axiom:
AXIOM NEPA (No-Envy-Or-Pity Axiom):
For any pair of income vectors y'\yB: [yt > y: ~ yApiyB &
yt =y: ~ yA[iyB], 'V i.
P and I are the binary relations of respectively 'better than' and 'indifferent to' (where
the superscript i indicates that this is with respect to the ordering of individual i; the
absence of a superscript will in the coming discussion indicate the ordering of the
social choice rule). In section 5, I discuss somewhat further some plausible substitutes
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for Axiom NEPA, and the rest of the axioms in this section is therefore formulated in
such way that they may cover the coming extensions as well (by including the overall
income vector as the argument in people's well-being functions).
I assume that the well-being functions ofpeople allow full cardinal comparability, i.e.
that they are defined up to a common positive affine transformation.U
Axiom CFC (The Cardinal Full Comparability Axiom):
a and f3 are constants, and W;(yI) denotes ,1 s transformed well-being function. I
shall elaborate somewhat on the choice of Axiom CFC in section 5, but it seems to
me to be a rational point of departure. Unit comparability of well-being is needed in
order to implement the classical utilitarian choice rule - the most substantial opponent
to the Rawlsian framework - and, thus, the classical utilitarian rule cannot be
preferred to the leximigroup rule advanced in this essay on the basis of this part of the
invariance requirement. However, Axiom CFC imposes level comparability of well-
being as well, and in this respect a leximingroup rule is more demanding than the
classical utilitarian rule. But this is also the case for the leximin rule, and hence the
analysis in this essay does not presume a more demanding framework for
interpersonal Comparability of well-being levels than what is conventionally the case
when discussing the Rawlsian framework.
Finally, I incorporate the assumption of Rawls on the link between well-being and
income. This axiom is important in the following discussion, because it makes
feasible several interesting definitions of the least advantaged segment.
Axiom MWA (The Monotonicity Welfare Axiom):
11 However, only ordinal interpersonal comparability is needed in most of the discussion in the
sections 4 and 5.
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Certain restrictions on a social choice rule are conventionally considered as
indisputable, and they are accepted without any further discussion in this essay. The
binary relation of 'at least as good as' is denoted R in the further discussion.
Axiom SP (The Strong Pareto Axiom):
For any pair of income vectors yA,yB: [Wi(yA)~Wi(yB), '1i]-+ yARyB. In
addition.for some jeN: [W/yA» Wj(yB)] -+ yApyB.
Axiom A (The Anonymity Axiom):
If yA is a reordering of the income vector yB, then yAIYB.
Axiom T (The Transitivity Axiom):
Let yl' denote the ordered version of the income vector yl, Le. the income vector
obtained from a reordering of yl such that yr s yf s......s y!r. It follows from
Axiom A that yl'IYI .Hence, in the rest of the essay we can narrow the discussion to
the ordered versions of income vectors, and, thus, assume that the same person
obtains the same position in every income vector under consideration (i.e. person i
always obtains position i in the income distribution).
4. Analysis
In this section, I discuss social choice rules that may represent the idea of Rawlsian
reasoning more convincingly than the leximin rule. The leximin interpretation of the
second principle of justice can be stated formally as follows:12
12 See Sen (1982), p. 234.
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Axiom LM (The Leximin Axiom):
For any pair o/ income vectors
& W;(yA) = W;(yB), 'Vi < j] -+ yApyB.
[W;(yA) = W;(yB), 'V il -+ yAlYB .
the other hand,
Axiom LM appoints the worst-off person to dictator in every possible situation; even
in situations where the interests .of everyone else in the population are in conflict with
the interests of the worst-off person. A seemingly more moderate axiom has been
suggested by Hammond.P
Axiom HE (Hammond's Equity Axiom):
For any pair o/ income vectors y\yB:
[3j,keN: Wj(yB)<W/yA)<WI;(yA)<WI;(yB) & W;(yA)=W;(yB), 'V i-:#j,k]
-+ yARyB.
The idea of Axiom HE is to narrow the dictatorial power to the worse off person to
cases where only two persons are concerned about the choice between two income
vectors. In these situations, Axiom HE does not pay consideration to the losses or
gains of the better off person, but assigns the worse off person to dictator. Thus, ifwe,
by way of illustration, consider the income vectors yA = {20,40,60,80,lOO} and
yB = {20,39,80,80,lOO}, then, it is easily seen that Axiom HE and Axiom NEPA
together imply that yARyB. However, if we introduce the income vector
yC = {O,SO,SO,60,lOOO}as well, then, Axiom HE and Axiom NEPA are unable to
rank between either yA and yC or yB and yC. This incompleteness derives from the
fact that Axiom HE does not state a position on cases where the interests of more than
two people are involved. It leaves unanswered the question about whether the
interests of the worst-off person sometimes ought to be trumped in these situations.
Axiom LM, however, appoints the worst-off person to dictator in every possible case,
and, thus, from Axiom LM and Axiom NEPA it follows that yApyC and yBpyC .
13 See Hammond (1976a). Hammond is concerned with the ranking of the set of potentially feasible
social states (and not solely the issue of income distribution), but his overall conclusion coincides with
the results reported in Theorem l.
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The distinction between these two axioms, though, is illusory, which is rather obvious
if we keep in mind that the better off person in Axiom HE is unable to trump the
worse off person even if his or her gain is enormous and the loss of the worse off
person insignificant. If we accept such a view (as we do if we endorse Axiom HE),
then how can we possibly claim that the interests of the worst-off person sometimes
ought to be trumped if the interests of more than two people are involved (which is
the position we take up if we reject Axiom LM)? The fact that the interests of more
than one person are at stake (in addition to the interests of the worst-off person) can
hardly make any substantial difference. In the two-person case, we may increase the
gains or the losses of the better off person as much as we dare without being able to
overrule the interests of the worse off person according to Axiom HE, and, thus, it
seems plausible to assume that this normative position also embraces the claim that
the interests of the worse off person should trump the gains or the losses present in
many-person cases.t+
The following theorem states the relationship between Axiom LM and Axiom HE
more formally.
Theorem 1: LM is the only choice rule that satisfies NEPA, MWA, CFC, A, SP, T,
andRE.
Proof. Suppose that 3 yA,yB: yt < y: & yApyB. Then it follows from Axiom
NEPA and Axiom SP that 3ieN-{I},yt>y:. The theorem is now proved by
establishing a contradiction.
Step (1): Define SB= {i e Nlyt > y:}. As noticed above, SB :t:ø, and SBcN by
assumption, because yt < y~. Hence, if M is the number of elements in SB, then
O<MS(N-I). Define yB-l such that: (yBuyB-l)_(yBilyB-l) =
{y: ,y:-l ,y~ ,y~-l} & yrl = yf, 3 j e SB& y~-l = y: - ~ (y~ - yt), O< 'If < 1]. It
follows from Axiom NEPA and Axiom HE that yBRyB-l.
14 Of course, some readers may argue that there is a limitation on the size of the feasible gains and
losses that one person may experience, and that this may explain an important difference inAxiom HE
and Axiom LM. I presume that this is the argument underlying the discussion in Sen (1976,1977) on
this issue, but I shall not pursue this line of reasoning in the following.
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Step (2): M ':F.l-øDeflne SB-l = {i ENly;" > y~-I}. Define yB-2 such that:
[(yB-l u yB-2)_ (yB-l n yB-2) = {y:-l ,y:-2 ,y~-1 ,y~-2}, y:-2 = yf, 3j E SB-l
& y~-2 = y~-1 _ VI(y~ _ yt )]. It follows from Axiom NEPA and Axiom HE that
M
yB-1RyB-2. Moreover, it follows from Axiom T that yBRyB-2. Repeat this step M
times. It is then easily seen that it follows from Axiom NEPA, Axiom HE, and Axiom
T that yBRyB-M.
Step (3): Define yA such that: [(yAuyA)_(yAnY~) = {yt,yt} &
yt < y: < y~-M]. It follows from Axiom NEPA and Axiom SP that yArr:
Moreover, because SB-M=ø, it follows from Axiom NEPA and Axiom SP that
yB-MpyA.
Step (4): The required contradiction is now established by noticing that yApyB (by
hypothesis) & yBRyB-M (from step (2» & yApyA (from step (3» implies
yARyB-M, which is contradicted in step (3) (where it follows from Axiom NEPA and
Axiom SP that yB-MpyA).
Step (5): The proof is completed by repeating step (1) - (4) for some pair of income
vectors yA, yB, where yt = y~& y~ = y: & ... &y: = y: &Y:+l <Y:+l,k < n, and then
using the induction hypothesis.
The underlying intuition of the proof is rather straightforward. The fact that the worst-
off person in yB is better off than the worst-off person in yA makes it possible to
construct a sequence of steps where a number of insignificant decreases in the income
of the worst-off person in yB (without making this person worse off than the worst
off person in VA) knocks out the increase in income of those who are worse off in
yB than in yA (independent of the size of the income increase). Hence, the new
income vector ought to be considered as worse than yB according to Axiom HE, but
better than yA according to Axiom SP (because everyone in the new income vector
has at least as much income as in yA, and the worst-off person has more). Therefore,
if we endorse Axiom HE, then yB cannot be considered as worse than yA if the
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worst-off person is better off in yB than in yA. Consequently, we also have to
endorse Axiom LM.IS
The problem of Axiom HE and Axiom LM, though, is that they do not take into
consideration whether the persons concerned about the ranking between two income
vectors belong to the least advantaged segment or not. Rawls, on the other hand,
stresses the importance of this aspect. He claims that we ought to accept some
aggregation of interests among the members of the least advantaged segment, but
rejects any trade-off between the interests of the members of the least advantaged
segment and the interests of the members of the better off group. In order to establish
a more precise formulation of this criterion, a formal definition of the least
advantaged segment is needed. In the rest of this section, Ipursue a solution to this
problem.
Define r' = {l, ...i,j,k, ...p}, OSpS n as the set of people who constitute the least
advantaged segment in a society with income distribution yl, and let RI denote the
better off group in society I (where pI u RI =N, 'til). (In the coming discussion, the
reader should have in mind that we are indifferent between income vectors where the
same person obtains the same position in every income vector under consideration.
As verified in section 3, this follows from Axiom A.) The following axiom, then,
appears to capture an important part of Rawlsian reasoning.
Axiom REA (The Rawlsian Equity Axiom):
For any pair of income vectors yA,yB: [ 3jepAnpB: Wj(yA»Wj(yB) &
Wi(yA)~Wi(yB), 'tIi:#jepAupB] ~yApyB.
Axiom REA claims that the gains and losses of the members of the better off group
should be ignored if someone in the least advantaged segment is concerned about the
choice between two income vectors. Thus, a member of the least advantaged segment
is appointed to dictator if everyone else in the least advantaged segment is indifferent
IS The following income vectors may serve as an illustration of the sequence of the proof:
yA = {9,90,90,90}, yB = {20,40,60,80}, yB-l = {17,40,60,90},
yB-2 = {14,40,90,90}, yB-3 = {1l,90,90,90},and yA = {10,90,90,90}.
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between the income vectors in question. However, Axiom REA does not in general
appoint the worst-offperson to dictator, because it does not exclude the possibility of
a trade-off between the gains or losses of the worst-off person and other members of
the least advantaged segment.
Theorem 2: LM satisfies NEPA, MWA, CFC, A, SP, T, andREA.
Proof The theorem is easily verified by checking the definition.of the leximin rule. If
the leximin rule did not satisfy Axiom REA, then, in some cases the leximin rule
overruled the interests of a member of the least advantaged segment in order to satisfy
the interests of one or several members of the better off group. But if that were the
case, then, the member of the least advantaged segment is better off than the members
of the better off group, because the leximin rule always appoints the worst off person
to dictator. The required contradiction should thus be obvious.
Of course, the leximin rule can easily be excluded as a reasonable normative position
by imposing another axiom which rejects the dictatorship of the worst-off person. But
be that as it may for the moment. A more interesting issue is whether there are any
additional choice rules that satisfy Axiom REA (and the other axioms imposed on the
choice rule in Theorem 2). In order to answer this question, though, we ought to come
up with a more explicit definition of the least advantaged segment. Various
possibilities exist, but the approach that probably strikes people as most appealing is
to connect the defmition of the least advantaged segment to the average income in
society.
Definition LTAD (Less-Than-Average-Definition):
For anyI: pl ={i E NL.: <.!_ ty:}.r' n .=1
Defmition LTAD has an intuitively egalitarian interpretation if we take into account
Axiom MWA; it defmes the least advantaged segment as the group of people who
enjoy a lower level of well-being than what it is possible for everyone in a society to
enjoy if the same amount of income is equally distributed. Hence, Axiom REA
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interpreted in the context of Definition LTAD states that when we consider two
income vectors, then we should assign lexicographic priority to the improvement of
the well-being of those who receive less than the average amount of income. And the
Rawlsian intuition conveyed by this version of Axiom REA is straightforwardly seen
from the following example: Consider the income vectors yA = {lO,10,90, l00},
yB = {5,8,190,200}, yc = {3,5,290,300}, and yD = {2,15,40,50}. It follows from
Definition LTAD, Axiom NEPA, and Axiom REA that the ranking of the income
vectors in this example has to be based on the amount of income received by the
individuals 1 and 2 (because they receive less than the average_ amount of income in
each of the four states of affairs). Consequently, it follows that we ought to ignore the
fact that the individuals 3 and 4 receive a great deal more income in B and C than in
A. And it is easily seen that LTAD, NEPA and REA imply that yApyB, yApyC , and
yBpyC . However, we are unable to rank between the three first-mentioned income
vectors and yD by the use of LTAD and REA, because REA does not claim strict
priority to the improvement of the well-being of the person in the worst-off position
(if that were the case, then, of course, yD is the worst income vector).
But it turns out, though, that if we accept LTAD and REA, then we also have to accept
IM.
THEOREM 3. IM is the only choice rule that satisfies NEPA, MWA, CFC, A, SP, T,
REA, and LTAD.
Proof. Suppose that 3 yA ,yB: yt < y~ & yApyB. The theorem is now proved by
establishing a contradiction.
Step (1) Define yX such that: [yt >Y1& yt;:::! tyt, Vi -{I} & yt = ytl. It
n ;=1
follows from Axiom NEPA and Axiom SP that yXpyA.
S (2) D f· yB h h [j B '\,./. & A j 1~ jtep e me sue t at: y; <Y;' v l Yl <Yl <- ~y;
n ;=1




Step (3) It follows from step (1) and (2) that, respectively, pA = {y~} and
ps = {y:}. Hence, it follows from Axiom NEPA, Axiom REA, and Definition LTAD
that yiipyA (because y: > y~).
Step (4): The required contradiction is now established by taking into account that
yApyB (by hypothesis) & yApyA (from step (1» & yBpyii (from step (2»
implies yApyii, which is contradicted in step (3).
A similar conclusion as reported in Theorem 3 can be reached for a number of
definitions of the least advantaged segment in society. The most obvious cases, in
light of Theorem 3, should be those which are modifications of Definition LTAD, i.e.
cases where the least advantaged segment is defined as people who have less than a
certain percentage of the average income in society. But for our purpose, a more
interesting extension of Theorem 3 is reached by making the following definition of
the least advantaged segment:
Definition LTWD (Less- Than- Wealthiest-Definition):
For any I: pl = {i ENly: < yJ =...= y~}.
Definition L1WD defines the least advantaged segment as people who have less than
the wealthiest person in a state of affairs, and it is thus an extreme version of the
suggestion of Rawls on this issue:''Thus all persons with less than half of the median
income wealth may be taken as the least advantaged segment" .16 However, it is easily
seen, that also for Definition LTAD (and any less extreme version of this definition)
of the least advantaged segment, Axiom REA implies the leximin rule.
Theorem 4: LM is the only choice rule that satisfies NEPA, MWA, CFC, A, SP, T,
REA, and LTWD.
16Rawls (1971), p. 98.
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Proof The theorem is proved by the same line of reasoning as present in the proof of
Theorem 3, with the following minor change in step (1) and (2): In proving Theorem
- - l~ --4 we have to define yA, yBsuch that y~= y: =...= y! ~ - ~y:, 1= A,B.
n i=1
The line of reasoning underlying the proofs of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 is the
following: Anyone who is presently in the least advantaged segment in society can be
lifted out of that segment (in the way they are defmed in these theorems) by one of
two contrary steps. We may either decrease or increase the income of some of the
members of society, and thereby influence the cut -off line in the wanted direction.
Thus, the least advantaged segment in yl: contains only the worst-off person, because
anyone else who was part of the least advantaged segment in yA is lifted out of that
segment by an appropriate increase in their income. Obviously, it follows from
Axiom SP and Axiom NEPA that yl: ought to be preferred to yA. With respect to
yB, however, people (except for the worst-off person) are lifted out of the least
advantaged segment by an appropriate decrease in their income (decreasing the
average income and the income of the wealthiest person). Thus, yB ought to be
preferred to yii. But now there is only one member left in the least advantaged
segment in both yii and yl:, and hence it follows from Axiom REA that yii ought to
be preferred to yl:. The required contradiction is, then, easily established by taking
into account the ranking in the various steps of the proof.
One approach that has been hinted at by various authors.l? is to define the least
advantaged segment as the poorest X% of the population.
Definition LTKD (Less-Than-k-Definition):
For any I: pl = {l,... ,k}, 3 (1~ k ~ n) .
This definition outlines a framework that contains genuine alternatives to the leximin
rule.
17 See for example Hammond (1976b), p. 272 and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1989), p. Il.
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Theorem 5: There are several choice rules that satisfy NEPA, MWA, CFC, A, SP, T,
REA, andLTKD.
Proof. An example (in addition to the leximin rule) will suffice. Consider the
following choice rule that assigns lexicographic priority to the sum of the well-being
l l






[L W;(y;A)= L W;(y~) &
,. ,.




L W;(yt) = L W;(y~)H yAJYB], 3 1< k < n. It is
;=1+1 ;=1+1
clear that both this choice rule and the leximin rule satisfy all the imposed axioms.
There is, however, a deep problem with the approach suggested by Definition LTKD,
which is easily seen by pondering on the question about whether we ought to define
the least advantaged segment as the k or k + 1 poorest people in society.18 Consider
the following four situations.l?
i. The k th worst-off person is a rich guy. A change in the tax system would reduce his wealth
insignificantly. However, for some reason, the (k + l)th worst-off person - the wealthy lady next door
- would gain tremendously from such a change in the tax system. Everyone else in Wealth City is
unconcerned about this part of the tax system.
ii.The k th worst-off person is a poor and undernourished lady. The (k + l)th worst-off person is not
well-off either, but he has nevertheless a reasonable standard of living. A change in the tax system
could contribute to a minor improvement in the well-being of this poor lady, but the same change
would, for some reason, greatly reduce the well-being of the (k + l)th worst-off person (making him
poor and undernourished - though not as poor as k). Everyone else in Poverty City is unconcerned
about this part of the tax system.
iii. The k th worst-off person is a poor and undernourished guy. The (k + l)th worst-off person,
though, is an extremely wealthy lady. A change in the tax system could contribute to a minor increase
in the income of the poor guy, but would at the same time bring about a substantial decrease in the
wealth of the rich lady (though she would still live in affluence - no doubt about that). Everyone else in
Inequality City is unconcerned about this part of the tax system.
18 Of course, this problem is also present in the leximin rule (which is the rule attained by letting
k=I).
19 Some readers may find it trivial to discuss whether we should include the tk + l)th worst-off
person in the least advantaged segment or not. But, of course, k and k +1may be interpreted as
groups (with large numbers of people), and, thus, the relevance of this discussion should be rather
obvious.
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iv. The k th worst-off person and the (k + l)th worst-off person - two brothers who run the local gas
station - have the same income. They are not well-off, but neither are they poor or undernourished. A
change in the tax system could improve their income tremendously, but would, for some reason, cause
a minor reduction in the income of those who have a lower income than the two brothers (though none
of them, that is to say, is really poor). Everyone else in Equality City is uncmcemed about this part of
the tax system.
Three of the four examples illustrate situations which make the approach suggested
by imposing Defmition LTKO on Axiom REA an untenable normative position to
take up.20 (Does the reader agree?) The situation in Equality City is maybe the most
obvious case. If we are allowed to make a trade-off between the tremendous gain of
one of the brothers and the losses of those worse off, then why should we not be
allowed to take into account the gain of the second brother (that would double the
counted gain from the tax policy, and might be what is needed in order to overrule the
losses of the rest of the least advantaged segment)? The two brothers are equally well-
off in both states of affairs under consideration, and hence no plausible argument can
defend the cut-off line suggested by Definition LTKO.
Thus, the examples from respectively Poverty City and Wealth City are not needed in
order to reject choice rules of the type suggested in proving Theorem 5. But they are
still of interest, because they hint at the solution to our problem. In both cases, the
reduction in the income of the (k +1)th worst-off person is ignored. But is that a
reasonable way of evaluating the change in tax policy in Wealth City and Poverty
City? Or is there something that tells us that we ought to allow a trade-off between
the interests of the k th worst-off person and the (k + l)th worst -off person in those
twocases?
Let us consider the argument outlined by Rawls in his defence of the claim that
people would choose the second principle of justice in the original position: "[T]he
person choosing has a conception of the good such that he cares very little, if
anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be
sure of by following the maximin rule. It is not worthwhile for him to take a chance
for the sake of a further advantage, especially when it may turn out that he loses much
20Some readers may argue that any normative position that endorses a cut-off line is untenable. That is
the claim of the utilitarian framework. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the pros and cons
of such a position, and I assume here that a reasonable interpretation of the Rawlsian framework may
constitute a tenable normative position.
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that is important to him".21 But if we approach the tax policy issue in Wealth City by
placing ourselves in the original position, would we then care about the insignificant
loss of the wealthy guy? Or would we perceive the change in the wealth of both
persons as basically unimportant, and, thus, endorse the change in tax policy if the
gain of the wealthy lady exceeds the loss of the wealthy guy? Correspondingly, would
we fmd the loss of the (k + l)th worst-off person unimportant in the evaluation of the
change in tax policy in Poverty City? Or would we find it worthwhile to reject the
change in tax policy in order to avoid the severe decrease in living standard of this
person?
Certainly, only the circumstances in Inequality City may provide a reasonable defence
for neglecting the interests of the (k + l)th worst-off person. Only in that situation is
it possible to use the kind of reasoning suggested by Rawls in order to defend a
limited range of concern. It is plausible to argue that the extremely wealthy lady
would - behind a veil of ignorance - recognize that the loss of some wealth is of no
basic importance in her life, and that she therefore would agree that the change in tax
policy should take place if it contributes to a minor increase in the income of the poor
guy. But this argument has nothing to do with the overall relative position of the two
persons involved, whether it is with respect to the average or maximum income or the
number of people that are poorer than them in the society in question. The issue of
interest is whether the two persons involved have more or less than a minimum
stipend (where the level of this stipend is to be decided in the original position), and
the impression given by the example is that the income of the wealthy lady and the
income of the poor guy is respectively above and below this norm of completeness.
Consequently, the poor guy is the only one of these two that belongs to the least
advantaged segment in society, and his interests should therefore be assigned
lexicographic priority.
Hence, Rawlsian reasoning presupposes a conception of the good that makes the
possession of income above a minimum stipend of no fundamental importance in the
lives of people.22 Accordingly, this assumption ought to be the foundation for the
21Rawls (1971), p. 154.
22 There will, of course, be disagreement about what the appropriate nonn of completeness ought to
be, but that is an issue which we can ignore here.
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definition of the least advantaged segment in order to attain a choice rule that conveys
Rawlsian intuition.
Definition LTMD (Less- Than-Minimum-Definition):
Forany I: pl = {i E Nly: < z}.
z denotes the minimum standard to be agreed upon in the original position.23
Theorem 6: There are several choice rules that satisfy NEPA, MWA, CFC, A, SP, T,
REA, and LTMD.
Proof. An example (in addition to the leximin rule) will once again suffice. Consider
the following choice rule, that assigns lexicographic priority to the alleviation of the
overall 'poverty gap' in the least advantaged segment:
(L(Wj(Yj = z)-Wj(yt» < L(Wj(yj = z)- Wj(y!»~ yApyB] &
jepA jep·
[L(Wj(Yj = z)- Wj(Yt» = L(Wj(yj = z)- Wj(y!» & LWj(yt) > L Wj(y!)
jepA jep· jeRA jeR·
~ yApyB] & [L(Wj(Yj = z)- Wj(yjA»= L(Wj(Yj = z)- wj(Yt» &
jepA jEP-
L Wj(yjA)= L wj(Yt),+-+ yAJYB]. It is easy to check that both this choice rule and
jeRA åeR-
the leximin rule satisfy the imposed axioms.
The choice rule suggested in proving Theorem 6 illustrates one interesting
leximingroup interpretation of the Rawlsian position. Yet, one objection to this rule
may be that it does not pay attention to the distribution of income within the least
advantaged segment. In order to do that, though, we have to demand further
restrictions (than those imposed by Axiom CFC) on the invariance class of people's
well-being functions, and, in the next section, I shall consider this possibility.
23 It should be noticed that according to LTMD, everyone in a society may belong the least advantaged
segment Rawls, however, assumes that the society under consideration has 'reasonably favourable
conditions' (see Rawls (1993), p. 297), which may be interpreted as saying that it is possible for
everyone to have an income above the minimum standard. Thus, everyone will not belong to the least
advantaged segment in societies of this kind. The introduction of such an assumption would not change
any results in this discussion.
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5. Modifications
Axiom CFC and Axiom NEPA are rather demanding, and, thus, it can be of a certain
interest to discuss the robustness of the results of section 4 with respect to alternative
conjectures about people's preferences and about the invariance requirement.
Axiom CFC involves the claim that we are able to both compare people's gains and
losses and levels of well-being, i.e., we allow any transformation of the well-being
function that preserves equalities between units and levels of people's well-being
functions. Undoubtedly, it may be fair to question this claim, and one suggestion may,
then, be to argue that we should substitute the requirement of ordinal interpersonal
comparability for Axiom CFC, i.e., we should only allow transformations of the well-
being function that preserve equalities between levels of people's well-being
functions. If we impose this restriction on the analysis, though, it is easily seen that
the leximin rule is the only choice rule that satisfies the set ofaxioms discussed in
section 4.24
However, as I see it, there is a more plausible modification of Axiom CFC which has
been overlooked in the social choice literature, to wit the modification that allows for
various transformation requirements for various segments of society. In my view, it
seems reasonable to claim that we have relevant scales which can be applied in order
to settle a minimum stipend z, and, moreover, to make interpersonal comparisons of
well-being among the members of the least advantaged segment. But I doubt the
possibility of making interpersonal comparisons of well-being in the better off group,
and, thus, there may be a case for introducing an axiom that takes into account such a
distinction between the least advantaged segment and the better off group. Moreover,
within this framework, there may also be a case for allowing further restrictions (than
those captured by Axiom CFC) on the invariance class within the least advantaged
segment. Hence, this line of reasoning may allow interesting variants of the choice
rule suggested in proving Theorem 6, though it is beyond the scope of this essay to
pursue these possibilities.25
24 See Deschamps and Gevers (1978).
25 These possibilities are discussed inTungodden (l994e).
90
Axiom NEPA has played an important role in the proving of the theorems reported in
the preceding section. Some readers may find this axiom controversial, and, thus, I
shall briefly discuss the following two plausible modifications:
Axiom WEA (Weak-Envy-Axiom):
For any pair of income vectors yA,yB:
vt e {ie Nly: S; y:}]-+ yAp"yB, 'V k,
Axiom WPA (Weak-Pity-Axiom):
For any pair of income vectors
[y: >y:&y1 ~ y: ,'V j e {ie Nly: <y:}]-+ yAp"yB, 'V k.
Axiom WEA postulates that people are concerned about their relative position in
society, and, thus, in some situations they may prefer a lower personal income if their
relative position at the same time is strengthened Axiom WPA, on the other hand,
presumes that people feel sympathy for those who are worse off than themselves, and
the axiom incorporates the assumption that people sometimes may prefer a lower
level of personal income if at the same time the well-being of the worse off group is
improved. Both axioms are obviously stylized assumptions about people's
preferences, but each of them probably reflects a piece of the true picture.
Axiom WEA has severe consequences for the validity of the proofs in the preceding
section; it cannot be substituted for Axiom NEPA in proving the theorems 1,3, and
4.26 But that is not a surprising conclusion. If the worst-off person envies the higher
income level enjoyed by the rest of the population, then the leximin rule will not
solely be concerned with the income level of the worst-off person (which is a premise
for the line of reasoning underlying the proofs of these theorems). However, the
theorems can easily be proved in the same manner in the space of well-being (i.e.
when the income level of people is substituted with their well-being level in the
respective proofs). Hence, the conjecture of Axiom WEA does not overrule the
reported results, but severes only the neat link between the distribution of well-being
26 Step (1) becomes invalid in each of the proofs.
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and the distribution of income that is attained by the separability assumption of
Axiom NEPA. The link is also severed by the introduction ofAxiom WPA, though
this axiom does not affect the validity of the proofs of the theorems 1, 3, and 4.
However, both axioms cause some problems for the practical implementation of the
leximingroup rule suggested in the proof of Theorem 6, because an additional
difficulty is now added to the interpretation of the minimum standard of income. If
either Axiom WEA or Axiom WPA is accepted, then the minimum standard of
income will have to depend on the particular distribution of. income. If not, then
people in some cases may prefer to belong to the least advantaged segment with one
income distribution instead of being in the better off group with another income
distribution, and the suggested choice rule would then in cases of this kind violate
Axiom SP. However, this problem is avoided if we accept the following assumption
about the preference structure in society: Axiom NEPA captures the preference
structure of the least advantaged segment, and Axiom WEA or Axiom WP A the
preference structure of the better off group. It is, however, left to the reader to judge
whether this is a reasonable proposal or not.
6. Final Remarks
The message of this essay is that the second principle of justice outlined by Rawls
ought to be interpreted as a limited aggregative principle, and not as a leximin rule
which entirely focuses on the well-being of the worst-off person in a society. And in
the analysis I have illustrated one interesting leximingroup social choice rule (for the
problem of ranking various income distributions) that formalize this interpretation of
Rawlsian intuition. This message is of importance, because it has been common in the
literature of social choice theory to argue that we face a choice between the utilitarian
principle of Bentham and the leximin principle of Rawls.27 But if that were the case,
then it appears implausible that anyone ever should reject the utilitarian point of view.
How could anyone reasonably claim that we should appoint one position to dictator in
social choices? Hence, the victory of Bentham should be expected and accepted.
However, the social choice rule presented in this essay represents a plausible
alternative to the utilitarian point of view, and, thus, makes the battle of Bentham and
Rawls somewhat more interesting.
27 See for example Sen (19n) and Deschamps and Gevers (1978).
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One of the main claims in the poverty measurement literature the last ten years has been that
a poverty measure should reflect increased overall poverty if - ceteris paribus - a subgroup
of the population experiences an increase in poverty. The claim has been presented as the
subgroup consistency axiom,2 and on this basis a group of poverty measures has been
rejected: "By this criterion the Sen-measure and its variants are not well suited for poverty
analysis by subgroup, since they violate this consistency requirement in certain cases".3
The subgroup consistency axiom is intuitively appealing and reflects a feature of the
poverty problem which it is very hard to reject. (It may be regarded as an analogue to the
well-known monotonicity axiom, which demands that a poverty measure should reflect a
decrease in overall poverty if - ceteris paribus - one person's poverty is reduced.') Thus,
poverty figures reported on the basis of a subgroup inconsistent poverty measure will
certainly be met with scepticism. If (for example) it is reported that the problem of poverty
increases in the subgroups of society, and at the same time (and within the same
framework) claimed that the overall poverty problem decreases, then an inevitable and
reasonable response is to question whether the various poverty levels are measured
correctly. Hence, if the Sen-measure lacks the subgroup consistency property, it appears
sensible to reject this approach to poverty measurement.
l For their comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Rune Jansen Hagen, Karl Ove
Moene, Ottar Mæstad, Agnar Sandmo, Amartya Sen, and Svein Aage Aanes.
2 See Foster etat. (1984,1991).
3 Foster etat. (1984), p. 18.
4 See respectively Foster etat. (1991) and Sen (1976).
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The purpose of this essay, though, is to reveal that the ongoing debate about subgroup
consistency is misleading. When we discuss the concept of subgroups in Sen's approach, a
subtle treatment is needed. We have to be aware of the importance of reference groups in
the Sen-measure, and make the appropriate distinction between reference groups and
subgroups. It turns out, in fact, to be rather easy to demonstrate that the Sen-measure is not
at all violating the subgroup monotonicity axiom, and moreover to verify that the
conventional line of reasoning on this issue is based on a misrepresentation of the
framework of Sen.
In section 2, I describe in brief the Sen-measure and the class of Foster-measures. In
section 3, the main arguments of the essay are outlined, and in section 4, I make some
general comments on the choice between these two approaches in the measurement of
poverty.
2. The Poverty Measures
Let me first describe to the point the most important features of the Sen-measure and the
class of Foster-measures.t For our purpose, it is only necessary to take into account the
part of the income distribution yl of a society I that covers the poor part of the population,
i.e. the income vector y! = {Yi E y/lYi S z}, where z is the income poverty line and Yi is
the income of individual i. Moreover, it shall be convenient to work with an ordered
version of the income vector y!, where the q elements are numbered in order of income,
i.e. OSYl So••S Yf• 6
The class of Foster-measures is additively separable in the elements of the income vector







5 These are the main contributions in the poverty measurementliterature; see Foster (1984) for a survey.
6 By making this assumption, we introduce an anonymity property in poverty measurement, i.e. any
reordering of the income vector does not change our characterization of the poverty problem. Thereby, we
may assume that the same person obtains the same position in every income vector under consideration.
This assumption is considered as uncontroversial in the poverty measurementliterature, and is accepted
without any further discussion in this paper. But see Tungodden (1994).
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where n is the total population and a is a normative parameter. It is easily seen from (1)
that pF equals the head-count ratio H = q when a = O and the aggregate poverty gap
n
1= ±(z-y;) when a=1.
;=1 qz
The Sen-measure pS is not additively separable in the elements of the income vector y;,
and there are two ways of defending a non-separable approach! First, we may argue that
the importance we attach to a person's poverty level should depend on the overall poverty
problem in the society in question. I have doubts about the appropriateness of this
normative claim, but I shall not elaborate on the pros and cons of it here.? However, I find
the second argument in favour of a non-separable approach more plausible, to wit that there
may be important physical and psychological interconnections that have to be taken into
account in order to represent correctly the well-being of poor people in poverty
measurement. This has been argued by Sen, who claims that "[ilt seems reasonable to
argue that any person's poverty cannot really be independent of how poor the others are.
Even with exactly the same absolute short-fall, a person may be thought to be 'poorer' if
the other poor have short-falls smaller than his, in contrast to the case in which his short-
fall is less than that of others". 8 In the rest of the essay, the latter argument is presumed to
constitute an important part of the foundation of a non-separable approach.?
Sen incorporates these interconnections in poverty measurement by applying the Borda
Ranking Rule:10 The poor individuals are ranked in order of income, where the least poor
individual is ranked as number one (and so on). These ranking numbers are, then, applied
as the weights vi(z,Y;) of the income gaps of the poor people. Hence, having in mind that
we work with ordered versions of the income vector, it follows that Vi=10(Z,Y;) = 10 (and
so forth). Thus, the weight assigned to the income gap of an individual depends on the
income structure of the society in question, which (at least partly) reflects the idea that the
well-being of this person depends on this same income structure (and not only on his or her
personal income level).
7 But see Tungodden (1994).
8 Sen (1981), p. 31.
9 On this issue, see also Tungodden (1994).
10 For a general discussion of the Borda Ranking Rule, see Sen (1982), p. 186-187.
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The following axiom provides a neat normalization of the approach of Sen:ll
Axiom N (The Normalized Poverty Value):
If the poor have the same income, then pS =HI.
Let G, represent the Gini-coefficient for the poor population. The Sen-measure may, then,
be expressed as follows:12
(2) pS =H(/- (1-/)G,).
It is easily seen from (2) that pS =HI when G, = 0, Le. when there is no inequality
within the poor part of the population.
3. Subgroup Consistency and Reference Groups
Foster et.al. argue that the Sen-measure violates the subgroup consistency requirement, and
they state the axiom that takes care of this requirement as follows:13
AXIOM S (Subgroup Monotonicity Axiom):
Let y. be a vector of incomes obtained from Y by changing the incomes in subgroup j
from r! to y.j where nj is unchanged. If y.j has more poverty than r', then y. must
also have a higher level ofpoverty than Y.
Their argument is supported by the following example:14 Let the initial income distribution
in a society be represented by the vector Y = (1,6,6,7,8,12). Divide the society into two
subgroups with income vectors yl = (1,6,12) and y2 = (6,7,8). The poverty line in this
society is z = 14. The income distribution in subgroup 1 changes, yl· = (3,3,13), and the
problem of poverty in subgroup 1 increases according to the Sen-measure (Le.
pS(y;·,z»ps(y;,z». The situation is unchanged in subgroup 2, i.e. y2· =y2, and
hence pS (Y;· ,z) = pS(y;,z). Axiom S claims that in this situation, it follows inevitably
11 Sen (1976), p. 223.
12 See Sen (1976, 1981) for a comprehensive discussion of this result
13 Foster et.al, (1984), p. 763.
14 See Foster et.al (1984), p. 763. A similar example is given in Foster etal, (1991), p. 688.
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that the overall poverty problem in society has increased. Thus, ifwe measure the overall
poverty problem in society by applying the income vectors Y and y. = (3,3,6,7,8,13),
then pS (y.,z) > pS (Y, z) ought to be true. However, the opposite is the case, and Axiom S
is violated Consequently, the Sen-measure appears to lack the subgroup consistency
property, and it is tempting to conclude that this framework is inappropriate for poverty
measurement.
The problem of this argument, though, is that it ignores the particular importance Sen
assigns to reference groups. In the framework of Sen, the reference group is fundamental
in incorporating physical as well as psychological interconnections among the poor in
society. A redefinition of a person's reference group thus marks a substantial change in the
setting of the analysis, and there is no obvious link between poverty figures derived from
different assumption about poor people's reference groups. In the preceding example, the
problem is precisely that one is juggling with the reference groups in question. In one case
(when poverty is measured by subgroups) the individual's reference group is limited to a
subgroup of society, but in the next case (when poverty is measured by the whole sample)
the overall society is the reference group. Obviously, the reference group - if it is to reflect
some factual interconnections - either has to be the society or the subgroup, and, thus, the
demand for consistency in the example is unfounded 15Hence, the example does not prove
that the Sen-measure is subgroup inconsistent.
In fact, the line of reasoning in the example violates the axiomatic structure of the Sen-
measure. The individuals in the poor part of the population are in the first part of the
example ranked according to their income position in a subgroup of society, and not
according to their position in the overall poor population. This latter ranking, though, is
presumed in the construction of the Sen-measure:16
Axiom R (Ordinal Rank Weights):
The weight vi(z,Yp) on the income gap of person i equals the rank order of i in the
interpersonalwelfare ordering of thepoor.
15Of course, it appears reasonable to claim that various reference groups may be defined for various types
of interconnections, but this fact does not change the conclusions of this section. Thus, I ignore this
additional complexity.
16 Sen (1976), p. 376. We may in this discussion ignore the distinction between an income ordering and a
welfare ordering, since Sen later on in his discussion assumes that a richer person also is better off - and,
thus, people obtain the same position in both the income ranking and the welfare ranking.
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The idea ofAxiom R is to incorporate interconnections among the poor people in society in
the measurement of poverty, and, thus, the overall poor population is the relevant reference
group of a poor person.l? The Sen-measure is derived from this assumption, and, hence,
the Sen-measure is not dermed for situations where the relevant reference group for poor
people (for some reason) should be a subgroup of the poor population.
Is it, then, possible to modify the framework of Sen such that it also can be applied in a
society where the relevant structure of reference groups is more complex than what is
assumed in Axiom R? Assume that there are K'(k' = 1,... ,Kr) reference groups in a
society, and let yr denote the income of individual i in reference group kr. We may in
these situations work with a slightly modified version ofAxiom R:
Axiom Rr (Ordinal Reference Group Rank Weights):
The weight vr (z,y;') on the income gap of person i in reference group e equals the rank
order of i in the interpersonal welfare ordering of the poor in reference group kr.
Moreover, we may introduce the following normalization axiom for the measurement of
poverty in reference groups:
Axiom Nr (Normalized Reference Group Poverty Value):
If the poor in reference group e have the same income, then P:: =H'" I'" .
Axiom Nf should be a reasonable suggestion in the light of Axiom N. By introducing
Axiom Rr and Axiom Nf in the framework of Sen, it is easily seen that the poverty level of
the reference group (for large numbers of the poor) is given by:
where P:: =O when no one is poor in reference group k", and P:: = l when no one has
any income in reference group k",
17 On this issue, see also Sen (1981), p. 187.
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We may now state the following theorem:
Theorem 1:For large numbers o/the poor, the following extension o/the Sen-measure:
satisfies the axioms S, N, Rr, and N".
Proof It follows straightforwardly from (3) that pS' does not violate the axioms S, Rr,
and W. It also rather easily seen that pS' does not violate Axiom N: If there is no
inequality among the poor in the various subgroups, then it follows from (3) that
K' k'
pS' = L!!_ Hk'Ik' .Moreover, if the poverty gap is the same in all reference groups (i.e.
k'=l n
K k'
Ik' = 1" =...= IK'), then pS' =r' L !!_Hk'. Hence, it follows that Axiom N is not
k'=l n
violated.
The most important message of Theorem 1 is that in a society with more than one reference
group, the overall poverty problem has to be measured within a disaggregated framework if
we are to capture the relevant interconnections. Thus, a misplaced question has been posed
in the poverty measurement literature. In societies with several reference groups, it is not a
question about whether the Sen-measure (or any other measure) is decomposable or not,
but about whether these measures are able to capture the true nature of the object at issue.
In these cases, the nature of the object one aims to measure demands a disaggregated
approach, and consequently, it makes no sense to compare the results derived from
respectively a disaggregated and an aggregated approach (as is done in the example
discussed at the outset of this section). The results from an aggregated approach are of no
meaning in situations where one wants to take into account the interconnections within the
various reference groups of society.
Still, we may in some cases be interested in measuring the poverty level in subgroups of a
reference group (where the reference group may be either a part of the poor population or
the overall poor population). How shall we approach such a situation within the framework
of Sen? The problem in cases of this kind is that the poverty level in a subgroup is sensitive
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to changes in the poverty level in the rest of the reference group, because there are
interconnections between people in different subgroups (who belong to the same reference
group). Hence, it is impossible to normalize the subgroup poverty level without referring to
the overall poverty level in the reference group; the poverty level for a subgroup
j'" (j'" =1,... ,JIr.) is not uniquely defined in the situation where everyone in the subgroup
has the same income level. The poverty level of the subgroup also depends on the relative
position of the poor members of the subgroup within the overall poor population of the
reference group. Consequently, it is in the normalization of the subgroup poverty level
impossible to apply a normalization procedure that corresponds to Axiom N.
An alternative normalization procedure could be to demand that when no one in subgroup
j'" has any income and no one else in reference group k" is poor, then P~; = l. It is in
J
this situation impossible for the people of subgroup j'" to become any poorer (neither in
the absolute dimension nor in the relative dimensionts), and, thus, this normalization
procedure would imply that the subgroup poverty level is measured relative to the worst
possible situation for the subgroup.I? However, it is easy to verify that such a
normalization of the subgroup poverty level would imply a violation of Axiom N in the
measurement of reference group poverty.
There is, however, a slightly different subgroup normalization procedure which is
consistent with Axiom N:
Axiom NS(Normalized Subgroup Poverty Level):
If no one of the poor in subgroup j'" has any income, and no one else in reference group
jl'
k" . he r". qIS poor, t n .l' = --y-.
J n
18 Here, I assume that any interconnections between the poor part and the nonpoor part of the population
have been captered in the poverty line.
19 It is important to have in mind that the population size is assumed constant in this discussion.
Otherwise, it would have been more controversial to derme the worst possible situation for a subgroup in
the way it is done in this paragraph. For a further discussion of this issue, see Tungodden (1994).
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Axiom NS implies that the subgroup poverty level is measured relative to the worst possible
situation for the overall reference group, and it is easily seen that r: = 1 when subgroup
J
j'" coincides with reference group kr and no one in the reference group has any income.
Measurement of subgroup poverty levels has to be based on the ranking procedure
described in Axiom Rr (which coincides with Axiom R if there is only one reference group
in the society). Thus, the poverty level of subgroup j'" is given by:
(4) r". =al' ~ (z - y~')v~'.• r ~ ",
J L'ier
where v:' is the rank order of individual i in the interpersonal welfare ordering of
reference group kr and al' is the normalization parameter. It is important to have in mind,
though, that r: is not independent of the income level in other subgroups within the
J
reference group kr. Any change in the income level of some of the other subgroups that
influence the ranking of an individual in subgroup r will change the poverty level in r:
J
According to (4) and Axiom NS:20
(5)
Hence, it easily seen that the poverty level of a subgroup (within a reference group) may be
measured as follows within the framework of Sen:21
20 Axiom NS and (4) imply (S) for the following reason: In the situation covered by Axiom NS, the poor
individuals in subgroup r have no income, and, moreover, constitute the whole poor population in
j~.~ .~
reference group kr. Thus, if we take into account (4), q k' = a' z(l +...+ qJ ), and (S) follows
n
straightforwardly.
21 There is a minor problem within the framework of Sen in a discussion of subgroup poverty, to wit how
do we rank people with the same income? Sen (1976), p. 220, claims that the Sen-measure is insensitive to
how we solve this problem, but this is obviously not correct when we extend the framework to also cover
the measurement of subgroup poverty levels. As is easily seen from (4), the ranking problem may cause
two identical subgroups (being part of the same reference group) to end up with (slightly) different poverty
levels.
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S' 2 ~ k'k'(6) Pol' = k' ol' [~(Z-Yi )Vi J.
I n Z(ql +1) ieil'
Thus, the following theoremmay be stated:
Theorem 2: For large numbers o/the poor, the following extension o/the Sen-measure:
satisfies the axioms S, N, R", and NS.
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from (4), (5), and (6) that P~: satisfies the axioms S,
I
Rr, and NS. In addition, if everyone in the poor part of the population of reference group
kr has the same income y (Le. yr = ... = yk~ = y), then it follows from (6) that
"Jl' il' 2P:: = L q k' [k' ol' (Z - y) L v:' J. For large numbers of poor, this expression
il'=1 q n Z(ql +1) ie/'
may be written as follows: P:: = 2~ -}) (1+...+ qk' ). Hence, in situations where
q n Z
everyone in the poor part of the population has the same level of income, P:: =Hk' Ik' •
Thus, P:: satisfies Axiom N.
The modified version of the Sen-measure reported in Theorem 2 is subgroup consistent, as
may easily be verified with respect to the outlined example.22 Assume that everyone
belongs to the same reference group in the example.23 Axiom Rr, then, implies that the
weight assigned to the poverty gap of an individual depends on this individual's ranking in
22 By applying Theorem 2, the sum of the reported poverty figures of the subgroups do not equal the
reported total poverty level. This is due to the fact that Theorem 2 is derived for large numbers of the poor -
and the example only counts six individuals.
23 We may alternativelyassume that the two subgroups of the example constitute two distinct reference
groups. By applying Theorem l it is easily seen that the framework of Sen also in this case is subgroup
consistent, This exercise is trivial in the light of the discussion above, and is left to the reader, therefore.
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the overall income distribution yl' = (1,6,6,7,8,12).24 By applying (3), (6), and Theorem
2, it is straightforwardly seen that the initial overall poverty level in the reference group is
P:: = 0,63, and that the initial subgroup poverty levels are respectively p; = 0,71 and
r: = 0,39. When we conduct a similar computation after the change in the income
2
·distribution in subgroup Il' , the following results are obtained: p:;. = 0,64, P:.·.. = 0,73,
and ps' .. = 0,39. Hence, the conclusion is very different from the one reported by Foster
*2
et.al.25 Overall poverty and poverty in subgroup Il' have increased due to the worsening
in the situation of the second worst off member in society (and in spite of the improvement
in the situation of the worst off member in society), and the poverty level of subgroup 21'
is unchanged (because the change in income in subgroup Il' did not have an influence on
the positions of the members of 21' in the overall ranking within k''). Obviously, there is
no violation of the subgroup consistency property in this example.
4. Final Remarks
Ihave proved in this essay that the Sen-measure is a subgroup consistent poverty measure,
and that it may be extended to cover cases where several reference groups are present. The
main dichotomy in the current poverty measurement literature is therefore not - as
frequently claimed - about subgroup consistency, but about how different poverty
measures take care of interconnections between poor people. The class of Foster-measures
neglects this aspect of poverty, the Sen-measure does not
I shall not attempt to argue in favour of one of these two approaches, because Iguess that
both frameworks may have a role to play in the measurement of poverty.26 The class of
Foster-measures gives some cutting power in empirical work, but may overlook an
essential part of the overall picture in certain situations. The Sen-measure is somewhat
more demanding in empirical work, but may sometimes take into account vital aspects of
the nature of poverty. Thus, computational simplicity aside, the nature of the kind of
poverty one aims to measure ought to be the essential criterion in a choice between these
24In the computation. it is assumed that the second worst off person in society - both before and after the
change in income - belongs to subgroup Il' . Obviously. this assumption is trivial. and does not affect the
~eneml conclusion derived from this example.
Foster et.al. (1984).
26See also Sen (1992). p. 106-107. on this issue.
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two frameworks. and not - as this essay has revealed - a misleading debate about the
property of subgroup consistency. However. both the Sen-measure and the class of Foster-
measures face some deep problems in situations where the population size varies. and,
moreover. do not distinguish clearly between factual and nonnative considerations. Hence,
some further development of the framework of poverty measurement is needed, but I leave
such an elaboration for another occasion.27
27 See Tungodden (1994).
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6A New Approach to Normative
Poverty Measurement!
1. Introduction
Normative poverty measures are often criticised for giving a rather arbitrary
representation of the problem of poverty in a society.2Different measures rank states
of society differently, and there seems to be no reasonable way of choosing among
the existing alternatives. In addition, normative measurement of poverty is usually
based on income data, and the relation between income and well-being is frequently
left unexplored. Hence, the lack of confidence in reported conclusions is
understandable. A reflection of this scepticism towards the flora of normative poverty
measures is the extensive use of the controversial head count statistic in normative
discussions of the problem of poverty.
But are we doomed to live with arbitrariness in normative poverty measurementft I
do not think so, and I shall claim that a lot of the arbitrariness referred to in the
!For their comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Anthony Atkinson, Sudhir
Anand, Bernt Christian Brun, Rune Jansen Hagen, Jonathan Murdoch, Ottar Mæstad, Agnar Sandmo,
Amartya Sen, Svein Aage Aanes, and participants at the Nordic Workshop on Public Economics and
Applied Welfare in Oslo (August 1993), the Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society in Vienna
(January 1994), and at seminars at the University of Bergen and Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration.
2 The reader should keep in mind that the aim of this paper is to discuss normative poverty
measurement in contrast to descriptive poverty measurement The distinction is important, though not
always well understood in the poverty measurement literature. See Murdoch (1994) for a recent
contribution to the theory of descriptive poverty measurement
3 Foster (1984) seems inclined to think so: " Hence, one conclusion ofthis survey is that the choice of
a single poverty measure involves a certain degree of arbitrariness"(p. 242).
108
poverty measurement literature is illusory. The distinctions between normative
poverty measures are usually not arbitrary, but rather related to different responses to
some unavoidable normative and factual choices faced in poverty analyses. The
arbitrariness only enters the stage when these choices are concealed in the aggregation
procedure. This may also explain why the head count measure still is extensively
used; when we count the number of poor people we are (hopefully) aware of the
normative choices implicit in the procedure. And many people find the head count
procedure, despite its defects, more attractive then an apparently arbitrary and
complex alternative approach (even though the latter satisfies some appealing
axioms).4
My aim in this essay is to present an approach to normative poverty measurement
which makes the necessary normative choices more explicit. Furthermore, the
proposed approach also presents the normative choices in a framework which is
intuitively appealing, and thereby makes it easier for people to respond to these
choices in a way that is in compliance with their normative position on this issue.
Nevertheless, some noise will still prevail in the measurement of poverty and some
readers may find this fact disturbing. I do not, because I doubt that the nature of the
problem permits us to defend anything else than a crude normative position.å
However, this is not the same as saying that any crude indicator of poverty is
reasonable, but the acceptance of a crude indicator as our aim should allow us to
make practical choices where necessary.
Various interpretations of the concept of individual poverty are possible, and I have
underlined elsewhere the relevance of normative reasoning in a clarification of this
issue.s Basically, we may relate the concept of poverty to the problem of suffering
(that may be captured by the idea of basic needs) and to the problem of unfairness
(that may be captured by the idea of a reasonable share of the resources in society),
4 See also Foster (1994): "Characterizations may indeed help in constructing and choosing among
indexes; but if the choice is between an intuitive index without an axiomatic characterization and
another index whose only merit is an irrelevant characterization, the decision is clear. A researcher's
time might be better spent identifying important aspects of the phenomenon to be measured and
showing how a particular index captures them, rather than erecting axiomatic structures around
measures that will never be used" (p. 367-368).
5 On this issue, see also Sen (1992), p. 4849.
6 See Tungodden (l994a).
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and these two aspects are the underlying foundation of the discussion in this essay.
Hence, divergent normative positions reflect disagreement about the relative
importance of these two aspects of poverty.
In section 2, I consider some of the current problems in the poverty measurement
literature. The issue of evaluative space is discussed in brief in section 3, and in
section 4, the basic framework of the suggested approach is outlined. In section 5 and
6, I apply the new framework in order to achieve a complete cardinalization of the
poverty problem, and, moreover, discuss the issue of ordinal poverty comparison.
2. Problems
I shall in this section discuss in brief some of the substantial problems in the existing
literature on poverty measurement. (At the moment I disregard the choice of
evaluative space, an issue I return to in section 3.) The poverty measurement literature
is extensive, and my aim is not at all to present an exhaustive survey'? Thus, the
discussion is confmed to the two main contributions, the Sen-measure and the class of
Foster-measures - henceforth pS and r".8
Conventionally, poverty measures have been defined on ordered versions of the actual
income vector in a society, i.e. income vectors where Yl s,..SYi s,..SYN' and N is the
total population.? For this framework, we may write pS and pF as follows:
(1) pS = 2 *t (z * - y;)(Q +1- i) ,
(Q+ I)Nz i=l
(2) pF = 1 ~(z* _ )a
N[ 'r ~ v,r .Z .=1
7 See Sen (1981) and Foster (1984).
8 However, the problems discussed are also present in other well-known poverty measures, as for
example Watts (1968) and Chakravarty (1983). For a discussion of the problem of subgroup
consistency inpoverty measurement, see Tungodden (l994b).
9 See paragraph 4.1, where I elaborate on the underlying foundation of this assumption.
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where z", Yi' Q, and a are respectiv ly the income poverty line, the income of
individual i, the number of poor peopl ,and a normative parameter. It is easily seen
from (1) and (2) that if we introduce e notational simplifications H = Q (the head
N
count ratio) and 1=t (z· :- y;) (the lative income gap), then an equal distribution
;..1 Z Q
of income in the poor part of the popul tion implies that pS = HI and pF = la .
N
2.1 Lack offocus
It has been considered uncontroversia to claim that a normative poverty measure
should be invariant to changes in the' come of the nonpoor part of the population.
The motivation has been to separate nsiderations about the badness of aggregate
poverty from a discussion of the burde of poverty in a society.IO Both aspects may
be of importance in an overall evalua on of the poverty problem, but they are two
distinct questions which certainly sho Id be analysed separately. The discussion in
this essay shall be in line with the tra . .onal framework of poverty measurement on
this issue, and concentrate on the cons ction of a normative poverty measure that
reports on the badness that follows fro the problem of poverty in society. Moreover
- for reasons that become evident in ection 3 - I shall ignore the question about
whether there are important physical psychological interconnections between the
nonpoor and the poor part of the popul tion that may make it controversial to claim
that a normative poverty measure oug t to be invariant to changes in the income of
the nonpoor part of the population. ere is, however, a closely related invariance
requirement that poses more substanti problems for the conventional framework,
and I now tum to a discussion of that is ue.
Less attention has been paid to how eh ges in the population size should fit into the
picture of normative poverty meas rement. Traditionally, normative poverty
measures are sensitive to the size of the nonpoor part of the population, because they
are defined as per-capita measures.'! ence, it follows from these measures that the
10 Sen (1981), p. 186.
11 Foster (1984), p. 232.
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problem of poverty is less severe if a nonpoor person is added to the population. This
is easily seen ifwe rewrite (1) and (2) in the following way:
(3) pS = ![(QI)+Q(I-I)Gp],
(4) F 1 [2 ]PØ:2 = N (QI) +Q(I- I)Cp ,
where Gp and Cp are inequality measures on the income distribution in the poor part
of the population (respectively the Gini coefficient and the squared coefficient of
variation).12 Both poverty measures consist of two parts inside the brackets: The flrst
part may be interpreted as the badness related to the overalllack of income in the poor
population, where income is assumed equally distributed among the poor. Obviously,
this effect depends on the number of poor people Q and the relative income gap I.
However, income is usually not equally distributed and the second part takes this
latter aspect into account. The badness that follows from a skewed distribution among
the poor (which is reflected in the inequality index) is assumed to be more severe the
larger the number of poor people in the population and the larger the relative income
gap. However, the size of the nonpoor part of the population is irrelevant for both
these aspects, and hence a change in the number of nonpoor people will only affect
the normative consideration of the poverty -problem via the fraction outside the
brackets in both (3) and (4).
Characterising the problem of poverty in per-capita terms introduces some
questionable normative properties in a poverty analysis. According to this view, the
badness from aggregate poverty may more or less be alleviated by population growth
in the nonpoor part of the population. But this claim is in some sense clearly false.
The same number of people will be poor and they will be just as poor as they were
before the population grew. Hence, the extent of suffering will surely be unchanged,
and it may seem like the per-capita approach lacks foundation in situations that
involve changes in the population size.
12See Sen (1976), p. 224 for a detailed discussion of the Gini-measure and Foster et.al (1984), p. 762
for a discussion of the squared coefficient of variation. It is (for the sake of simplicity) assumed in (4)
that a=2. I shall return to a discussion of this assumption in paragraph 2.4.
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Moreover, the nonnative implications of changes in the number of poor people are
even more disturbing. If another poo person is added into society, then - ceteris
paribus - the extent of suffering incre es. But this is not necessarily perceived as an
aggravation of the poverty problem thin the per-capita framework. Another poor
person increases the total population as well, and the second effect may dominate
the direct effect (which is to increase th extent of suffering). Thus, an additional poor
person may within this framework red ce the problem of poverty. To illustrate: The
problem of poverty decreases ace . g to pF as long as we add poor people with
income above the average income into society where everyone is poor.P Hence, the
need for a revision of the traditional pproach to normative poverty measurement
should be evident.
The empirical importance of this issue is exposed in a recent publication on human
development and structural adjustment in India.14 The poverty alleviation statistic in
this report reveals that the rate of deelin in the head-count ratio (which is a per-capita
measure) in rural segments was aroun 0.6% per year between 1970-71 and 1983.
However, because of population grow ,the number of rural poor people increased
from 206 million to 214 million over is period. Hence, we may ask what normative
importance we should attach in this c e to the decline in the head-count ratio (the
problem of the head-count ratio being i sensitive to changes in income levels is not at
issue here). On the contrary, it is not . ficult to fmd normative support for the claim
that the aggregate poverty problem of dia has been aggravated by the fact that the
number of poor people in the rural se ents increased by 8 million people.
The per-capita approach indicates som thing about the badness of the situation when
the suffering itself is equally distribu (as is illustrated in (3) and (4». And one may
argue that it is possible to find no ative support for this kind of reasoning by
entering into some kind of original posi .on, where the normative basis of the analysis
is fonned as a choice behind a veil of .gnorance.P However, this line of reasoning
13 The case is only slightly different if we ha both poor and nonpoor in a society. Alike examples
may also be given for pS.
14 Parikh and Sudarshan (1993).
15 See Harsanyi (1955) and Rawls (1971,1993) for a discussion of this social choice mechanism.
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faces some deep problems with respect to the issue of population growth, and, thus, I
doubt that the per-capita approach may be defended by such a move)6 But be that as
it may, the approach proposed in this essay may either be perceived as a different
response to the choice presented in the original position or as a separation of one
important element in the evaluation of a society. This latter interpretation seems to me
to be rather appealing: By normative poverty measurement we aim to give a
normative characterisation of the badness of a problem, namely that the well-being of
some people is below a stipulated minimum level, and in the characterisation of this
problem we avoid a further question about how to weigh the problem of poverty
against the fact that some people in society may enjoy a high level of well-betng.l?
2.2 Discontinuity at the poverty line
There is an extensive debate in the poverty measurement literature about whether we
ought to assign any importance to the fact that people cross the poverty line.18 It is for
example claimed by Sen that " ...if a transfer [from a non-poor to a poor] drags a
person from above to below that threshold while reducing the income gap of a poorer
person, it is not obvious that the overall poverty measure must invariably be expected
to decline. The poverty line has some absolute significance and to cross it is a change
of some importance't.l? Such a view is reflected in r', which experiences an abrupt
change when the size of the poor population changes. On the other hand, no
importance at all is assigned to crossing the poverty line in pP; this class of poverty
measures is smooth at the poverty line. Various arguments on this issue may be
considered, but I shall not elaborate on their validity here. The problem of both pS
and r", as I see it, is that they do not leave this normative question open to
discussion; an answer is already implicit in the proposed measures. Thus, our aim
shall be to present a framework for analysis of poverty which provides more
flexibility on this complex issue.
16 For a further discussion of this issue, see Parfit (1984).
17 See also Sen (1982), p. 159, for a discussion of the distinction between nonnative indicators and
comprehensive social welfare judgements.
18 See for example Lipton and Ravallion (1993), p. 24, Foster and Shorrocks (1991), p. 690, and Thon
(1979), p. 438.
19 Sen (1984), p. 342.
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2.3 Normalization and Information
The normalization procedure conventionally used in normative poverty measurement
weakens the informative force of these measures. Normative poverty measures are
normalized such that PE [0,1], where P =O when no one is poor in a society and
p = 1 when no one in the society has any income. The problem, within this
framework, is to have a deep cardinal understanding of for example P = 0.62 or
dP = O.l, since we are unable to transform these figures into any counterpart in
reality. Hence, if we want to "improve the effectiveness of communication" in
normative poverty analysis, we should strive for a more intuitively appealing
presentation of normative conclusions on the problem of poverty.20Otherwise, it may
easily be the case that appealing descriptive poverty measures (such as the head-count
measure) also are used as the basis for normative conclusions.
2.4 The Problematic Parameter
The Sen-measure (as presented in (1» leaves no normative flexibility to the user; the
approach gives a specific functional form for normative measurement of poverty.
However, as Kakwani points out, the Sen-measure may be seen as a member of the
following class of poverty measures.-!
(5) ps· = Q Q f(z·- y;)(Q+ 1-i)II,
<,,})II)Nz· ;=1
;=1
where f3 is the normative choice parameter. (5) becomes the Sen-measure when
f3 = 1. Hence, the feasible normative base of the approach proposed by Sen is
extended by focusing on the class of poverty measures proposed by Kakwani.
Likewise, the normative choice parameter a provides the class of Foster-measures
with some flexibility (as is seen from (2».
20 Atkinson (1987), p. 762. See also Foster (1994).
21 Kakwani (1980).
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The problem, though, is that the parameter of both pF and ps' presents the normative
choice within an ordinal framework. The only insight attained from, for example,
knowing that a > a*, is that the normative view reflected in a is more averse to
inequality than the normative view reflected in a* .22 Thus, in the absence of any
reasonable cardinal interpretation, it is hard to have any strong opinion about the size
of the parameter. But these parameters have a decisive effect on the conclusions of
normative poverty measurement. P:=3,5 and P:=10 satisfy the same axioms (and,
hence, we are indifferent between them in that respect), but they will certainly inform
us differently about the poverty problem. Which shall we choose? No easy answer is
at hand, and most people probably fmd it hard to state the alternative that is closest to
their view on this issue.
Consequently, it is urgent to provide a cardinal understanding of the important
normative choice faced in poverty measurement. In order to establish acceptance for a
cardinalization of the poverty problem, the framework of the analysis ought to be
outlined in a way which makes it easy to evaluate whether one actually agree or
disagree with the reported normative characterization of the poverty problem.
Otherwise, endorsement (or disagreement) could easily be replaced by scepticism and
doubt. The latter is probably a common response to the current framework of applied
poverty measurement, where without any further reasoning the smallest integer
satisfying some proposed transfer criteria is used as the normative parameter.23 But
why should we choose the smallest integer? Any larger real number seems equally
appropriate as long as we do not provide any further support for our choice, and the
importance of normative conclusions reached from this kind of analysis may certainly
be questioned.
2.5 Summing Up
The approach outlined in the rest of this essay deals with four problems in the current
poverty measurement literature: First, it suggests a more reasonable approach to the
measurement of poverty in cases where population size differs. This is an extremely
22 Here, I assume that the poverty measures in question satisfy the axioms that are conventionally
required in the literature.
23 Ravallion (1994) is a recent example.
116
important topic in order to make empirical poverty measurement relevant for
practitioners. Population size plays an important role in almost every case of interest,
and, thus, the per-capita approach is of limited relevance. Second, the suggested
approach provides a reasonable understanding of the property of discontinuity at the
poverty line, and, moreover, allows for flexibility on this issue. Third, it makes
cardinalization of poverty measurement more relevant, by introducing a framework
which reports on the problem of poverty in an intuitively appealing way. And fourth,
it provides a cardinal understanding of the parameter values in normative poverty
measurement.
3. Interpersonal Comparisons orWell-Being
The problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being is extensively discussed in
social choice theory.24 This issue, though, is more or less neglected in the poverty
measurement literature, where the aim has been to report on the problem of poverty
on the basis of the income distribution in a society.25The strategy is in some sense
reasonable in the light of the limited access to information that is often faced in
empirical poverty analysis, but there are important topics that may be neglected by
the choice of such a strategy. Moreover, to choose the space of income as the
evaluative space in poverty measurement may also contribute to mingle some
substantial normative and factual issues. Thus, Ishall in the following discuss poverty
measurement as the task of aggregating well-being distributions, and, hence, the issue
of interpersonal comparisons turns out to be of importance.
The message of recent social choice theory is (roughly speaking) that we have to
choose between ordinal or cardinal interpersonal comparability of well-being (if we
do not reject the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons), and, hence, the
possibility of acquiring a normative cardinalization of the poverty problem seems to
be rather limited when we choose to work with well-being distributions.26 However, I
24See Sen (1982) for a discussion ofvarious issues in this literature.
25A combination of these two approaches is preICIIl in Sen (1976).
26Ordinal interpersonal comparability allows trIDIfonnalions of the well-being function that preserve
equalities between levels of different individuals' well-being functions. Sen (1976) applies the Borda
Ranking Rule on this framework, and thereby acquires a cardinalization of the problem of poverty.
Cardinal interpersonal comparability allows transformations of the well-being function that preserve
equalities between units of different individual's well-being functions. The framework of Atkinson
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shall claim that social choice theory has overlooked an essential element in the
discussion of various feasible informational frameworks.27 Social choice theory has
explored the link between informational frameworks and social choice criteria by
assuming that the same type of interpersonal comparisons of well-being is possible
throughout the society. Hence, if you find it reasonable to state that you enjoy a
higher level of well-being than the victims of the civil war in Rwanda, then
(according to the reasoning in this literature) you also ought to be able to state
whether you enjoy a higher or lower level of well-being than-your neighbour next
door. But why should you? I perceive it as rather apparent that I am unable to do
interpersonal comparisons of well-being in the local community where I live, but I
will certainly not reject the possibility of making an interpersonal comparison of my
well-being and the well-being of the victims of the civil war of Rwanda. Moreover, I
assume, as I return to shortly, that there are relevant scales which can be used in order
to do interpersonal comparisons of well-being among people that we characterize as
poor.
Hence, I shall make the following two assumptions about the informational basis of
poverty measurement.
Assumption 1 (Identification): For every individual i it is possible to decide
whether Wi E [O,z], where Wi is the well-being oj individual i and z is the poverty
line.
Assumption 2 (Interpersonal Comparisons): The well-being oj the poor population
is defined up to the identity transformation ojthe well-being tuple.
It follows from Assumption 2 that the informational invariance requirement in this
analysis is trivial.28 The reason for this is simply that I assume that it is possible to
(1970) may indicate a feasible approach to the cardinalization of poverty within such a framework.
But, as I see it, both these infonnational frameworks are too restrictive in a discussion of the problem
of poverty, and, thus, they contribute to an unreasonable limitation of the feasible nonnative positions
that one may take up in this context, Of course, social choice theory also acknowledges the possibility
of ratio and absolute measurability, but usually these alternatives are - for good reasons - viewed as too
extreme assumptions to be imposed on the overall well-being tuple of society. For a comprehensive
discussion of interpersonal comparability in social choice theory, see Roberts (1980).
27 See also the discussion in Tungodden (1994c).
28 The poverty measures discussed in the sections S and 6 may in fact allow a stricter invariance
requirement (to wit ratio measurability), but (as I see it) there is nothing gained by considering this less
demanding transfonnation assumption.
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construct a relevant absolute scale for measuring the well-being level of people in the
poor part of the population. In fact, such a scale is implicit in the determination of the
poverty line, and, thus, the assumption does not impose any additional informational
requirement on the analysis. Various possibilities exist; the scale may for example be
dermed as the intake of nutrition, the body mass index, life expectancy, or an index
that combines various aspects of intrinsic importance.29 More important, though, is
the fact that Assumption 2 does not imply anything about interpersonal comparisons
between non-poor individuals. Thus, one may claim that it is impossible to make
interpersonal comparisons of well-being in the non-poor part of the population and
still support a cardinalization of normative poverty measurement. Hence, the
informational requirement underlying the class of poverty measures proposed in this
essay is far less restrictive than what is the case in the traditional framework of
normative inequality measurement.30
It is useful, in a discussion of poverty, to define the lowest possible level of well-
being. Ifwe for example adopt the body mass index as the scale of well-being (which
is the ratio of a person's weight to the square of her height), then individual i is at the
lower limit of survival if Wi = 12.31 However, I shall make a notational
simplification, which contributes to make the outlined approach comparable to the
conventional discussion of poverty measurement, and define .!:!!=O. (Accordingly,
readers that are not convinced about the importance of measuring poverty in the space
of well-being, may in the following simply interpret well-being as income. The
reported results should still be of interest.) Hence, we may assume that the absolute
well-being scale is represented by nonnegative reals Ro, i.e. the actual well-being
vector in society S - WS - is drawn from the set W:=U:=l~' Moreover, it is
convenient to define p =Owhen there is no poverty in the society and more generally
p E Ro, so that pA. > pB reflects that the poverty problem is viewed as more severe in
societyA than in societyB.
Finally, I assume that the location of the poverty line z in the well-being space is
predetermined. (If we adopt the body mass index, then, by way of illustration, z= 17
29 See Dasgupta (1993) f<r a discussion of some of these alternatives.
30 See. for example. Atkinson (1970).
31 See Dasgupta (1993). p. 414.
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defines people as poor if they are undernourished.) The problem of poverty
measurement may then be defined in two steps:32 First, the identification mapping
I: ~ -+ ~ defines the poverty vector W; in society S as follows:
W; (z,Ws):= {Wi e WSIWi S z}. Based on this identification mapping, the aggregation
mapping P: ~ -+ Ro assigns a single value to any poverty vector W;. The aim of the
following sections is to impose structure on the aggregation mapping, and Inow tum
to a discussion of a set of basic axioms that constitutes a reasonable foundation of
normative poverty measurement.
4. Basic Axioms
Many of the axioms outlined in this section are well-known in the poverty
measurement literature, but they are usually defmed in the income space. I redefme
them in the space of well-being, and - though the change may seem rather trivial -
there are some important implications that follow from this change of evaluative
space. Moreover, the reformulation contributes to underline the distinction between
normative and/actual considerations in poverty measurement, which is important in
order to clarify the normative foundation of the outlined framework.
The basic axioms may be separated into two main categories. Initially, Iconsider the
. axioms that are concerned with changes in people's well-being, and, then, (in the
second paragraph of the section) I extend the framework to also cover cases where
there is a change in population size.
4.1 Changes in individual well-being
I introduce the notational simplification CWAnB = (WA UWB) - (WA ("\ WB), i.e. the
subset CWAnB reflects the difference in the well-being tuples of states A and B.
Moreover, let wf refer to the well-being level of individual i in state S, i.e wt =WiB
should be interpreted as a particular individual i having the same well-being level in
states A and B.
32This two-step view on poverty measurement was introduced by Sen (1976).
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AXIOM A (The Anonymity Axiom):
a) For any i=k,1 & S= A,B: [wA -WB WB-WA &1;- I' 1;- I
W~(I;.I)=W~(I;.I)]~ P(w:) =P(W:).
b) For any i=k,1 & S=A,B: [w:=w: & WI;~WB;W,~WA &
wA =WB]~p(WA)=p(WB).
-I; -l p p
The first part of Axiom A is a well-known assumption in a great deal of modem
welfare economics, and it will also be implicit in the construction of the remaining
axioms}3 It claims that a normative poverty measure should be invariant to a
permutation of the well-being tuple in a society. The second part extends this to
include cases where people in society are replaced by new poor people with the same
level of well-being. Thus, it follows from Axiom A that it is irrelevant in a normative
evaluation of the poverty problem whether person k or person 1 is the worse off
person, i.e., the aggregate poverty measure should reflect an impartial evaluation of
the poverty problem. Hence, we may in the following work with ordered versions of
the well-being vector, Le. WS = {w: ~ ..~w: ~ ..~ w!}, 'V S. However, a similar
axiom stated in the income space (as is common in the poverty measurement
literature) is more questionable. It presupposes that everyone has the same ability to
convert income into something of intrinsic importance.
The next axiom is a straightforward reformulation of the monotonicity axiom
proposed by Sen.34
AXIOM Ml (The First Monotonicity Axiom):
Forany i & S= A B' [w~ < z w~ >w~ & {w~ w~} = CWAf"\B]~ P(WA) > P(WB),. , " , '" p p'
Thus - ceteris paribus - a(n) reduction (increase) in the well-being of a person below
the poverty line aggravates (assuages) the problem of poverty according to Axiom
Ml. Hence, by imposing this axiom on the aggregation mapping, we reject head
count as an appropriate normative poverty measure. In this framework, it matters for
33See Sen (1982) for a discussion of thisaxiom inamore general context
34 Sen (1976). p. 219.
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the normative conclusion whether people are immensely deprived or just below the
poverty line. A reformulation ofAxiom Ml in the income space would only be
uncontroversial if there in general is a monotonic relationship between well-being and
income.
AXIOM Fl (The First Focus Axiom):
Forany S=A,B: [W: =W: & NA =NB]-+P(W:)= P(W:).
The content ofAxiom Fl has been discussed to some length in paragraph 2.1, and the
normative implications of this axiom are widely accepted in the poverty measurement
literature. A normative poverty measure ought to be invariant to changes in the well-
being of nonpoor individuals, because it aims to characterize the badness that follows
from the destitution experienced by the poor part of the population.35 However, a
corresponding axiom dermed in the space of income may be more debatable, and its
relevance depends on the reasonableness of the factual claim that the destitution of
the poor part of the population is independent of the income level of the nonpoor part
of the population.
AXIOM P (The Priority Axiom):
For any i= k,1 & S=A,B: [z:i? w: >w: >wt & (w: -w:)= (wt -w:) &
{w:", w:.,} =CWAnB]-+P(W:) > P(W:).
Axiom P makes the claim that an increase (decrease) in the well-being of a poor
individual which remains poor, ought to reduce (increase) the aggregate poverty
measure more the poorer the individual in question is at the outset. In a discussion of
this claim, the distinction between well-being and income is of vital importance. One
may argue in favour of a transfer principle defined on the income space (as, for
example, a version of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle), and still reject Axiom P. A
transfer principle dermed on the income space may only be concerned with the factual
35 Axiom Fl may be somewhat controversial when we take into account the issue of unfairness in a
discussion of the badness of the poverty problem. However, I neglect this complication here (but see
Tungodden (l994a,d», and presume that the elements of unfairness related to Axiom Fl are captured
by the predetermined poverty line.
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consideration that the well-being function is concave with respect to income. Axiom
P, on the other hand, is concerned with our normative judgement related to the
distribution of suffering, and it argues that a reduction in suffering is most valuable at
low levels of well-being. Of course, these two aspects may often work in the same
direction, but they are nevertheless judgements of very different kinds. Inmy view,
we ought to accept Axiom P, but the proposed approach may easily be redefmed such
that the normative poverty measure is insensitive to inequality in well-being among
the poor.
AXIOM S (The Separability Axiom):
For any i=k,l & S=A,B,C,D: [(w:-w:)=(w;-w~) & {w:,w:}=CWAnB &
{wf ,w~} =CWcnD]--+ {p(w:) - p(w:)} = {p(W~) - p(w:)}.
By imposing Axiom S on normative poverty measurement. we take up the normative
position that the badness that follows from a person having a low level of well-being
is independent of the extent of poverty in the society in question. However, this is not
to claim separability in the underlying foundation of the well-being tuple. There is
certainly force in the argument that the well-being level of a person depends on the
well-being level of people in his or her reference group (as Sen persuasively has
pointed out), but that is mainly a factual claim which should not be intermingled with
the normative statement embodied in Axiom S.36What we are concerned with here is
the normative evaluation of the poverty problem after all physical (as well as
psychological) interconnections have been taken into account.
4.2 Changes in population size
Traditionally, less attention has been paid to how changes in the population size ought
to affect the reported poverty figures. However, we are frequently concerned with
comparisons among societies differing in population size, and. thus, in order to make
a normative poverty measure more operative, I shall establish a normative framework
36 See Sen (1973) and Broome (1991) for a general discussion of interconnections in the well-being
tuple, and Tungodden (1994b) for a discussion of some of the implications of this aspect in poverty
measuremenL
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for cases with a variable number of people. In this context, the following two axioms
should be rather uncontroversial:
AXIOM F2 (The Second Focus Axiom):37
AXIOM Ml (The Second Monotonicity Axiom):
For any i & S= A,B: [w~< z & {w~}=CWAroB]-+ P(W!»P(W:).
The intention underlying the population axioms has been elaborated in earlier
sections: We ought to avoid a hybrid poverty measure which mingles a discussion
about the badness of poverty with the distinct (though important) question about the
burden of poverty in a society. Hence, the poverty problem is considered to be
aggravated when - ceteris paribus - the number of poor people increases in a society
(Axiom M2), but it ought to be considered as independent of changes in the size of
the nonpoor part of the population (Axiom Fl).
s.A Class of Poverty Measures
The basic axioms discussed in section 4 clarify ·some substantial issues in normative
measurement of poverty, but nevertheless, the normative framework characterized by
these axioms innate a considerable amount of incompleteness in the evaluation of the
problem of poverty. If we aim for a complete cardinalization of our normative
position on this question, then we have to choose a particular functional form (among
all the candidates which satisfy these properties) as the poverty measure. This step
lacks foundation in current poverty measurement literature, and, thus, I shall in the
following outline a reasonable framework for this choice.
37 Axiom Fl makes Axiom Fl superfluous in a characterization of the normative foundation of the
class of poverty measures proposed in this paper.
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5.1 An example
Compare a society A where we have QA poor people with the same level of well-
being (Le. wt =...= W~A < z) with a reference society B where there are QB poor
people who have the lowest possible level of well-being .!!! (i.e. w:=...= w~.= .!!!).
Obviously, whether we view aggregate poverty as worse in A than in B depends on
the number of poor people in respectively A and B and the intensity of poverty inA.
It goes without saying, though, that if wt =~, then society A and B have the same
aggregate poverty when QA =QB . But what is the case when- w < wt < z? Assume
that you would argue that the poverty problem in society A and B is the same if
QB = 50. (It is for our purpose unnecessary to specify the number of poor people in
A.) Let us now introduce a society C with the same number of poor people as in A.
Neither in society C is there any inequality among the poor (Le.
wf =...= wgc < wt =...= w~ < z). Assume that in this case you claim that QB = 100
would make you say that society B and C tie with respect to aggregate poverty.
We have now moved closer to an informative representation of your normative
position on the problem of poverty. Let me illustrate: If fifty people with the lowest
possible level of well-being .!!! are added to society A (and let A+ denote the society
after this change), then you would have to claim - if you accept the basic axioms of
section 4 - that the poverty problem of A+ and C is equally bad. Hence, the difference
in severity in the poverty problem of A and C may be described by reference to the
hypothetical society B. Moreover, it also makes sense within this framework to say
that you view the poverty problem in society C as twice as bad as the poverty
problem in society A. (If the population in society A were duplicated, then the
poverty problem would be equally bad in society (A +A) and C.) Shortly, I shall
apply this line of reasoning in a discussion of the problem of selecting functional
forms, but for that purpose some new concepts are introduced.
5.2 New concepts
We may call an individual's contribution to the aggregate problem of poverty for an
individual's effective poverty (ep:). Hence, the difference between effective poverty
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(ep;) and the poverty gap (z - w;) of individual i in society S is that whereas the
former refers to the importance attached to the level of well-being of individual i in
the aggregation mapping, the latter is a pure description of the poverty problem of
individual i. Consequently, contrary to the poverty gap of an individual, an
individual's effective poverty is related to a specific normative view on the problem of
poverty.
Moreover, let the term reference poor denote an individual with the lowest possible
level of well-being ~. As indicated in paragraph 5.1, we may define aggregate
poverty in units of reference poors, and, hence, the following defmition of effective
poverty may be stated:
Definition 1 (Effective Poverty): Individual i's effective poverty is the number of
reference poors which has to be added to the population when individual i is
withdrawn from the population in order to maintain the same level of aggregate
poverty.
I shall close this section by outlining the class of poverty measures that we ought to
pay attention to in our discussion of a complete cardinalization of normative poverty
measurement, and, then, in section 6, I shall apply the intuition underlying Defmition
1 to support the choice of a particular normative position.
5.3 A Class of Poverty Measures
We may, based on the basic axioms already outlined, narrow the feasible area of the
aggregation mapping. First, it follows from Defmition 1 that:
(6) epi (wi = !!!) = 1, Vi,S.
Moreover, according to Axiom F2:
(7) ep;(wi) = 0, V wi> z & vs.
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as
Axiom S and Definition 1 imply that P(W;) = F(Lept). An appealing
normalization is then achieved by choosing to work with the following aggregation
mapping:
as
(8) P(W;) æ Lept.
i-l
(8) accentuates the appealing structure of this framework: Analogous to a head count
procedure, we just add up the assigned number of reference poors for each poor
individual in society. Hence, the normative evaluation of the poverty problem is
illustrated by reference to a particular hypothetical society. By way of illustration,
PNX(W:) = 80.000 reports that from the normative position NX, the poverty problem
of society A is considered as equally bad as in a (hypothetical) society with 80.000
poor people whom all have the lowest possible level of well-being. Moreover, if
PNX(W:+) = 120.000 reports the situation of society A following, for example, a
change in policy, then - according to the normative position NX - the policy change
has aggravated the poverty problem to the same extent as a (hypothetical) policy that
has a consequence that 40.000 non-poor people end up with the lowest possible level
of well-being. Hence, the outlined framework provides us with an intuitive
cardinalization of normative poverty measurement.
An objection to this framework, though, may be that it does not provide us with any
information about the intensity of poverty within a society. li it is reported that
pNX(W:) = 80.000, then it is impossible to know whether this poverty figure reflects
a society where 80.000 people have the lowest possible level of well-being or a
society with a much larger number less deprived poor people. However, this
information may easily be retrieved by reporting on the average effective poverty
among the poor, which straightforwardly may be defined as follows:
as
P(W;) = -4Lept, vs, Hence, P(W:) = 1 reflects that everyone in the poor part of
Q i=l
the population in society A has the lowest possible level of well-being.
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The basic axioms impose some structure on the task of assigning reference poors to
various levels of well-being. First, according to Axiom A and Axiom S, the number
of reference poors that is to be assigned to a level of well-being should be
independent of both the rest of the well-being tuple and of the position of any
particular individual in society. Hence, it follows that:
(9) epf(wf)=h(wf,z), 'V i.S,
Moreover, if we assume that 1iJ:Il h(wf ,z) = I, then it follows from Axiom P that
Wi -t-!!+ -
h(wf ,z) is a continuous function of wf on W; (though not necessarily on WS, an .
issue Ireturn to shortly)_38Nothing of importance is lost by assuming that h(wf,z) is
a differentiable function in the same region, and, hence, we may state that Axiom MI
and Axiom P imply that:
(10) :.S < 0, 'V i,S.
I
(11)
Whether h(wf,z) should be dermed as continuously differentiable on WS depends on
the normative importance assigned to the fact that people cross the poverty line. We
may formalize this normative choice by introducing a poverty line parameter d in the
following equation:39
(12) epf(wf=z)=h(z,z)æd, de[O,I), 'VS.
3 8 If h(wf .z) is discontinuous at wd e [O,z), then it follows that
lim [h(wd +e,z)- h(wd,z)] < lim [h(wf +e,z)- h(wf,z)], wf *wd e [O,z). Hence, it is
e-+O· e-+O·
rather easily seen that h(wf ,z) violates Axiom P if h(wf ,z) is discontinuous at some wd*° and
at the same time continuous at w =O. The assumption of continuity in the region close to the
reference poor is only controversial if our nonnative view attaches particular importance to the fact
that a person is lifted out of the worst possible position. (Readers that flnd this discussion difficult
should see Fig. l and Fig. 2 that are introduced shortly.)
39The poverty measure violates Axiom Ml if d = 1,and, thus, this parameter value is not permissible
in (12).
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Consequently, h(w:,z)e[d,l], 'Vw: ~z, and h(wf,z) is only continuous on WS if
d =o. The chosen size of d reflects the importance assigned to people crossing the
poverty line. Any normative view where d ~ O assigns a normative premium to the
situation where a person is lifted out of poverty. The interpretation of this normative
premium is straightforward: d = r reflects the normative view that a marginal
increase in the well-being of r poor people at the poverty line (enabling them to
escape poverty) is considered to be of the same importance for the alleviation of the
poverty problem as lifting one person with the lowest possible level of well-being ~
out of poverty. Hence, this approach enables us to present the issue of discontinuity at
the poverty line in an intuitively appealing way which adds understanding to a
problem that for a long time has not been very well understood in the poverty
measurement literature.40
The discussion in this section may be summarized by Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. It follows
from (6), (10), (11), and (12) that the feasible region for h(wJ,z) is [z-~-l] in
Fig.l and [b - f -1] in Fig. 2. The normative position of the head count measure is
represented by the straight line [a-I]; the normative position of the poverty gap





Fig. -1 No discontinuity at the poverty line (d =O).
40 This is recently underlined by Ravallion (1994), p. 5: "Another - less weU understood - issue






Fig. 2. Discontinuity at the poverty line (d = f).
The following theorem collects together the results of this sectionr'!
Theorem 1: The class of poverty measures:
o!
pew;) æ Lh(w: ,z),
;=1
where h is a decreasing, continuously differentiable and, convex function of wf on
W; and h(wf,z) E [0,1], Vw: E W;, VS, satisfies the axiomsMl, M2, Fl, F2, P, A,
andS.
41 The class of poverty measures reported in Theorem 1 is related to the class of poverty measures
discussed by Atkinson (1987) (which also covers the class of poverty measures pF discussed in
section 2), but there is a substantial distinction between how these two classes of poverty measures
treat changes in the population size. The class of poverty measures suggested by Atkinson is defined in
per-capita terms, and - as discussed in section 2.1 - this approach faces deep problems in poverty
comparisons between societies with different population size. However, this is not the case for P
(which satisfies Axiom F2 and Axiom M2). Moreover, the approach outlined here provides a powerful
setting for a discussion of the various normative positions that one may adopt within the basic
framework, and, hence, does not simply claim that our normative reasoning on this issue should be of
the kind that people may "propose measures which look belter" (Atkinson (1987, p. 755).
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Proof. Axiom Ml holds because h is a decreasing function of wf on W;. Axiom P
holds because h is a continuous and convex function in the same region. Axiom Fl
and Axiom F2 hold because P is a function of W;. Axiom A holds because h is the
same for every individual in any society, and Axiom M2 and Axiom S hold because
P is separable in the effective poverty of individuals and h(wf ,z) is independent of
sw_i•
There are poverty measures not covered by Theorem 1 that also satisfy the basic
axioms outlined in section 4 (as for example variants of P where h is not a
differentiable - though still a continuous - function of wf on W;).,But these poverty
measures do not represent distinct normative positions that should be taken into
consideration in a normative discussion of the problem of poverty.42 It suffices to
discuss P in order to provide a reasonable approximation of the various normative
positions that we may adopt within the outlined framework, and, hence, I shall in the
rest of the essay narrow the discussion to the class of poverty measures reported in
Theorem 1.
6. The Final Step
The pursuit of a complete cardinalization of the problem of poverty may be too
ambitious a aim, because the object we attempt to measure may be opaque. The
danger of overprecision in poverty (and inequality) measurement has been stressed by
Sen, who argues that "if an underlying idea has an essential ambiguity, a precise
formulation of that idea must try to capture that ambiguity rather than lose it".43
However, the ambiguity of an idea cannot defend an arbitrary representation of that
idea, and, thus, the importance of providing clarity in the foundation of the chosen
representation should be obvious. In this section, I sketch three plausible responses to
this problem.
42There may be one exception, to wit the class of poverty measures that represent the normative view
that we ought to introduce a worst off position parameter (analogue to the poverty line parameter) in
order to capture the normative premium of lifting a person out of the worst possible situation. Such a
parameter may easily be incorporated in the same way as sketched with respect to the poverty line
parameter, but it is left to the reader to make such a modification of the outlined framework.
43Sen (1992), p. 48-49. See also Sen (1973) and Foster (1994).
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6.1 A Pluralistic View
The most straightforward response is to report on the poverty problem from various
normative positions. This approach is well-known in poverty measurement literature,
but the relevance of the parameter values traditionally applied may - as I return to
shortly - be questioned. Three distinct normative positions are illustrated in Fig. 3,
where S, M, and W indicate, respectively, strong, medium and weak aversion against





Fig. 3. Three normative positions on poverty; (d =O).
These normative positions may be approximated by several classes of functions. I
indicate one solution by applying a class of polynomial functions (which is frequently
used in the poverty measurement literature). Thus, the class of normative aggregate
poverty measures may be represented as follows:
as
(13) Pp(w!)= I,[a(wf)"+b], 'fl S,
;=1
44 Of course, a corresponding figure may be drawn for cases where d ~ O.
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where n is a normative parameter, and a and b are constants. It follows from (6)
and (12), respectively, that b =1 and a = (d -1), such that pP may be written aszIt
follows:
(14)
The normative parameter n may be interpreted within the outlined framework, to wit
-
as the badness assigned to a chosen well-being level in terms of the reference poor.4S
Formally, we may write the normative choice as follows: Choose n; for some 'r in
the following equation:
(15) h(wf = 1%,z)= n~ 'rE (0,1)
n~E (0,[1+ 'r(d -1)]),
where the feasible region for n~follows from Axiom P. By combining (14) and (15),
we find that:46
S, M and W in Fig. 3 may now be approximated by substituting into (16) respectively
nf =.!.., nf =.!., n~ = 2, and d = o. The important part of this discussion, though,
2 30 2 4 2 5
is not these numbers in themselves, but the fact that we may easily discern the
45 IT we remove Axiom P, it is easily seen that p-(ADomP)(W!) = f[1 + (d -1)wf1, i.e.
i=1 z
p-(AUom P) is the total poverty gap when d =O.
46 Equivalently, the same kind of reasoning may be applied on, for example, a class of symmeuic
hyberbolas, where (when d =O) the expression corresponding to (16) is
pSH (W!) =f (z - wf) 1 ,with (J = s n~n .
;=1 z (J Wi (l-'r+n~)+n~1%
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implications that follow from the various parameter values. By way of illustration, the
interpretation of the normative position S is that thirty people with well-being level
wf = .!.z are considered to constitute the same poverty problem as one person at the
2
lowest possible level of well-being. Henee, this approach makes explicit the kind of
weighting that is already implicit in most of current poverty measurement literature,
and, thus, makes it possible to do a well-founded cardinalization of the problem of
poverty.
We may within this framework reinterpret the conventional parameter values applied
in normative poverty analysis based on the class of Foster-measures (which was
discussed in section 2 of this essay); to wit a= 2 and a = 3.47 It is easily seen from
Fig. 4 that these two parameter values do not represent very different normative
positions on the problem of poverty, and both of them may be characterized as
portraying medium aversion against inequality in well-being among the poor. Henee,
the gain achieved by reporting normative conclusions based on both of these





Fig. 4. Commonly reported ethical views on poverty.
47 In this discussion, we have to adjust for the faet that the class of Foster-measures is defined in the
income space and within a per-capita framework,
134
6.2 Further structure
An alternative response may be to look for another reasonable normative property (in
addition to the basic axioms) which can support the selection of one single measure as
the normative basis of poverty analysis. I am going to advance one such property
(without defending it), but it is important to underline that the aim of this discussion
is primarily to indicate a way of structuring normative poverty measurement, and not
necessarily to reach one single poverty measure which everyone should agree upon.
Property X: The poverty gap elasticity of effective poverty should equal the inverse
. [ s dh (z - wf) z ]of the relative poverty gap El( s)h(w; ,z) = d s = S·
'-Wi (z-W;) h (z-w;)
Property X sketches a weighting scheme where the response of effective poverty from
an increase in the poverty gap is given by the relative poverty gap. Hence, a one
percent increase in the poverty gap should according to Property X induce a
[1/ (z -zWi' )] percent increase in effective poverty (i.e. effective poverty should, for
example, increase with two percent if person i with well-being wf = ~z experiences
a one percent increase in the poverty gap).




An interesting interpretation of (17) can be achieved by applying the following
identity:
(18)
dhX(gX(wf ,z» _ dhx(gx(w: ,z» dgX (wf ,z)
d(z - w:) = dgX (w: ,z) d(z - wf) .
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If we take into account that the natural exponential function e possesses the property
of being its own derivate. then (17) follows from (18) if hX(gx(wf.z» = e,lC(Wf.a) and
dgX (wf. z) z B' . find th
.....;:;;..--'-~s...;.. = S 2' Y mtegranon we at:
d(Z-Wi) (z-wi)
(19)
where K is an arbitrary constant (6) implies that K =O. and we may thus state the
following theorem:48
S
QS _( Wi S)
Theorem 2: pX (W;) == Le a-wi • VS. is the only poverty measure within the class
i=1
o/ poverty measures P that satisfies Axiom Ml, M2, Fl, F2, P, A, S and Property X .
Proof. The necessity part of Theorem 2 is obtained by verifying that pX possesses
Property X. The sufficient part is established by checking that no other function
within this class of poverty measures possesses the same elasticity property (which
from Fig. 1 should be straightforward).
Let me close this discussion by once again reminding the reader that the intention of
this discussion was not at all to propose Property X as a fundamental normative
property. but rather to indicate how we may approach the problem of structuring
normative poverty measurement within the class of poverty measures reported in
Theorem 1. And it is important to notice that this is not an arbitrary choice of a
poverty measure within a class of poverty measures. It is a choice based on an
outlined property which we mayor may not find acceptable. Hence. if Property X
reflects a sensible normative position (and we accept continuity at the poverty line).
then Theorem 2 establishes that pX is a reasonable poverty measure to apply in a
cardinalization of nonnative poverty measurement.
48 Notice that pX (W;) is not dermed for wf = Z.
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6.3 Ordinal ranking
Interesting tools have been developed in the poverty measurement literature in order
to support an ordinal ranking of the problem of poverty in comparisons among
societies.s? Properties of a stochastic dominance relation have been used to support
poverty orderings and to reveal the relationship between the Lorenz ordering and a
poverty ordering.so In this paragraph, I sketch a similar approach for the class of
poverty measures reported in Theorem 1, and, moreover, propose an interesting
cardinal complement to the traditional approach, which probably will make the
ordinal ranking framework even more applicable for practical purposes.
Let APB stand for society A having a more severe poverty problem than society B
according to any poverty measure in the class of poverty measures P. Moreover, let
us consider continuous well-being distributions where the marginal density and
cumulative density functions ofwell-being are given by q(w) and Q(w), respectively;
i.e. both marginal density and cumulative density are expressed in number of people.
Hence, the class of poverty measures P may be written as follows:
•
(20) P(W!) =IqS(w)h(w,z)dw, 'VS.
o
We may now state the following theorem:S1
Theorem 3: For any S=A,B: [.åQA.B(w)æQA(w)-QB(w»O,'Vwe[O,z]l
.-+APB.
Proof. APB implies that:
•
(21) I (qA(w)-qB(w»h(w,z)dw > o.
o
49 See also Atkinson (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks (1988).
50 Foster and Shorrocks (1988), p. 176.
51 See also Atkinson (1987).
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It follows from (6), (10), and (12) that (21) is satisfied if L\qA,B(W) > 0, 'cl WE [O,z].
Moreover, ifwe integrate (21) by parts, it is easily seen that APB also implies that:
(22) AQA,B(Z)h(w = z,z) - jAQA,B(W) ah~Z) dw > 0,
o
Hence, the proof is established by taking into account (10), (12), and (22),
The interpretation of Theorem 3 is straightforward, As established in the first part of
the proof, the weights assigned to levels of well-being (as long as they satisfy the
basic axioms) are irrelevant for ordinal poverty comparison if the number of poor
people in society A at any level of well-being is larger than in society B. Moreover,
the second part of the theorem establishes that the weighting scheme also is irrelevant
for this purpose as long as the cumulative number of people at any level of well-being
(below the poverty line) is larger in society A than in society B. The reason is simply
that in these cases, a "deficit" of A relative to B in the marginal density of poor people
at some level of well-being is outweighed (in the normative evaluation of the poverty
problem) by a "surplus" in A relative to B at a lower level of well-being.
Theorem 3 supports ordinal ranking in some cases, but may nevertheless be too
restrictive a tool in order to reject ordinal ranking in situations not covered by this
theorem. A more general basis for ordinal ranking, though, can be established if we
adopt one particular class of functions (as for example the class of polynomial
functions discussed in paragraph 6.1), and let RV; be the set containing the range of
acceptable values for the normative parameter n; (which will be a subset of
(0,(1+ -r(d -1»). Moreover, let APRV; B stand for society A having a more severe
poverty problem than society B according to the normative positions incorporated in
RV;, i.e. APRV; B iff Pd,,.. (W:) > Pd,,.. (W:), 'cl n; E RV;.
The concept of a critical comparison value (ccv~)may now be introduced:
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Hence, by reporting on the critical comparison values we may achieve ordinal poverty
ranking in cases where Theorem 3 is unable to guide us. Consequently, we may apply
the critical comparison value to provide a broader framework for ordinal poverty
comparison.
Theorem 4: There are four feasible regimes in ordinal poverty comparison between
any two societies S =A,B:
I. ccv: = {Ø}H[APB v BPAl.
II. [ccv: il RV; = {Ø}, 3 RV; c (0,(1+ 't'(d_1)})l~[APRv: B -v BpRV:Al.
III. [ccv:cRV;, 3RV;~(0,(I+'t'(d-I)})l~[APRv:B v BpRv:Al v [_APRv:B
& _BpRv:Al.
IV. [ccv: =(0,1+ 't'(d-I)}lH W:=W:.
Proof Part I and ITof Theorem 4 follow from Definition 2, and from the fact that for
a given well-being distribution, P may be perceived as a continuous function of n:
(which it is straightforward to verify). Part III follows from the fact that this
continuous function may intersect several times for the respective well-being
distributions (which is also easily verifIed).52 Part IV follows from Defmition 2 and
AxiomMl.
Part 1 of Theorem 4 is an extension of Theorem 3, because ccv: = {Ø} may be
fulfilled in situations not covered by Theorem 3. An example may serve to illustrate
this: A comparison of the problem of poverty between W:=b~,~} and
QA [wA m(I-II.) ]
52 If we assume that d=O. then pP(n-r,W:)= ~- (-;-) ln-r +1. It follows that
iJpP(n WA) QA [I ~m(1-II.) w~]a T' p =L- _ (W,) ln-r ln(-') ~ O. The intuition of this result is
n-r ;=1 (n-r I)ln 't' z z
appearant from Fig. 4. where we see that (for example) Ils is below hw for every level of well-being
below the poverty line and above the reference poor. Hence. the number of reference poors assigned to
a level of well-being is never larger in Ils than in hw. and thus the reported overall number of
reference poors for society A may never be larger in Ils than in hw. Moreover. it is straightforward to
verify that iJl pP~n~,W:) ~O. Thus. the underlying intuition of Part ill of Theorem IV should be
n-r
apparent, and the proof is easily established by an example.
139
W:= {(z-e),(z-e),(z-e)}, where e is a small number, is notcovered by Theorem
3. Nevertheless, ccv:=o will be an empty set. Thus, this approach provides a more
complete description of the cases where we are able to attain agreement among all the
feasible nonnative positions covered by the basic framework.
But there may be feasible nonnative positions that are considered as inappropriate by
everyone in society. Part II of Theorem 4 is of considerable importance in these
cases.53 It establishes that an ordinal ranking will be endorsed byeveryone who
accepts the range of parameter values present in RV'f (and, of course, also by those
who accept a subset of these parameter values). Hence, it sketches a less demanding
approach to ordinal ranking of the problem of poverty than what is common in the
poverty measurement literature. Situations covered by Part ID of Theorem 4 may be
less structured, though it also embrace cases where there is a unique critical
comparison value. However, more research should be made in order to structure the
various cases of Partm.Part IV of Theorem 4 is trivial.
7. Final Remarks
Poverty is an important element in a normative evaluation of economic policies and
institutional reforms. Thus, the importance of acquiring a reasonable normative
criterion that characterizes the problem of poverty in a society should be apparent. In
this essay, I have argued that the per-capita approach in normative poverty
measurement lacks a normative foundation and clouds the issue at stake. Moreover, I
have presented a framework which deals with the problems of the conventional
approach, and makes explicit the normative considerations needed in normative
poverty measurement.
However, the framework outlined in this essay may be criticised for making poverty
comparison between small and large societies nonsensical. There seems to be a bias
towards the normative statement that aggregate poverty is worse in large societies
than in a small society. But that is, of course, true, because there is more suffering and
53 Notice that Part I is only a special case of Part II, to wit the case where
RV'f = (0,(1+ -r(d -I)}).
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destitution in for example India compared to Somalia. Hence, this line of criticism is
no serious objection against the proposed approach. The class of poverty measures
presented in this essay gives a cardinalization of a well-founded normative view on
the problem of poverty - in contrast to the per-capita approach which normative
foundation certainly may be questioned.
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7Distant Suffering and MoralitYl
1. Introduction
I am conscious of the fact that daily two thousand people are dying in Somalia, and
that more than one million Somalis are in danger of starvation.? Nevertheless, my
behaviour is not influenced by this information in a notable way, and I continue to
live a life in affluence (and without any immense sense of guilt). What is wrong? Or
is there anything wrong at all? Am I obliged to sacrifice my 'lightness of being' in
order to save some lives on the east coast of Africa, or is such an act only for saints
and nothing that morality demands of each of us?3
My moral intuition, though, tells me that I ought to do something. By acting, I may
easily alleviate suffering+ and that is - if I trust my intuition on these questions - a
good thing to do. Moreover, it is something I can do (at least to a certain extent)
without having to sacrifice too many things that I consider to be of substantial
l For their comments on earlier versions of this essay, I am grateful to Rune Jansen Hagen, Agnar
Sandmo, Thomas Scanlon, and Svein Aage Aanes.
2 The figures are from The Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, October 1992 (no. 4, p. 99).
They are not representative for the present situation of Somalia, but it goes without saying that even
worse figures may be reported from Rwanda. Moreover, the nature of the situation in many other
impoverished countries causes this issue to be of more general importance.
3 Maybe we shouldjoin Crane (1899): A man said to the universe: "Sir, I exist!" - "However", replied
the universe, 'The fact has not created in me a sense of obligation." (quoted inHardin (1976), p. 135).
The deeper question about the overall status of morality is not elaborated on in this essay, though, but
see Taylor (1993).
4 Some readers may question this claim, and argue that the problem in these situations is the absence of
a possibility to contribute to the improvement of the conditions of those who suffer in these countries.
Undoubtedly, there are problems of this kind, but I doubt that they completely erase the relevance of
the issue of this essay. See also Sen (1984) for a discussion of the approach of 'fantasie' (which is the
approach that neglects the problem of 'power realities' in the countries in question).
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importance in my life. Hence, it appears appropriate to ask why I am not moved by
these thoughts. What restrains me from acting in accordance with my moral intuition?
This is the puzzle that I shall discuss in the following, where I aim to provide some
understanding on the complexity surrounding my (and, I believe, many other
people's) internal conflict about suffering in the poor part of the world.5
In section 2, I indicate why our moral motivation may distinguish between distant and
near suffering. In section 3-4, I discuss whether the moral frameworks of classical
utilitarianism and contractualism may support my intuition on this issue, and in
section 5, I comment on the link between moral motivation and day-to-day action.
2. Distant Suffering and Moral Motivation
What may motivate the claim that "[s]uffering outside one's own country just is not
something one has a duty to help alleviate, because those suffering belong to a
different society, and hence to a different moral community"?6 Are there any morally
relevant differences between suffering in, respectively, my own society and distant
poor countries that can provide support for such a seemingly arbitrary narrowing of a
person's moral community? Two aspects may be of importance in this context, and I
shall consider them in brief in this section. We may call them the issue of
communication and the issue of co-operation.
The issue of communication may indicate an important distinction between our moral
motivation towards distant and near suffering. If we endorse the view that morality
ought to be linked to our ability to sympathise with others (as claimed by, among
others, Hume), then our moral motivation will be strongly connected to the extent that
we communicate and identify with those who suffer. In this respect, distance
undoubtedly plays an important role. People in distant countries are (obviously) not
5 Suffering in distant affluent societies raises some further complex moral questions. May I for
example claim that the situation of men in the Harlem region of New York - who have less chance of
reaching the age of 40 than Bangladeshi men have - is outside my mom} sphere because this suffering
takes place in one of the most prosperous cities of the world? (See Sen (1992), p. 114-115 for a
discussion of these figures.) The citizens of New York have the resources to alleviate the suffering in
Harlem, but it is a matter of fact that they - for some reason - do not take advantage of this possibility.
Hence, we may question the mom} relevance of the fact that this suffering takes place in an affluent
society. However, in this essay, I concentrate on the more straightforward problem of our moral
obligations with respect to suffering in distant poor parts of the world
6 This claim is also discussed in Dower (1991), p. 279.
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part of our daily life in the same way as people in our own society, and, thus, we are
more or less unable to receive by communications their inclinations and sentiments,?
We are not connected to them in a way that makes it necessary for us to argue and
defend our way of living as a response to their claims. There exist no channels
through which people in distant poor countries may easily question our position and
we are obliged to respond. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that we acquire more
understanding and sympathy for people who suffer in the local community than for
people in distant regionsf and, hence, it follows inevitably that the moral motivation
derived from the property of sympathy will concentrate on the alleviation of suffering
in our own community?
The issue of co-operation has been stressed by (among many others) Rawls and
Gauthier, though, as I return to shortly, they deviate on the importance attached to this
source of moral motivation.t? In defending the view that the distribution of income
ought to be regulated by the basic institutions of society, Rawls claims that "the well-
being of each depends on a scheme of social co-operation without which no one could
have a satisfactory life")1 Correspondingly, Gauthier claims that "we shall show that
under plausible conditions, the net advantage that constrained maximizers [Le.
persons who are disposed to comply with mutually advantageous moral constraints]
reap from co-operation exceeds the exploitative benefits that others may expect. From
this we conclude that it is rational to be disposed to constrain maximizing behaviour
by internalizing moral principles to govern one's choices")2 Hence, both Rawls and
Gauthier motivate their line of reasoning by claiming that some scheme of obligations
is needed in order to acquire the feasible benefits of co-operation. But it is probably
not too controversial to assume that our well-being is more or less independent of any
7 Clearly, this problem is even more pressing with respect to our relationship to future generations.
8 See also Tyler and Dawes (1993) for a discussion of the relationship between group identity and the
r,rception of justice principles.
Notice, though, that this is not a problem for the line of reasoning that rely on the property of
sympathy in moral questions, because - within this setting - we do not have any reason to contribute to
the alleviation of suffering anywhere: "[T]OOultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be
accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of
mankind". (Stated by Hume in the First Appendix to the Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
(see Wiggins (1987), p. 118». Thus, there does not exist any rational scheme of sympathy, and, hence,
we should not feel any sense of guilt if our behaviour is not influenced by facts about suffering in
Somalia (or anywhere else). Our behaviour is guided by our desires, and our desires are beyond
rational evaluation.
10Rawls (1971,1993) and Gauthier (1986).
11Rawls (1971), p. 103.
12Gauthier (1986), p. 15.
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co-operation with those who suffer in Somalia,13 and, thus, this line of reasoning
seems to make leeway for a distinction between distant and near suffering in moral
reasoning. The alleviation of near suffering may very well contribute to improve the
well-being of the nonpoor part of the local community, because (by way of
illustration) we may thereby avoid riots or reduce violence. This fact may motivate us
to establish a scheme of moral obligations that requires us to contribute to the
alleviation of near suffering, but - at the same time - does not involve any obligations
with respect to distant suffering.
However, contrary to Gauthier, Rawls also stresses the idea of impartiality (in
addition to the idea of mutual advantage) in discussing the underlying motivational
sources of his framework,14 and if we take this aspect into account, it becomes less
plausible to claim that the Rawlsian framework does not impose any obligations on us
with respect to distant suffering. I shall return to a discussion of this source of
motivation in section 4, where I elaborate on the moral framework of contractualism
(which is closely related to the Rawlsian framework). But, that is to say, the sources
of moral motivations discussed in this section are undoubtedly of utter importance in
our lives, and, hence, we may expect that moral theories not founded on these sources
more easily involve moral arguments that are in conflict with our conventional
opinions. Thus, an essential part of the following discussion will be to examine other
plausible sources of moral motivation, and, moreover, to discuss why they seem to
play such an insignificant role in our lives. I start by examining the framework that
has dominated the arena of moral reasoning for the last two hundred years.
3. Classical Utilitarianism
Moral questions are in classical utilitarianism judged solelyon the basis of changes in
the aggregate amount of well-being, and an act is characterised as good if it
contributes to increase the overall amount of well-being in society.P This simple
algorithm for moral reasoning is based on the view that well-being is the only aspect
13This claim is obviously imprecise, because it does not clarify the underlying interpretation of the
concept of well-being. As should become evident in section 4, a comprehensive understanding of the
concept of well-being (incorporating our full humanity) may support co-operation with people who
suffer in distant regions on the basis of this source of moral motivation.
14Rawls (1993), p. 16-17.
15 Here, I ignore the discussion about how to interpret well-being within the utilitarian framework. On
this issue, see Sen (1982).
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of value, and, thus, the source of moral motivation within this setting is the possibility
to bring about the most valuable states of affairs.l''
It follows straightforwardly that distance (in time and space) has no deep-rooted
moral relevance within the classical utilitarian framework (though, as I return to
shortly, it may play an instrumental role in. establishing moral rules that contribute to
the fulfilment of the classical utilitarian end). According to classical utilitarian
reasoning, we ought to bring about as much improvement in_overall well-being as
possible - independent of where the increase in well-being takes place. Hence, the
difficulty of making interpersonal comparisons aside, it seems like the classical
utilitarian framework demands us to accept a substantial reduction of our own level of
well-being if it contributes to an improvement in the well-being of those who suffer in
the poor parts of the world (whether it should be distant or near). In the words of
Singer:" .. .1 and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as
possible ...perhaps ...tothe point at which by giving more one would cause oneself and
one's dependants as much suffering as one would prevent in [Somalia]")7
However, this may be too hasty a conclusion about the classical utilitarian scheme of
moral obligations towards distant suffering, and some further elaboration on the
structure of this framework may turn out to be of a certain interest for our discussion.
Frequently, the classical utilitarian framework has been characterised as an
overdemanding moral theory (and the claim of Singer probably manifests this view),
because it claims that we ought to bring about the most valuable states of affairs by
every single act we perform. This difficulty reflects the well-known problem of Mill
on how to define a distinction between expedient acts (Le. acts that it would be good
to do, but not wrong not to do) and just acts (i.e. acts that it would be wrong not to
do).18 The possibility explored by some authors is to obtain a reasonable solution to
this problem by appealing to the fact that a claim about classical utilitarianism as a
reasonable moral framework does not necessarily imply anything about the
appropriateness of the classical utilitarian decision procedure.l? The idea is simply
that classical utilitarianism (in the words of Parfit) may be an indirectly self-defeating
16 There are some other possible interpretations of the foundation of classical utilitarianism. On this
issue, see Kymlicka (1990) and Tungodden (1994a).
17Singer (1972), p. 234.
18Mill (1861).
19 On this issue, see Kymlicka (1990).
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theory, Le. that the end of classical utilitarianism will, on the whole, be less well
served by applying a classical utilitarian decision procedure.20 The classical utilitarian
decision procedure, applied to every act we perform, may be in conflict with essential
elements of a good life (like the ability to make personal commitments), and, hence, it
may turn out to be a failure - in terms of the classical utilitarian end - to apply the
classical utilitarian decision procedure in day-to-day action. But if that were the case,
then the classical utilitarian framework demands that we apply a different decision
procedure, to wit the one that contributes most efficiently to the achievement of the
aims of classical utilitarianism.U The structure of this other decision procedure may
(for some reason) be less demanding than the classical utilitarian decision procedure,
and, thus, the classical utilitarian framework may escape the claim of being an
overdemanding moral theory.
This other decision procedure may allow distance to become a relevant parameter in
moral reasoning, and, thus, the conclusion of Singer does not follow straightforwardly
from the classical utilitarian framework. In order to clarify the appropriate scheme of
moral obligations within the classical utilitarian framework, we have to examine
various feasible moral decision procedures in the light of the classical utilitarian end. I
shall not pursue this line of reasoning, though, because I doubt that it provides an
appropriate defence for the real problem of classical utilitarianism. Classical
utilitarianism claims that if the overall increase in well-being is the same in two
situations, then it does not matter whether the increase in well-being takes place as a
significant improvement in the life of a person who is suffering or as an insignificant
improvement in the well-being of a large group of very well-off people. This claim,
which is about the structure of value, cannot be escaped by appealing to the
possibility of defending a non-utilitarian decision procedure within this setting. Even
though it may turn out that the classical utilitarian framework implies an appealing
non-utilitarian decision procedure in day-to-day action, we cannot escape the
conclusion that the classical utilitarian framework is indifferent with respect to
whether the improvement in well-being takes place in the life of a person who is
suffering or in the life of a well-off person.
20 Parfit (1984).
21 Hence, classical utilitarianism is not a directly self-defeating theory; once again, see Parfit (1984).
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Hence, I find it implausible that the classical utilitarian framework represents a
satisfactory foundation for moral reasoning. Undoubtedly, it captures one important
argument that ought to be taken into account inpondering on moral problems, namely
that - ceteris paribus - by increasing the overall amount of well-being in society we
contribute to bring about a more valuable state of affairs. But at the same time it is in
deep conflict with our moral intuition on other elements of the structure of the realm
of value, and, thus, we shall turn to a discussion of an alternative moral framework
that seems to provide a more reasonable setting for moral reasoning.
4. Contractualism
The source of moral motivation in contractualism is our (presumed) desire for
justifying our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject (where
reasonableness is related to individuals' reflected judgement of the situation).22 A
sensible way of justifying one's acts - according to the framework of contractualism -
is to see whether these acts could have been incorporated in a (hypothetical) general
agreement among informed and unforced individuals. If this is not the case, then the
act in question is considered wrong. Obviously, aggregate considerations should
constitute an important part of the judgement of the reasonableness of an act, but (and
this is the substantial deviation from the classical utilitarian decision procedure)
changes in the overall amount of well-being have no exclusive claim in
contractualism. Hence, the source of moral motivation in classical utilitarianism - to
wit to bring about more valuable states of affairs - plays an indirect role in the
contractualistic framework, though it is not the ultimate source of moral motivation in
this line of reasoning.
In order to derive any implications from the framework of contractualism for distant
suffering, we have to elaborate on how to define the scope of the desire for
justification. Scanlon claims that we have a desire for being "in actual agreement with
the people around us",23 and a hasty conclusion may then be to say that this
framework claims that we do not have to include the people of Somalia (or anyone
else in distant regions) in our scheme of moral obligations. But Scanlon then goes
further and argues that no one shall fall outside the protection of morality because
22Scanlon (1982), p. 116.
23Scanlon (1982), p. 116.
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they are not able to contribute any benefits to the other participants: "[T]he absence of
these capacities alone does nothing to undermine the possibility of a justification of a
being".24 Hence, it is the possibility of justification that is perceived as the relevant
criterion to be applied in order to settle the appropriate scope of morality, where the
possibility of justification is assumed to depend on our ability to have a clear sense of
which things can be said to make the situation better or worse for that being.
Consequently, it follows straightforwardly that the scope of contractualism
incorporates people in distant regions.25
But why should we all be moved by a desire to justify our actions whenever there is a
possibility for justification? Are we guaranteed that moral reflection will persuade us
to transform any possibility for justification into a desire for justification? It is beyond
the scope of this essay to provide a general answer on this complex issue, but if we
narrow the discussion to the case in question, namely distant suffering, I believe a
glimpse of an answer may be perceived. If we really reflect upon the possibility for
justifying our actions to people that are dying and starving in Somalia, we also truly
recognise how effortlessly we are able to alleviate some immense suffering without
having to sacrifice anything of comparable moral significance. And if this contrast in
significance in the involved gains and losses is perceived, the desire for justification
is - I shall claim - unavoidable. Why? Because, then, to neglect such a fact (by
excluding distant suffering from what we perceive as our moral sphere) would be a
"denial of an essential aspect of ourselves ...of our full humanity".26 Thus, the
recognition of this fact (spurred by a perception of a possibility for justification) will
urge us to have a desire for justifying our actions to people who suffer (independent
of the distance in question).
It seems to me that the normative implications of this framework are rather
straightforward and unquestionable in the context of distant suffering: We ought to
accept a substantial reduction in the standard of living if this would contribute to an
improvement in the well-being of people who suffer. There may be some leeway for
partial considerations in such an agreement, Le. we may argue that individuals
24 Scanlon (1982), p. 115.
25 However, this conclusion does not involve any claim about the content of the (hypothetical)
agreement, and, thus, it does not say anything about the extent of our obligations on distant suffering.
Shortly, I return to this issue.
26Nagel (1991), p. 19-20.
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entering the (hypothetical) contract agree that one is not morally obliged to sacrifice
something of considerable moral importance in order to save lives or avoid starvation
elsewhere. But nevertheless, the framework of contractualism appears to indicate that
our obligations with respect to distant suffering are extensive, and, thus, it seems to be
in deep conflict with conventional behaviour in our society.
s.Moral Motivation and Action
Why are we then not moved by the reasoning of contractualism? Why are we not
motivated to act by the possibility of being able to justify our actions to others on
grounds they could not reasonably reject (and by the possibility to bring about more
valuable states of affairs)? Some people are, and they sacrifice the affluence we strive
for and attempt (in one way or another) to contribute to the alleviation of human
suffering in the world. And I doubt that anyone would claim that their lives are less
good than ours. In fact, the integrity and completeness of their lives sometimes
overwhelm us (or at least me), and - in my view - makes it plausible to claim that
these features are the ultimate ends of a human life.27But what about the rest of us?
Why are we not inspired to seek these ends, which from a distance seem so supreme?
One obvious (though not unquestionable) explanation is that we lack "moral
education".28 The frameworks presented in the preceding sections appeal to abstract
reasoning and thorough reflection on moral questions, and it may be the case that we
partly lack the ability to seriously reflect on moral problems. But even among people
who have the opportunity to reflect and reason about these questions do moral
arguments usually not spur any notable action. We may, of course, argue that a
modern and complex world makes it more difficult to know which acts to perform in
order to behave in accordance with one's moral beliefs, but I doubt that this problem
can provide a satisfactory explanation on the lack of action with respect to distant
suffering.
27I have expressed a somewhat deviating position on this issue in Tungodden (1994b), where I stress
the 'problem of space' and 'the problem of compatibility' in the realm of value. However, it may be the
case - though not necessarily - that these two divergent arguments coincide at a certain level of
abstraction, but it is beyond the scope of this essay to elaborate on this issue.
28See Scanlon (1982), p. 117, and Kymlicka (1990), p. 265-267.
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The deeper problem is (as I see it) 'that even if we managed to attain a sustainable
desire for justification, we usually would be unable to seek the corresponding desire
fulfilment. There is (in Nagel's terms) a division within each individual between the
personal and the impersonal standpoint,29 and when the desire for justification is
mainly related to the latter standpoint, everyday actions are inevitably governed by
the personal standpoint. Therefore, for most people, the personal standpoint will
overrule a sustainable desire for justification in their day-to-day behaviour. This is a
fact that may explain why our behaviour is not influenced by knowledge about
immense suffering in Somalia (or other distant regions), and which indicates the
importance of establishing international institutions that can commit us to the moral
obligations that we endorse when we take up the impersonal standpoint.
6. Final Remarks
Four sources of moral motivation have been discussed in this essay, and it turns out
that they have rather different implications for the question of our moral obligations
towards distant suffering. If sympathy and mutual advantage constitute the underlying
foundation of moral reasoning, then (as debated in section 2) distant suffering should
not pose any internal conflict within each of us. None of these sources of morality
demands us to sacrifice anything of substantial importance in order to improve the
well-being of (for example) those who suffer in Somalia, and, thus, they do not
support any substantial change in our conduct on this issue. On the other hand, the
implications of endorsing the framework of classical utilitarianism and contractualism
are demanding, and (as indicated in section 3 and 4) the moral scheme of obligations
they impose on us seems to be rather extensive. Thus, the presence of an internal
conflict in our lives is understandable if all these four sources of moral motivation
play an important role in our reasoning on this issue.
It may, of course, be claimed that the line of reasoning of classical utilitarianism and
contractualism is flawed, and that we only should pay attention to demands derived
from sympathy and mutual advantage. I have doubts about the appropriateness of this
claim, though I have argued (in section 3) that the framework of classical
utilitarianism poses some deep problems, and, moreover, that the implications of this
framework are less evident than they seem to be on the face of it. Still, I believe that
29Nagel (1991).
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the source of moral motivation stressed by classical utilitarianism, namely the
possibility to contribute to bring about a more valuable world, has some relevance,
but it seems to me to that this element is more appropriately captured within the
setting of contractualism.
Two substantial problems are present within the framework of contractualism; first,
what is the content of the hypothetical agreement that shall reflect our scheme of
moral obligations, and, second, how are we to acquire the desire for justifying our
actions to the other members of our moral community? In the context of distant
suffering, though, the first problem seems to be rather trivial, and, thus, the discussion
has primarily been about issues related to the second problem. In this debate I have
indicated the relevance of international institutions, and - perhaps most important -
the significance of making leeway for moral reflection in our lives.
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